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FROM THE EDITORIAL TEAM

Welcome to the Volume I of the Second Edition of the Saber and Scroll Journal!

As the Saber and Scroll Journal enters into its second year of publication, we are so pleased to have such a warm response and stable journal team. While the last year has been filled with changes, we have done our best to bring you the best possible journal that we can put together and this edition is no different. It has been only through the support of the Saber and Scroll members that we have been able to be successful into a second year. We thank those who have volunteered in the past and our present volunteers as well as the historians who have submitted their work for the journal.

As we normally do with the first journal of the year, this journal was an open topic. Every author in this volume is a member of the American Public University System community. It is the best American Public University System's History and Military History Departments have to offer from undergrads to faculty and from Ancient Greece to the American Civil War.

With that said, we hope you enjoy the Winter Issue of the Saber and Scroll Journal.

Your Journal Team

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DEFENDERS OF THE FAITH: AUGUSTINE, AQUINAS, AND THE EVOLUTION OF MEDIEVAL JUST WAR THEORY

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Christianity has always had a difficult relationship with the concept of war. After all, it is impossible to follow Christ's command to "love one's neighbor" on the battlefield. Indeed, "turning the other cheek" in such a situation is very likely to allow one to meet God face to face. Christian pacifism was particularly prevalent in the early years of the Church, when many Christians steadfastly refused to join the Roman army, a move that caused governmental authorities some concern. As the empire began to crumble in the third century, the Christian repudiation of violence eventually led to persecution by the state. Guided by the pacifist theology supported by the early theologians Origen and Tertullian, many Christians went meekly to their deaths, winning the crown of martyrdom.

By the fourth century, however, the relationship between Christianity and the Roman state had radically changed. Under the protection of Constantine the Great, Christianity had not only achieved legitimacy, but had also become an important arm of the state. Later, under Theodosius the Great, Christianity became the official religion of the empire, effectively marginalizing the pagan belief systems that had once tried to destroy it. However, with this political victory came a host of theological problems, including the question of whether or not Christians were permitted to wage war. The attempt to reconcile Christ's injunctions against violence with the unfortunate necessity of war resulted in the development of what philosophers now call the "just war theory," the conditions under which war can be waged without sin. It is fitting that the first great philosopher to write about the just war, Augustine of Hippo, lived during the death throes of the Roman Empire, in a world plagued by the strife of nations. Over eight hundred years later, the man who would further develop this theory, Thomas Aquinas, lived in a world where warfare had assumed a truly spiritual function through the concept of the crusade and the blending of monastic and knightly traditions. Faced with this new idea of positive warfare, Aquinas reinterpreted Augustine's theology to fit this context.

When discussing Christianity and war, modern pacifists tend to focus on portions of the New Testament that specifically forbid any type of violence, the most famous of which is Christ's command to "not resist an evil person. If someone strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also." (Matthew 5:39) Almost as famous is his rebuke to Peter in Gethsemane after the apostle struck a servant with his sword: "Put your sword back in its place," Jesus said to him, "for all who draw the sword will die by the sword." (Matthew 26:52) These isolated comments would seem to confirm that Christians are absolutely forbidden from taking part in any sort of violent action, especially when paired with Christ's meek acceptance of death at the hands of his enemies. Yet curiously, alongside these injunctions are examples of acceptance of soldiers and their violent profession. John the Baptist, for instance, does not denounce the soldiers who come to him as "baby-killers" and demand that they give up their swords, but tells them "Don't extort money and don't accuse people falsely—be content with your pay." (Luke 3:14). Similarly, when the centurion came to Jesus asking him to heal his servant, Jesus told the crowd, "I have not found anyone in Israel with such great faith." (Matthew 8:11) Then there is Jesus' own use of violence in a righteous cause:

When it was almost time for the Jewish Passover, Jesus went up to Jerusalem. In the temple courts he found men selling cattle, sheep and doves, and others sitting at tables exchanging money. So he made a whip out of cords, and drove all from the temple area, both sheep and cattle; he scattered the coins of the money changers and overturned their tables. To those who sold doves he said, "Get these out of here! How dare you turn my Father's house into a market!" (John 2: 13-16)

Indeed, prior to going to Gethsemane, when the disciples tell him that they have brought two swords, Jesus does not berate them for bearing weapons, but merely says, "That is enough." (Luke 22:38) So the New Testament is not a paean to non-violence; rather, there is no strict conclusion on these issues and the Christian's approach to questions of the morality of violence seems to depend on the circumstances in which he finds himself.

Though many historians have tried to characterize the early Church as broadly anti-military, a deeper look at the history reveals a far more complicated situation. Some Christians seem to have been serving in the Roman military throughout the second

and third centuries while others refused to on the basis of their faith. That being said, the Church fathers of this period tend to prefer that Christians avoid military service for the good of their souls. In the late second century, Tertullian connected military service with idolatry, in part because it involved the Christian in traditional pagan worship. He relies on Christ's rebuke to Peter in Gethsemane to support his pacifism:

Shall it be held lawful to make an occupation of the sword, when the Lord proclaims that he who uses the sword shall perish by the sword? And shall the son of peace take part in the battle when it does not become him even to sue at law?...Shall he carry a flag, too, hostile to Christ? And shall he ask a watchword from the emperor who has already received one from God?¹

The third century theologian Origen held similar views on violence and the Christian:

[Christ] nowhere teaches that it is right for His own disciples to offer violence to any one, however wicked. For He did not deem it in keeping with such laws as His, which were derived from a divine source, to allow the killing of any individual whatever.²

Though both these men admitted that Christians were serving in the Roman army during their times, they certainly believed that a true Christian should avoid a way of life so seemingly antithetical to the commands of Christ.

By the late third century, these theological musings must have seemed rather moot. The strains of empire were taking their toll on the Roman state and more and more often, the Christians found themselves as the scapegoats. The general attitude of "don't ask, don't tell" which had prevailed during the Pax Romana was followed by the empire-wide persecutions of first Decius and then Diocletian. Christians were not even fulfilling the basic requirement of worshiping the divine emperor; how could they be expected to serve loyally as soldiers of Rome? As the Church fought to survive the persecutions, questions of the morality of military service must have been far from pressing.

All this would change when Constantine came to power in the early fourth century. After his victory over Maxentius at Milvian Bridge, Constantine acted quickly to legalize and support the religion that he believed had given him victory. A year after Milvian Bridge, Constantine issued the Edict of Milan which allowed anyone "who wishe[d] to observe Christian religion [to] do so freely and openly, without molestation."³ Constantine would go to great lengths to show his preference for Christianity, granting its bishops land and wealth, making them part of his circle of advisors, and enforcing the decisions of their councils. Scholars continue to debate what exactly he hoped to achieve through this patronage, but what is clear is that Constantine set Christianity on the path to dominance in the Empire, a dominance that was achieved by the end of the century when Theodosius made Christianity the official religion of the empire. Throughout this process, the once-disenfranchised Christians were now considered to be full citizens of the empire and thus were expected to aid in its defense. After centuries of mere discussion, Christian theology would now have to grapple with the problem of war.

The theologian who would take on this challenge and thus give birth to the concept of the "just war" was Augustine of Hippo. Born in 354 in North Africa to a pagan father and a Christian mother, Augustine was raised in a world where rival religions were struggling for the soul of the empire. This struggle was reflected in Augustine's own spiritual journey; he initially rejected the faith of his mother Monica, seeking answers to his questions about human nature in the dualist philosophy of Manichaeism. Eventually, however, he returned to Christianity, being instructed and baptized by Ambrose of Milan in 386. Soon after, he would return to North Africa with the intention of building a monastic community in the desert and living there in prayerful seclusion. But that was not to be, for he would be "shanghaied" into becoming the bishop of Hippo, whose Christian community needed his learning to guide them. In the over thirty years that he was bishop, Augustine would produce more than one hundred works in Latin that would become the foundation for Western Christian theology. Indeed, he wrote so much over such a long period of time that he felt it necessary to publish some retractions at the end of his life to "set the record straight."

Augustine was certainly no stranger to the horrors of war. In his lifetime, the Western Empire began to disintegrate under the weight of multiple invasions by Germanic tribes. In 410, Augustine, like most Romans, was aghast to learn that the Visigoths had sacked Rome, signaling the beginning of the end of civilization in the West. Naturally, those pagans who remained in the empire blamed these misfortunes on Rome having abandoned its traditional gods. Never one to back down from a challenge, Augustine took up his pen to refute them. His work entitled *Concerning the City of God* against the Pagans is a defense of Christian truth in the face of such disasters. It also serves as a synthesis of Augustine's thoughts on politics, including the function of war in a

Christian world. Although Augustine had addressed the issue of just warfare in some of his earlier works, it is in *The City of God* that this concept is presented in its finished form.

Augustine views the lack of worldly peace as an obvious result of man's fall from grace. He is the great developer of the Christian concept of "original sin," which he defines as the human preference for the inferior pleasures of the physical world, such as food, human love, and wealth, as opposed to the higher, spiritual pleasures, such as loving God and living morally. When discussing the peace that God promised Israel in the Old Testament, he writes, "But if anyone hopes for so great a good as this in the world, and on this earth, his wisdom is but folly."⁴ According to Augustine, there can never be true earthly peace so long as human beings exist in a state of sin. As such, the wars of secular society are waged merely for the enjoyment of inferior secular pleasures: "Thus, the earthly city desires earthly peace, albeit only for the sake of the lowest kind of goods; and it is that peace which it desires to achieve by waging war."⁵ The taint of sin makes the ideal of true everlasting peace unattainable; man must transcend his worldly nature in order to achieve it.

However, Augustine is quick to point out that earthly victory in a war and the peace that follows it are "gifts from God" and form the basis for the relationship between secular society and the Church.⁶ The Church needs the stability that secular society provides so that it can perform its function, which is to lead people to God. In accepting this earthly peace, the Church places itself under the direction of secular government in all matters that are unconnected to the faith and "makes no scruple to obey [its] laws," which would necessarily include the declaration of war.⁷

In this context, Augustine argues that Christians should not refuse to join the army simply because the role of a soldier entails the use of violence. For him, peace is indeed worth fighting for. However, Christians must fight the enemies of the state in the correct frame of mind, remembering that their purpose in fighting is neither the joy of slaughter nor the chance to plunder, but the establishment of peace, however ephemeral it might be. Augustine first addressed this issue in a letter to a friend who was afraid that his vocation as a soldier might lead him to damnation. He assuaged his friend's fears with the following words:

Peace should be the object of your desire; war should only be waged as a necessity, and waged only that God may by it deliver men from the necessity and preserve them in peace...Therefore, even in waging war, cherish the spirit of a peacemaker, that, by conquering those whom you attack, you may lead them back to the advantages of peace.⁸

In *The City of God*, Augustine further develops this theme by describing the attitude of the righteous man towards war:

But the wise man, they say, will wage just wars. Surely, however, if he remembers that he is a human being, he will be much readier to deplore the fact that he is under the necessity of waging even just wars. For if they were not just, he would not have to wage them, and so there would then be no wars at all for a wise man to engage in. For it is the iniquity of the opposing side that imposes upon the wise man the duty of waging wars...⁹

Thus, even the just war is a necessary evil, fought only for the purpose of preventing greater evils. The Christians who engage in such wars must therefore remember to fight according to what Augustine calls the "law of charity;" that is, with compassion and without malice.

Thus, the first criterion for a just war is its motivation: the establishment or preservation of earthly peace. To that end, Augustine goes on to establish the second criterion: the initiation of war by a legitimate authority. It is this declaration by a higher power that removes the stain of sin from a soldier's violent actions provided, of course, that the soldier is behaving in accordance with the precepts of the first criterion. Augustine specifically states that "when the soldier, obedient to the power under which he has been lawfully placed, slays a man, he is not guilty of murder..."¹⁰ For Augustine, Christ's rebuke to Peter at Gethsemane was not for his violent act, but for perpetrating such an act without Christ's authorization. That authority also need not be merely terrestrial; Augustine addresses divinely sanctioned violence in the Old Testament, such as the wars of the Israelites in the Promised Land, by stating, "And if this is true when the command is given by a general, how much more is it when it is given by the Creator!"¹¹ Without the endorsement of such a legitimate authority, no war can be truly just.

Augustine's just war must have both the correct motivation and the appropriate authorization. What then constitutes a just war to Augustine? It seems that the only war that Augustine would unequivocally support would be a war of defense against an aggressor. When discussing the early wars of Rome, Augustine claims that the Romans "were compelled to resist the savage

incursions of their enemies; and they were compelled to do this not by greed for human praise, but by the necessity of defending life and liberty.”¹² In the case of offensive wars, The City of God is less clear. However, one of Augustine’s earlier works, Questions on the Heptateuch, certainly implies that an offensive war is entirely just in the following circumstances: “if some nation or some state which is warred upon has failed either to make reparation for an injurious action committed by its citizens or to return what has been wrongfully appropriated.”¹³ Very few secular wars can uphold these criteria. However, Augustine justifies the ancient wars of the Israelites, waged under God’s authority, as just because the Israelites “acted not in cruelty, but in righteous retribution, giving to all what they deserved, and warning those who needed warning.”¹⁴ The justice of these wars depended on their divinely ordained nature; God promised the Holy Land to the Israelites and the Israelites had to conquer it to fulfill God’s plan. Yet even these wars were primarily secular in nature in that they were fought for territorial and political domination.

Augustine never seems to have considered the concept of religious war as being relevant to his discussion. To him, war is a purely secular activity that, although sometimes necessary, is always regrettable. It is ironic, then, that Augustine’s words became the basis for justifying a war with a distinctly religious character: the First Crusade.

In the seven centuries separating Augustine and the crusading movement, the West had fallen to the Germanic hordes (Augustine himself had died while his city was besieged by the Vandals) and a new fusion of Roman and Germanic cultures had been accomplished. The greatest embodiment of this cultural exchange was, of course, the reign of Charlemagne, the first Frankish emperor of the West. According to his biographer, Einhard, Charlemagne’s favorite book was Augustine’s Concerning the City of God and he takes great pains to paint the king of the Franks not as a mere seeker of loot and glory like earlier Germanic kings, but as a fighter of just wars to keep the earthly peace, especially against non-Christian enemies like the pagan Saxons and the Muslims of Spain. Whether Charlemagne truly embodied Augustine’s ideas of warfare is debatable; after all, Einhard himself admits that he has a considerable bias in favor of the king. Still, Charlemagne’s example would prove to be vital to maintaining the idea of just warfare into the High Middle Ages.

By the year 900, the earthly peace achieved by Charlemagne had been shattered by his successors as they divided his empire amongst themselves. New threats, particularly the raids of the Northmen, would create further chaos and inspire a new military ideal: chivalry. Based on the concept of heavy cavalry and wedded to older Germanic traditions, the new warrior elite would revolutionize how wars were fought. These early knights were not the pious and courteous figures of romantic tales; indeed, most of them engaged in what we would consider most unchivalrous behavior. In response, the Church attempted to rein in the knights by setting definite limits on their behavior. These efforts took many forms. The Church insinuated itself into the knightly ceremony until it became a secular version of the rite of baptism, reminding the knight that his first “liege lord” was God Himself. The Peace of God movement sought to limit the damage that knights could do by threatening to excommunicate any knight who showed violence to the poor, the clergy, or the property of the Church. Similarly, the Truce of God was meant to limit fighting only on specific days of the week (typically sunrise on Monday to sunset on Wednesday). Though these edicts of the Church were largely unenforceable, they did make the Church the ultimate arbiter of which types of wars should be fought and under what circumstances. The crusading movement would be the ultimate expression of this theoretical power.

Prior to the First Crusade, Pope Gregory VII had commissioned the canon lawyer Anselm of Lucca to compile Augustine’s texts on just war for use against his adversary, the Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV during the Investiture Controversy. Indeed, Gregory seems to have wanted to launch an expedition to the East as early as 1074, but his conflict with Henry preempted those plans. In 1096, Gregory’s protégé Pope Urban II used Anselm’s *Collectio canonum* in his preaching of an armed expedition to Jerusalem. At the Council of Clermont, Urban preached a sermon that launched the crusading movement as an Augustinian just war with both defensive and offensive characteristics. In the first case, Urban emphasizes the need to defend the eastern Christians: “...you must help your brothers living in the Orient, who need your aid for which they have already cried out many times.”¹⁵ To justify the offensive nature of the crusade, Urban characterizes the Moslems as pagans who have unlawfully seized and defiled the Holy Land, describing them as “despised, degenerate, and enslaved by demons.”¹⁶ To this traditional Augustinian view, however, Urban added an innovation: the idea that the crusade is a positive form of warfare that can be waged not only for the punishment of evildoers, but also for the salvation of the crusaders’ souls:

Remission of sins will be granted for those going thither, if they end a shackled life either on land or in crossing the sea, or in struggling against the heathen...Let those...who are accustomed to wage private wars wastefully even against Believers, go forth against the Infidels in a battle worthy to be undertaken now and to be finished in

victory. Now, let those, who until recently existed as plunderers, be soldiers of Christ; now, let those, who formerly contended against brothers and relations, rightly fight barbarians; now, let those, who recently were hired for a few pieces of silver, win their eternal reward.¹⁷

Urban believes unequivocally that real knights go on crusade. In Urban's hands, the crusade becomes a war waged not only out of necessity, but one that can be eagerly embraced by Christians as an act of penance and a means of attaining grace.

By the birth of Thomas Aquinas in 1225, the crusading movement had matured into a true religious tradition. The victory of the First Crusade had been reversed in 1187 by Saladin's re-conquest of Jerusalem. The Third, Fourth and Fifth Crusades had been dispatched in an effort to restore Christian rule of the Holy Land to no avail. During Aquinas' lifetime, two more crusades would be launched with no appreciable result. What is more, in 1215, the indulgence promising crusaders forgiveness of their sins had been extended to those taking part in the Albigensian Crusade in southern France against the heretical Cathars. The advent and indeed frequency of religiously-motivated warfare naturally necessitated a second look at the concept of just war in this new context. As the greatest theologian of his age, Aquinas restated the concept of just war and applied it to the new circumstances in which Christendom found itself.

Like Augustine, Aquinas was no stranger to the art of war. He was the seventh son of a powerful noble family in southern Italy. His father and his elder brothers were all knights, though young Thomas was intended for the Church from a very early age. Rejecting his family's plans to install him as the abbot of Monte Cassino, a position from which he could aid the family's political fortunes, Aquinas instead joined the newly-formed Order of Preachers, also known as the Dominicans. This order had been founded expressly for the purpose of combating heresy through disputation and its members soon became the theological "shock-troops" of the Church. As Aquinas continued his education at Paris and Cologne, he devoured the newly re-discovered works of Aristotle and joined in the attempt to reconcile his philosophical approach with the Christian faith. In doing so, he was eventually recognized as the greatest of the scholastic theologians.

Aquinas addresses whether war is always sinful in the Second Part of the Second Part of his masterpiece, the *Summa Theologica*, which discusses the three theological virtues of faith, hope and charity. In doing so, he places the just war squarely in the category of charitable acts, an assertion that Augustine stops just short of making. But how does Aquinas complete the transition from Augustine's just war of unfortunate necessity to the new crusader ideal of war as a charitable act?

For Aquinas, a just war requires three conditions that are rooted in Augustinian theology. The first and third conditions are essentially the same as Augustine presented; a just war requires "the authority of the sovereign by whose command the war is to be waged" and that "the belligerents should have a right intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil."¹⁸ It is in Aquinas's second condition that a subtle shift in perspective becomes evident: "Secondly, a just cause is required, namely that those who are attacked should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault."¹⁹ Although he cites the passage above from Augustine's *Questions on the Heptateuch* as justification for this, Aquinas does not fully define "just cause" in his usual exacting manner. On the contrary, he is content to allow this definition to remain somewhat vague, most probably in an effort to create a palatable context for the crusading ideal. By defining a just cause of war in a deliberately vague manner, Aquinas retroactively justifies the crusades, incorporating Urban's interpretation of Augustine's theology into the canon. Also, nowhere in this discussion of just cause (or indeed anywhere in the article) does Aquinas make mention of war as a necessary evil, something that Augustine consistently focuses on in his writings. What's more, through this definition of just cause, Aquinas makes no distinction between defensive and offensive wars, a distinction that Augustine was very careful to define. Since the crusades were preached as offensive wars with a defensive character, this merging of the two different types of war seems to have been inspired by the advent of the crusading movement.

Another crusade-inspired alteration appears in Aquinas' description of right intention: "For it may happen that the war is declared by the legitimate authority, and for a just cause, and yet be rendered unlawful through a wicked intention."²⁰ In this statement, one can hear an echo of the great preacher of the Second Crusade, Bernard of Clairvaux, who claimed that the failure of that crusade was not the fault of the cause itself, but of those knights who answered the call. These knights, like the Israelites of Exodus, "were...in their hearts returning to Egypt."²¹ In Aquinas' theology, the crusade is a just cause whose justice is betrayed only by the sins of the crusaders.

As the community of the faithful grew from a minority within the Roman Empire to a dominant force throughout Europe,

it became necessary to reconcile Christ's pacifist teachings with the necessity of warfare in the secular world. Augustine established the Christian rules for warfare, creating a theory of just war based on necessity to maintain earthly peace and purity of intention. Aquinas took Augustine's framework and transformed it to meet the requirements of an age where spiritual warfare was regarded as an act of charity and the secular world took on a religious identity. In expanding the concept of just war, Aquinas blended the secular and religious needs of Christendom into a theology that justified the Crusades. And in doing so, he created the foundation for the modern concept of just war.

Notes

- ¹Tertullian, *The Chaplet*, trans. S. Thewall, from *Ante-Nicene Fathers*, vol. 3 (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1885), revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight, <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0304.htm>, chap. 11.
- ²Origen, *Against Celsus*, trans. Frederick Crombie, from *Ante-Nicene Fathers*, vol. 4 (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1885), revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight, <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0416.htm>, 3.7.
- ³"Galerius and Constantine: Edicts of Toleration 311/313," *Internet Medieval Sourcebook*, <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/edict-milan.asp> (accessed January 1, 2013).
- ⁴Augustine, *The City of God against the Pagans*, ed. and trans. R. W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), XVII, 13.
- ⁵Augustine, *The City of God against the Pagans*, XV, 5.
- ⁶Augustine, *The City of God against the Pagans*, XV, 5.
- ⁷Augustine, *The City of God against the Pagans*, XIX, 17.
- ⁸Augustine, "Letter 189", quoted in Herbert Andrew Deane, *The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 159.
- ⁹Augustine, *The City of God against the Pagans*, XIX, 8.
- ¹⁰Augustine, *The City of God against the Pagans*, I, 26.
- ¹¹Augustine, *The City of God against the Pagans*, I, 26.
- ¹²Augustine, *The City of God against the Pagans*, III, 10.
- ¹³Augustine, *Questions on the Heptateuch.*, VI, 10, quoted in Deane, 312.
- ¹⁴Augustine, *Contra Faustum*, XXII, 74, quoted in Deane, 161.
- ¹⁵Fulcher of Chartres, "The Chronicle of Fulcher of Chartres, Book I," trans. Martha E. McGinty, in *The First Crusade: The Chronicle of Fulcher of Chartres and Other Source Materials*, 2nd ed., ed. Edward Peters (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 52.
- ¹⁶Fulcher of Chartres, 53.
- ¹⁷Fulcher of Chartres, 53.
- ¹⁸Thomas Aquinas, "Summa Theologica: War (Secunda Secundae Partis, Q. 40)," <http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3040.htm> (accessed January 1, 2013).
- ¹⁹Aquinas.
- ²⁰Aquinas.
- ²¹Bernard of Clairvaux, "Bernard of Clairvaux: Apology," *Internet Medieval Sourcebook*, <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/bernard1.asp> (accessed January 1, 2013).

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A CHANGE IN TACTICS: HARD WAR IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN OF 1864

LEWIS A. TAYLOR II
UNDERGRADUATE

When the American Civil War began in 1861, the dominant military tradition was one that was inherited from the eighteenth-century, a tradition that showed moderation in waging war, especially in regards to civilians, a principle that would soon change. There was a distinction made between the State and the people in that civilians were generally regarded as innocent bystanders who happened to get involved in the arguments that were taking place between nations, or as in the case of the American Civil War, between sectional governments. Because of their status as non-combatants, civilians were considered eligible for special protection, especially women, children, conscientious objectors, and the elderly.

Even though there had been some reversal of this separation of armies and civilians by the end of the eighteenth-century and the beginning of the nineteenth, there was still a policy of conciliation in place and this continued throughout the first three years of the American Civil War. When the war began, President Lincoln and other politicians in the North did not believe that all Southerners were in favor of secession and the slave owners controlled the entire secessionist movement. President Lincoln also did not acknowledge the South's secession from the Union; as a result, the United States should continue to treat Southern citizens as civilians and protect their constitutional rights. As early as 1862, General Henry W. Halleck, the General-in-Chief of the Union army, worked with Francis Lieber on many issues, including "how to handle guerrillas and how to treat prisoners of war."¹ Lieber, who was working at Columbia College in New York City, was a German-native who lived and taught in South Carolina for two decades where he was a former slave owner.² An avid critic of secession, Lieber published *Guerrilla Parties Considered with Reference to the Laws and Usages of War* (1862) and *A Code for the Government of Armies* (1863), the latter which the Federal War Department revised and issued.

In his articles, Lieber said armies needed to practice restraint while in the field. He said that officers needed to be held accountable for the actions of those under them, even when they were following orders and that "armies should be prohibited from the 'wanton destruction' of non-military resources."³ He did insist, however, that there may be times when military necessity would dictate a different course of action—allowing for the "destruction of property, and obstruction of the ways and channels of traffic, travel, or communication, and of all withholding of sustenance or means of life from the enemy."⁴ This explanation of "military necessity" was the blueprint for what was to follow.

By 1864, President Lincoln, frustrated by Union defeats and the inability of the vastly superior Union war machine to defeat the Confederate forces and crush the rebellion, began looking for a general who could take command of the Union forces, crush the rebellion and bring the war to an end.

President Lincoln found the general he was looking for in Ulysses S. Grant. General Grant had been given the nickname "Unconditional Surrender" Grant in 1862 at the Battle of Fort Donelson when Brigadier General Simon Bolivar Buckner, the fort's commanding officer, requested terms of surrender and Grant had replied that the only terms available were an unconditional and immediate surrender of the fort. Grant's insistence on surrender without terms fit very well with what Lincoln was looking for in a general, and Grant's attitude was that whatever was needed to win was what would be done. General Grant and his lieutenants, Phil Sheridan and David Hunter, would bring "hard war" to the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia—the breadbasket of the Confederacy—in an effort to not only deprive the Confederate army of needed supplies, but to also convince the citizens of the Shenandoah Valley that the Union forces would no longer tolerate their support of the Confederate army. As General Grant stated in his orders to his lieutenants: "eat out Virginia clear and clean...so that crows flying over it for the balance of the season will have to carry their provender [food] with them."⁵ With support from President Lincoln, who had changed his attitude on how the war should be fought, Grant initiated a campaign within a campaign in the spring and summer of 1864. Grant was determined to first destroy the Confederate army of General Jubal Early in the Shenandoah Valley and to then bring the war to the residents of the

Valley by destroying their ability to supply the Confederate forces elsewhere in Virginia and to convince them that continuing the conflict was an exercise in futility. To accomplish this he turned to two of his senior lieutenants: Generals David Hunter and Philip Sheridan. Many people are familiar with General William Tecumseh Sherman's "March to the Sea" but few are familiar with the destruction caused by General David Hunter in the upper part of the Shenandoah Valley, especially in the town of Lexington where his forces burned and gutted both Virginia Military Institute and Washington College, or the "hard war" waged by General Philip Sheridan in the central portion of the Valley, specifically Rockingham and Page counties. Hunter started the ball rolling in the spring of 1864, but it was Sheridan that finally brought the Confederate army in the Shenandoah Valley, and along with it, the Valley civilians, to its knees.

Chapter 2

The Shenandoah Valley

When the Shenandoah Valley is mentioned, people think of its scenic beauty, history, and the song "Shenandoah." A great number of people who populated the southern regions of the United States in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries passed through the Valley on their way to North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Texas. In 1861 to 1865, however, the Shenandoah Valley and its rich farmlands were anything but serene. It was the scene of more than three hundred military actions according to the National Park Service. Fifteen of these actions are classified as major battles and four of these battles took place between September 19 and October 19 of 1864.⁶

The Shenandoah Valley is the northern portion of the more extensive Great Valley of Virginia, which is a small portion of the Great Appalachian Valley that runs for over twelve hundred miles from Quebec, Canada to the state of Alabama. The borders of the Shenandoah Valley are the Blue Ridge Mountains on the east and the first ranges of the Allegheny Mountains on the west. The Shenandoah Valley runs for approximately 125 miles in a northeasterly direction from the northern part of Rockbridge County in the south to the Potomac River in the north. While varying in width, the valley, at its widest, is only 25 miles wide.⁷ The valley is composed of nine counties—Shenandoah, Page, Rockingham, and Augusta in the Lower Valley; Frederick, Warren and Clark in the upper Valley, as well as Berkley and Jefferson counties in West Virginia. The Shenandoah River flows northward through the Valley in two forks that come together at Front Royal and then flowing, as one stream, northward to Harper's Ferry, West Virginia where it joins the Potomac River. Because of this northerly flow of the Shenandoah River, a person traveling north in the Valley is said to be going "down the Valley"—a distinction that causes confusion to the Valley's many visitors.

The traditional explanation of the discovery of the Shenandoah Valley by Europeans was the expedition launched by Governor Alexander Spotswood and his "Knights of the Golden Horseshoe," who viewed the Shenandoah Valley from the crest of the Blue Ridge Mountains in 1716 from a point just east of what is now the town of Elkton in Rockingham County. However, there are other sources which state that Colonel Abraham Wood and Captain Henry Batte explored the Shenandoah Valley, but this is disputed by John Wayland in his book about the German element in the Shenandoah Valley.⁸ Wayland does report that a German immigrant by the name of Johann Lederer led a group of explorers from east of the Blue Ridge Mountains into the Valley in 1670.⁹

While many English settlers moved to the Valley from the Tidewater area of Virginia as well as its Eastern shore, the majority of the Valley settlers came down an old Native American trail that had become known as the "Great Wagon Road." This road, which is now Interstate 81, ran from Pennsylvania through Virginia and into North Carolina and was the main roadway used by settlers of German and Scots-Irish ancestry as they migrated south from Pennsylvania.¹⁰ Many of the German immigrants, especially the Mennonites, entered the Valley through Page County and then began moving into Rockingham County in the central part of the Valley. The Quakers came from the east entering the Valley from Frederick County, Maryland and Loudoun County, Virginia. There were also French Huguenots who settled in the Rockingham-Augusta county areas and the Scots-Irish who settled primarily in the upper and lower parts of the Valley.

By the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861 the Shenandoah Valley was a melting pot of immigrants, primarily farmers who were raising wheat, had few slaves, and were not part of the slave-owning aristocracy of eastern Virginia. There were, in the Valley, a large number of people who were supportive of the Union and did not favor secession, as well as a significant group of pacifists who wanted nothing to do with politics. This was the civilian population to whom the Union was bringing the war, a population that supported both the Union and the Confederacy and that just wanted to be left alone. Unfortunately, the new commander of the Union armies had a different plan for the inhabitants of the Shenandoah Valley. From Lexington in the south, to Harrisonburg

in the center and northward another 40 miles to Woodstock, Hunter and Sheridan would, in two separate campaigns, wage hard war on the Shenandoah Valley, a war that the Confederacy could not stop.

Chapter 3

The Beginning Of Hard War: General David Hunter, June – July 1864

The movement towards “hard war” did not suddenly emerge in 1864, but under the new leadership of Ulysses S. Grant the focus was an overwhelming drive to defeat the Confederate forces under Robert E. Lee in Virginia, opening the door to ending the war. Grant believed that after a defeat there should not be a retreat or even a long break to regroup, but rather the Union armies needed to be constantly advancing, overwhelming the enemy and wear it down by attrition if nothing else worked. Grant also brought with him William Tecumseh Sherman who had already shown a willingness to use whatever force was necessary to devastate the countryside so that the enemy army would not be able to draw any sustenance from it.¹¹ Grant was determined to keep pressure on the Confederates on all fronts, and in early May of 1864 assigned General Franz Sigel with clearing the Shenandoah Valley. To say that he was unsuccessful would be an understatement. Sigel’s orders included destroying the Confederate supply base in Staunton, moving eastward to tear up the tracks of the Virginia Central Railroad and then continuing on to Charlottesville to destroy that supply base as well. Sigel was not the most competent general in the Union army, having received his position in an attempt to keep the German population of the North happy. He moved his army at a very slow pace allowing Confederate General John C. Breckenridge to pull together enough forces to soundly defeat him at the Battle of New Market on May 15. Following this defeat, Grant relieved Sigel and replaced him with General David Hunter, giving him virtually the same orders as had been given to Sigel.

Hunter was a much more aggressive general, and under his leadership the Union forces penetrated further into the Shenandoah Valley than any other previous attempt. This is to be expected from a general “who had earlier sought permission to ravage the homes of Southern slaveholders....[and] believed in hard war.”¹² Hunter’s campaign of fire and vandalism soon became notorious.

Upon entering the Valley, Hunter defeated the Confederates under General W.E. Jones at the Battle of Piedmont on June 5 and then moved on to Staunton where part of his army destroyed the warehouses and supplies stored there, along with the “steam mill, foundry, and carriage and woolens factories”¹³ while others began destroying the railroad tracks leading east towards Charlottesville. When Hunter saw that the Confederates had strengthened their position on the mountain pass between Waynesboro and Charlottesville, Hunter decided to move his forces southward to Lynchburg. Lynchburg, while not as large as Charlottesville, was also a major supply center that had not only railroads, but also canals which connected it with the eastern part of Virginia.

On his way to Lynchburg, Hunter stopped in Lexington and burned the Virginia Military Institute (in retaliation for the services of the VMI cadets at the Battle of New Market) along with the home of a former Virginia governor, John Letcher. Lt. John Rogers Meigs, Hunter’s engineer, “availed himself of the opportunity, helping himself to a fine set of mathematical instruments before the institute’s buildings were set ablaze.”¹⁴ The person who was responsible for the burning was Hunter’s chief of staff, Colonel David H. Strother, who said that V.M.I was “a most dangerous institution, where treason was systematically taught.”¹⁵ In a report dated August 8, 1864, Hunter states that “[o]n the 12 (June) I also burned the Virginia Military Institute and all the buildings connected with it. I found here a violent and inflammatory proclamation from John Letcher, lately Governor of Virginia, inciting the population of the country to rise and wage guerrilla warfare on my troops...”¹⁶

For two days Hunter and his men burned and looted the town of Lexington, a delay that allowed Robert E. Lee to anticipate that Hunter’s next target was Lynchburg. This action was applauded by one Union soldier who wrote home, “Father, Hunter is just the man for the job of putting down this rebellion he is a fierce and savage looking man he has no mercy on the rebels.”¹⁷ Colonel Strother, when assessing the results of the campaign said in his report that “[a]bout fifty miles of the Virginia Central Railroad had been effectually destroyed; the Virginia and Tennessee road had been destroyed to some extent for the same distance; an incredible amount of public property had been burned, including canal-boats, and railroad trains loaded with ordinance and commissary stores, numerous extensive iron works, manufactories of saltpeter, musket-stocks, shoes, saddles and artillery-harness, woolen cloths, and grain mills....”¹⁸

While Breckenridge was pushed further up the Valley, he still managed to cause Hunter problems. Believing that Breckenridge’s force was too small to cause any major problems, Hunter relaxed and delayed moving on Lynchburg, a delay that allowed Lee to move General Jubal Early and the Second Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia into the Valley. The combined forces of Brecken-

ridge and Early were able to drive Hunter across the Valley and into the mountains of West Virginia, effectively clearing the Shenandoah Valley of Union forces, a move that left Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania vulnerable to the Confederate forces under Early and Breckenridge.

Emboldened by his success against Hunter, and with the blessings of Lee, Early moved his forces northward to the outskirts of Washington, D.C., where he came into contact with the Union forces at Fort Stevens. Lee needed to have some relief at Petersburg, and believed that should Early put pressure on Washington, Grant would have no choice but to pull Union troops away from Petersburg and bring them back for the defense of the capital. While Early's movement to Washington was not a tactical success, it nevertheless showed the vulnerability of the city, and for a short time, Lincoln came under enemy fire at Fort Stevens. Standing on the parapet, Lincoln was warned that his position was vulnerable to sharpshooters and it was only after a Union officer "was shot down within three feet of him, when he reluctantly stepped below."¹⁹

Realizing that the Confederates could continue to use the Valley as a way to continually threaten Washington, D.C., Grant sent a communication to the army Chief of Staff, General Henry Halleck on July 14 saying that a force needed to be assembled that could "eat out Virginia clear and clean," and the next day told Halleck that "Hunter....should make all of the Valley south of the B&O [rail] road a desert as high as possible. I do not mean that houses should be burned, but all provisions and stock should be removed, and the people notified to move out."²⁰ After a roundabout trip, Hunter finally ended up back in the Valley, coming back through Harper's Ferry. After getting his command back in shape and receiving reinforcements, he began his search for Early and his army. After a futile search he began to terrorize the Valley, more out of frustration and his need for vengeance after being so roughly treated earlier in the year than from any rational plan of attack. Hunter ordered the burning of many homes in the Lower Valley, even that of one of his distant cousins Henrietta Lee. One of the victims of Hunter's terrorism wrote the following to the general after her house was destroyed: "Your office is not to lead like a brave man and soldier, your men to fight in the ranks of war, but your work has been to separate yourself from all danger, and with your incendiary band steal unawares upon helpless women and children, to insult and destroy."²¹ Even Hunter's artillery chief, Henry Dupont wrote that Hunter was "dominated by prejudices and antipathies so intense and so violent as to render him at times quite incapable of taking a fair and unbiased view of many military and political situations."²² Grant realized it was time for a change in command in the Valley and he accepted Hunter's resignation, appointing General George Crook as his replacement.

During July and August of 1864, Jubal Early and his army had helped relieve some of the pressure Grant was exerting on Lee's army at Petersburg by heading north into Pennsylvania. There he burned the town of Chambersburg in an eye-for-an-eye policy. The burning of Chambersburg "sealed the fate of the Valley and its people and opened the door to some of the most desperate acts of war ever targeted against civilians."²³ Following Early's foray into Pennsylvania, he was defeated by Sheridan at the Battles of Third Winchester on September 19, 1864 and then Fisher's Hill on September 21, Early was forced to retreat up the Valley to try to regroup and resupply.

What happened during October in the Shenandoah Valley would cause a Union soldier from Vermont, Private William Fisk, to write: "They have tasted the bitter fruit of secession, and have had enough of it....They see the grim determination of the North and they begin to feel that to hold out longer is to fight against inevitable destiny."²⁴ That same private also wrote in his diaries that many of the citizens of Harrisonburg "are heartily praying for peace, let it come in what way it will...They find that it [war] does not satisfy, that it was a poor remedy for their imaginary grievances...."²⁵ It is doubtful that Private Fisk was speaking (at that point) for the bulk of the civilian population of the area, but the firestorm that was coming would soon cause even the most steadfast supporter of the Confederacy to stop and think about their commitment to the Confederate cause. This was because the population of Rockingham County more than doubled when more than 28,000 men under the command of Philip Sheridan set up camp around Harrisonburg, the county seat. While Sheridan was aware that he had severely hurt Early's forces, he was aware that Early was not ready to give up control of the "breadbasket of the Confederacy."

Chapter 4

Hard War Intensifies: General Philip Sheridan, August – October, 1864

Philip H. Sheridan was a captain in the Thirteenth United States Infantry, serving as the quartermaster and commissary officer for the regiment when the war began. Within a short period of time Major General Henry Halleck, commander of the Department of the Missouri, appointed him as his quartermaster, a position he held during the campaign for Corinth, Mississippi.

While Sheridan was efficient in this position, he was “remembered as not being very pleasant.”²⁶ Sheridan had a confrontation with Brigadier General Samuel R. Curtis, who commanded in Southwest Missouri, over some horses that thieves had stolen from local farmers and were now trying to sell to the army to replace lost cavalry mounts. The issue arose when Sheridan refused a direct order from General Curtis to pay for the horses, and “responded with some hastily chosen words.”²⁷ Curtis had Sheridan placed under arrest for his refusal to obey a direct order, but Halleck stepped in and transferred Sheridan to Tennessee before a courts martial could take place.

Sheridan was happy with the transfer because he was no longer assigned to rear echelon duties, but was given command of the Second Michigan Cavalry. By the end of 1863, Sheridan had attained the rank of major general and had, in that capacity, commanded XX Corps of infantry at the battles of Chattanooga and Chickamauga.²⁸ Sheridan was a confident leader and that trait, along with his aggressive leadership, caused him to stand out from the other Union commanders in the Western Theater. When Grant rose to lieutenant general and took command of all Union military forces, he brought Sheridan east to be in charge of the cavalry corps of the Army of the Potomac—one of only three general officers who were battle tested selected to accompany Grant to the Eastern Theater. One of those waiting to meet with General Sheridan when he arrived in Harpers Ferry, West Virginia, in August of 1864, was a young lieutenant named John Meigs. Lt. Meigs was an engineer who had served with the Union army west of the Blue Ridge Mountains for most of the past year, and of all the engineers available, Meigs knew the territory better than any. Little did Lt. Meigs know that in two months he would be the center of a controversy caused a large amount of destruction in the small town of Dayton, Virginia.

Two days after meeting Sheridan and impressing him with his knowledge of the Shenandoah Valley, Meigs was assigned as chief engineer with General Crook’s army in the Department of West Virginia. But in two weeks Sheridan decided how he would proceed in his campaign; he brought Meigs from General Crook’s army and assigned him as his aide-de-camp, becoming, at age twenty-two, the chief engineer of all forces under the command of General Philip Sheridan. Sheridan later wrote “I found that, with the aid of Meigs, who was most intelligent in his profession, the region in which I was to operate would soon be well fixed in my mind. Meigs was familiar with every important road and stream and with all points worthy of note west of the Blue Ridge, and was particularly well equipped with knowledge regarding the Shenandoah Valley.”²⁹

Sheridan was, more than anything, a clear-thinking planner. He was also an opportunistic combatant who shared Grant’s understanding that the defeats suffered by the Union forces during the first three years of the war necessitated a change in the basic rules of warfare. It was not enough to just engage the enemy in battle. The Union needed to bring the war to a satisfactory conclusion before the civilian population lost heart and demanded peace on any terms. To do this the institutions that supported the Confederate army and allowed it to live, move, and fight, had to be destroyed.

During the month of August 1864, not only did Sheridan skirmish with parts of Jubal Early’s army on almost a daily basis, he also had to put up with constant raids on his camps, supply lines, and lines of communications by roving band of guerrillas. The problem was that many of these so-called guerrillas were not guerrillas at all, but part of the Confederate army—but because they lacked proper uniforms they were mistaken as partisan rangers or guerrillas. Partisans and guerrillas were not considered part of the army, and because of that, were not given the same considerations if they happened to be captured. One particular incident is still talked about in the town of Dayton—the execution of Davy Getz.

Near the town of Woodstock, troopers from General George Custer’s Michigan brigade captured a civilian with a rifle in the woods near their camp. The troopers labeled him a bushwacker, but in reality, Davy was a thirty-nine-year-old with the mind of a child, who happened to be out hunting squirrels. There was no time to settle this affair until late September, following the Union victories at Third Winchester and Fisher’s Hill, and after the Union forces had moved south to Harrisonburg to set up camp between that city and the town of Dayton.

Getz, who happened to be left with the Michigan brigade’s supply wagons, was brought before a court in Dayton, which was convened by Custer, and sentenced to be shot. Getz was taken out to a field, made to dig his own grave, and then executed.³⁰ The execution of Getz as well as the occupation of the area by Northern soldiers was extremely aggravating to the citizens of Dayton and Rockingham County. While the members of the 116th Ohio Infantry, who had been in charge of the town, were remembered as having been gentlemen, the cavalry were remembered in a different light altogether. Even though orders that forbid looting had been issued, they were not enforced, and it was not just the enlisted men doing the looting—officers also helped them-

selves to things that they wanted. Captain John Deforest of the 12th Connecticut Infantry remembered his time in Rockingham County by writing it was “a time for devastating crops and devouring cattle.”³¹

Following the Union victory at Fisher’s Hill and the final battle of Sheridan’s campaign in October, a separate campaign took place in the central part of the Valley. Nothing much was said about this other campaign because it intentionally took the war to the civilian population. Historians had jumped from the battle at Fisher’s Hill to the cavalry battle at Tom’s Brook several weeks later without mentioning what Sheridan and his army had done during the missing weeks. It was not until recently, when Stephen Starr, in his *Union Cavalry in the Civil War* wrote that “[t]he deliberate planned devastation of the Shenandoah Valley has deservedly ranked as one of the grimmest episodes of a sufficiently grim war. Unlike the haphazard destruction caused by (Gen. William T.) Sherman’s bummers in Georgia, it was committed systematically, and by order.”³²

When Sheridan first entered Rockingham County he became aware of the abundance of crops (Rockingham County was one of the nation’s top ten agricultural counties at that time³³) and after establishing his headquarters in a private home in Harrisonburg, he began to send requests to Grant, asking him to “change the direction of his campaign.”³⁴ Sheridan had already destroyed many barns in Augusta County prior to moving to Harrisonburg, and he now argued that if they did not completely “destroy the Valley’s harvest and everything that supported it, they would have to deal in the future with other Confederate armies using the Valley to threaten the North.”³⁵

What Grant was not aware of was that Sheridan had already begun the destruction. For thirteen days, from September 26 to October 8, there was continuous burning of property and the confiscating of livestock in the Valley’s four central counties: Augusta, Rockingham, Shenandoah, and Page. Augusta and Rockingham counties were the two largest producers of wheat in Virginia—and because of this they were known as the “breadbasket of the Confederacy.” Grant utilized over five thousand cavalrymen and a brigade of infantry in the actual destruction of property, “while thousands of other soldiers in blue were called upon to drive off or kill livestock.”³⁶

The worst moments for Dayton and Rockingham County came in early October. On October 3, Lt. Meigs, Sheridan’s engineer, was out with two orderlies, making the rounds of the different camps so that the location of each brigade was noted should Sheridan decide to move his forces. They had finished their duties and were heading back into Harrisonburg when three riders approached wearing oilcloths for protection against the light rain that had started falling. The riders turned away from Meigs, but he followed them, ordering them to stop. They refused his orders and kept moving. Meigs and his men kept following the riders until finally they wheeled their horses around to prepare for a confrontation. When Meigs came up on the riders, who were actually scouts from Wickham’s brigade, the scouts ordered him to surrender. He refused, pulled his weapon and shot one of the Confederates. Meigs was then shot through the head and killed. One of his orderlies was able to escape and get back into the Union lines where he said they were attacked by guerrillas operating in the area.

When Sheridan heard of Meig’s death he flew into a rage. He had been consistently irritated by guerrillas and bushwhackers since his arrival in the Valley, and now they had killed one of his favorite officers. The orderly reported they had been fired on by civilians and that Meigs had been shot down in cold blood while trying to surrender. What he probably heard was the Confederate telling Meigs to surrender, and he was not aware that they were soldiers because their oilskins covered their uniforms. Even so, Sheridan regarded Meig’s death as murder, not an act of war. The next morning Major George A. Forsyth, one of Sheridan’s aides, was sent to find Meigs’ body. Forsyth speculated, and no one questioned his reasoning (or why a group of bushwhackers would operate that close to a Union camp), that Meigs had been murdered by members of Mosby’s or White’s gang.³⁷

Because of this act of murder,” Sheridan ordered that the entire town of Dayton and all surrounding houses in a five mile radius be burned to the ground. The task of burning the area fell to General Custer’s Fifth New York cavalry and the men of the 116th Ohio Infantry. The people of Dayton and Harrisonburg saw homes beyond the towns totally engulfed in flames as Custer and his men began their assignment. The Union soldiers visited every town between Dayton and Bridgewater, running off slaves, killing farm animals, and burning buildings.³⁸ The farm of one of President Lincoln’s cousins was not spared. At the farm of Joseph and Abigail Coffman (Abigail’s father and Lincoln’s grandfather were brothers) the soldiers killed all of the hogs, burned the barn, new smokehouse, and granary and destroyed almost all of the fencing. The house was spared, but only because it was used as a headquarters by Custer.³⁹

While this devastation was taking place in the county, the people of the town of Dayton were watching and waiting to see

what would happen to their homes. Finally, Colonel Wildes of the 116th Ohio sent a messenger to Sheridan and told him how well he and his men had been treated by the citizens of the town and asked that he rescind his order to burn the town. William T. Patterson, a soldier in Wilde's regiment, writing in his diary reflected the anguish that the common soldier felt about this duty: "This will include the city of Harrisonburg, the towns of Bridgewater and Dayton....This evening the citizens are removing their goods.....The work of destruction is commencing in the suburbs of the town."⁴⁰ Sheridan, while unhappy over the death of his lieutenant, held Wildes in high regard and agreed to spare the town. The order to burn the outlying homes and farms still stood.

When the 116th Ohio heard that the order to burn the town had been rescinded it was noted that "there was louder cheering than there ever was when we made a bayonet charge," and Colonel Wildes observed "a great deal of clapping of hands and shouts of gladness of the little children over the good news," and that this was "too much for even the grim and sturdy old soldiers. The sleeve of many a blouse was wet with their tears."⁴¹

The depredations endured by the residents of Dayton, Harrisonburg, and other parts of Rockingham County were over by the end of the first week of October. Sheridan had decided to move his army down the Valley toward Strasburg and Front Royal. If Sheridan had not moved when he did the final battles of the Valley campaign would have likely been fought around Harrisonburg instead of further north at Cedar Creek. Jubal Early had re-entered the Valley in Augusta County and was preparing to move northward himself. There was not much left in the area to support an army, even a force as small as Early's. Often the men had to spread one day's rations over two or three days, although they were able to grind some grain in a mill that somehow Custer had missed while burning the area. As one Confederate soldier remembered, "Our hearts ached at the horrible sight, our beautiful Valley almost a barren waste and we with an army so inferior in numbers as to render success almost hopeless. Yet the sight carried with it unseen power and determination to avenge this dastardly warfare, making us doubly equal to such an enemy."⁴²

Sheridan confirmed this destruction in his report of October 7 in the Official Records: "...In moving back to this point the whole country from the Blue Ridge to the North Mountains has been made untenable for a rebel army. I have destroyed over 2,000 barns filled with wheat, hay, and farming implements; over seventy mills filled with flour and wheat; have driven in front of the army over 4,000 head of stock, and have killed and have issued to the troops not less than 3,000 sheep. This destruction embraces the Luray Valley and little Fort Valley, as well as the main Valley...." He goes on to say that "Lieutenant John R. Meigs, my engineer officer, was murdered beyond Harrisonburg, near Dayton. For this atrocious act all the houses within an area of five miles were burned."⁴³ It is interesting to note that Sheridan is still regarding the death of Meigs as a murder, even though it was determined that those involved were not partisan guerrillas, but army scouts, making Meigs' death a combat death, not murder. Another report says that cavalry troops under Wesley Merritt "destroyed 630 barns; 47 flouring mills; 4 sawmills; 1 woolen mill 3,982 tons of hay, straw and fodder; more than 400,000 bushels of wheat; 3 furnaces; 515 acres of corn; 750 bushels of oats; more than 3,000 head of livestock; 560 barrels of flour; 2 tanneries; 1 railroad depot, 1 locomotive engine; and 3 boxcars."⁴⁴

After all of the Union forces had left Rockingham County, the officers of the court, located in Harrisonburg, appointed a committee whose job it was to make an assessment of the destruction inflicted within their jurisdiction. This jurisdiction included the city of Harrisonburg and Rockingham County only. On November 11, 1864, the committee published its report in the Rockingham Register and Advertiser. The committee found that in Rockingham County alone over 100,000 bushels of wheat were destroyed, along with 50,000 bushels of corn. The Union forces also burned 30 dwelling houses and 450 barns.⁴⁵

Sheridan was convinced that the devastation he caused in Rockingham, Augusta, and Page counties was sufficient enough that even if a Confederate force was able to follow him, they would not be in any condition to fight, but as the Union army began to move northward, shadowy riders began to appear on the horizon—riders wearing the grey of the Confederate cavalry. These riders were the advance scouts for General Jubal Early, who would follow Sheridan northward until, at Cedar Creek, the fate of the Shenandoah Valley would be decided.

Chapter 5

Conclusion: The End of the Destruction

The "burning" was over. The Union forces had moved north to try to crush Jubal Early and his army. Now it was time for the residents of Augusta, Page, and especially Rockingham counties to start putting their lives back together.

While some produce managed to survive the destruction caused by Generals Hunter and Sheridan, most of the Valley resi-

dents suffered from shortages that winter. Solomon Wenger of Rockingham County “remembered that his father’s horses nearly starved.”⁴⁶ Just north of Harrisonburg, near Fisher’s Hill, one of Fisher’s grandchildren was able to crawl into the bottom of their mill and scrape up close to a bushel of old flour dust. In later years, Mr. Fisher recalled that “[w]e sifted the worms out of it and mother baked it into bread.”⁴⁷

Ironically, emergency rations were provided by the very government that sanctioned Sheridan’s campaign of destruction, and sent to the Valley on the Baltimore & Ohio and the Manassas Gap railroads. The problem was that the rations were sent to Winchester and it was a trip of close to seventy miles for those people living in Rockingham County—a trip not easily made in 1864.

The justice who presided over Rockingham County wrote that “many of his constituents were without a pound of meat, bread, or anything to live on, to say nothing of fire-wood. It will require the daily and hourly exertions of the poor and those who have been burnt out to procure a scanty subsistence to sustain life during the winter.”⁴⁸ The editor of the Richmond Examiner was quite blunt in his description of the suffering in the Valley when he wrote: “The horror and crime of this devastation was remarkable even in Yankee warfare. They impoverished a whole population; they reduced women and children to beggary and starvation....”⁴⁹

The use of fire as a weapon in the 1860s was frightening to everyone concerned. Robby Martin, who was a small child in 1864, described this scene later in his life: “I have always carried....a vivid picture of the mighty roaring, vari-colored flames that licked up the flour mill. The flames leaped upward in great pointed spirals....The vivid red that predominated had for contrast all shades of green and other colors.....possibly partly consumed gases from wheat and flour and meal mingled with the real flames.”⁵⁰

The orders that Ulysses S. Grant gave to Generals Hunter and Sheridan were very succinct. There were two aspects to these orders: rid the Shenandoah Valley of all Confederate forces and make the Valley so desolate that it cannot supply any Confederate armies. Hunter failed in his mission, Sheridan succeeded. Sheridan’s success prompted John Mead Gould of the 29th Maine to write in his journal following the Union victory at Cedar Creek: “History must give General Sheridan credit for doing what only such Generals as Napoleon and his kind have been able to.”⁵¹

What did all of this destruction mean to the Confederacy? It was the primary cause of the losses suffered by the Confederacy at Tom’s Brook and Cedar Creek—defeats caused in part by the “famished condition of his [Early’s] army.”⁵² The loss of the autumn harvest in the Valley meant that supplies to Lee’s army in Petersburg would dramatically decrease, and probably more than anything, Sheridan’s successes helped reelect Abraham Lincoln to another term.

The Shenandoah Valley would return to normal eventually because of the industriousness of the residents, helped by friends and family living in other areas, and by Northerners who were willing to invest in the rebuilding of the Valley. By 1870, farms had returned to levels that existed before the war and railroads that had been destroyed, were rebuilt. In time even those who should have been the most unforgiving realized that the destruction had a purpose. When asked about “the burning,” an ex-Confederate cavalry officer replied: “What is the worst in war, to burn a barn or kill a fellow man?”⁵³

Notes

¹ Jennifer M. Murray, “Hard War in Virginia During the Civil War,” http://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/Hard_War_in_Virginia_During_the_Civil_War#start_entry, (Accessed October 10, 2012).

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ John L. Heatwole, *The Burning: Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley*, (Charlottesville, VA: Rockbridge Publishing, 1998), 8.

⁶ Jonathan A. Noyalas, Editor, “Give The Enemy No Rest: Sheridan’s 1864 Shenandoah Campaign,” (New Market, VA: Shenandoah Valley Battlefields Foundation, 2007), 1.

⁷ Heatwole, 1.

⁸ John Walter Wayland, *The German Element in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia*, (Bridgewater, VA: C.J. Carrier Co., 1964) 9.

⁹ Ibid., 10.

¹⁰ “Great Wagon Road,” <http://www.ncmuseumofhistory.org/collateral/articles/Great.Wagon.Road.pdf>, (Accessed October 10, 2012).

¹¹ John Bennett Walters, “General William T. Sherman and Total War,” *Journal of Southern History*, XIV (November 1948), 467.

- ¹² Mark Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 166.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*, 166.
- ¹⁴ Philip H. Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs of Philip H. Sheridan, General United States Army*, (New York: Charles L. Webster & Co., 1888), 503.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 167.
- ¹⁶ *War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I., Vol. 37. Part 1, Correspondence*, (Harrisburg, PA: National Historical Society, 1881, 1971), 97.
- ¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 167.
- ¹⁸ George E. Pond, *Campaigns of the Civil War: The Shenandoah Valley in 1864*, (Edison, NJ: Castle Books, 2002), 45.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 69
- ²⁰ Heatwole, 8.
- ²¹ George Rable, *Civil Wars: Women and the Crisis of Southern Nationalism*, (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1989), 170.
- ²² H.A. Dupont, *The Campaign of 1864 in the Valley of Virginia and the Expedition to Lynchburg*, (New York: National Americana Society, 1925), 37.
- ²³ Heatwole, 10.
- ²⁴ Grimsley, 176.
- ²⁵ Wilber Fisk, *Anti-Rebel: The Civil War Letters of Wilber Fisk*, (Croton-On-Hudson, NY: Emil Rosenblatt, 1983), 260-262.
- ²⁶ Heatwole, 11.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*, 12.
- ²⁸ William L. Shea and Earl J. Hess, *Pea Ridge: Civil War Campaign in the West*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 276.
- ²⁹ Sheridan, 503.
- ³⁰ John W. Wayland, *A History of Shenandoah County Virginia*, (Strasburg, VA: Shenandoah Publishing House, 1927), 386-387.
- ³¹ Heatwole, 64.
- ³² Noyalas, 28.
- ³³ Noyalas, 29.
- ³⁴ Noyalas, 29.
- ³⁵ Noyalas, 30-31.
- ³⁶ Noyalas, 31.
- ³⁷ Heatwole, 93.
- ³⁸ Heatwole, 93-94.
- ³⁹ Heatwole, 97.
- ⁴⁰ Grimsley, 184.
- ⁴¹ Heatwole, 105.
- ⁴² Capt. Samuel D. Buck, *With the Old Confeds: Actual Experiences of a Captain in the Line*, (Baltimore: H.E. Houck, 1925), 121-122.
- ⁴³ Henry Steele Commager, Editor, *The Civil War Archive: A History of the Civil War in Documents*, (New York: Black Dog & Levanthal, 2000), 731.
- ⁴⁴ Heatwole, 219.
- ⁴⁵ Heatwole, 192.
- ⁴⁶ Edith Wenger Morgan, *Stories My Father Told Us*, (Berryville, VA: Privately Printed, 1962), 7.
- ⁴⁷ *Ibid.* 9.
- ⁴⁸ Pond, 200.
- ⁴⁹ Heatwole, 224.
- ⁵⁰ Carolyn Martin Rutherford, Editor, *A Boy of Old Shenandoah*, (Parsons, WV, McClain Printing Co, 1977), 36.
- ⁵¹ Noyalas, vi.
- ⁵² Noyalas, 34.
- ⁵³ Noyalas, 35.

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NINETY SIX – STRATEGIC BACKCOUNTRY OUTPOST AND MICROCOSM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY WAR

ANNE MIDGLEY

GRADUATE

[Ninety Six] must be kept at all events & I think no reasonable expense should be spared—besides Georgia depends entirely upon it...

General Charles Lord Cornwallis to Colonel Nisbet Balfour¹

You know the importance of Ninety Six, let that place be your constant care...

General Charles Lord Cornwallis to Lieutenant Colonel Francis Lord Rawdon²

Though scarcely known today, in the mid-eighteenth century, Ninety Six, South Carolina was a thriving community, built close to the convergence of the Cherokee Path, a key route from the Cherokee lands to Charleston and the Island Ford Road, which led to the Saluda River and points further southeast. Its strategic location made it a key stopover for traders and travelers; a location known widely throughout the South during the late colonial period. Today, only a National Park Service Visitor Center and outbuildings occupy the site, yet had it developed apace with Charlotte, North Carolina, a site of similar size and situation in the 1760s, Ninety Six could have become a power-house of the New South. The critical strategic nature of Ninety Six led to its destruction by the British in early July 1781, although the site had just been successfully defended by Loyalist troops against the longest field siege of the Revolutionary War, which had ended less than a month beforehand.³

Despite its strategic significance to the British during the Southern Campaign of the Revolutionary War and the larger-than-life role that it played in the South Carolina backcountry during the late colonial period prior to the war, Ninety Six is rarely focused on by historians. Cowpens, a remote pasture in the backwoods used for fattening cattle on the way to market, is much better known today for the battle fought there on a cold day in January 1781 than is Ninety Six; yet, it was fear for his strategic outpost that caused General Charles Lord Cornwallis to send Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton racing after Brigadier General Daniel Morgan, leading to the British debacle at Cowpens.⁴

This paper establishes the strategic significance of Ninety Six to the British effort to retake the Carolina backcountry, traces its rise to become both a trading center and a center of justice for the backwoods settlers, examines why Ninety Six and its surrounding area was a Loyalist stronghold, and studies both the strengths and shortcomings of General Nathanael Greene and his military engineer, Count Thaddeus Kosciuszko's approach to siege warfare. It analyzes why the commander of Ninety Six, Lieutenant Colonel John Harris Cruger, was more successful than either Major General Benjamin Lincoln at Charleston or Cornwallis at Yorktown in defeating the siege tactics thrown against him.⁵

Today, the site of Ninety Six, South Carolina is an area of rich archaeological interest. Evidence has been found to place human activity at the site as early as 9000 BC with the discovery of a Clovis point there in 2005. The Native American peoples of most interest to students of the Colonial and the Revolutionary War periods in South Carolina are the Cherokee, who are mentioned as inhabitants of the Savannah River headwaters region as early as 1674. Ninety Six is located between the Long Canes Creek, a feeder of the Savannah River, and the Saluda River. The Cherokee figure prominently in the story of Ninety Six, as the site grew up at the junction of Cherokee trading routes, including the Cherokee Path which ran from the Cherokee hill towns to Charleston, and an intersecting trading route which ran to the Savannah River. Ninety Six's very name was thought to have come from the distance in miles between its location and the Cherokee town of Keowee, in present-day South Carolina.⁶

Relations between the British colonists and the Cherokee were initially based on trade; the colonists exchanged firearms, blankets, farming tools, and other items for animal pelts and slaves captured by the Cherokee during their various raids and skirmishes with neighboring native peoples. As more settlers migrated to the South Carolina backcountry, more formal trading outposts were established to facilitate the exchange of goods. With its well situated location and pleasing environment, Ninety Six became the

site of a trading outpost established in 1738 by Thomas Brown.⁷ During the middle of the eighteenth century, the government of South Carolina encouraged immigration to the backcountry, partially to provide a human shield between Indians to the west and the eastern edge of the colony, which included the Low Country plantations and the town of Charleston.⁸ As more settlers flocked to the South Carolina backcountry, population pressures, as well as misunderstandings between the various Cherokee peoples and colonists, caused ruptures in the fairly cordial trading relationships that had existed between the two groups. For as the colonists attracted to the backcountry were of diverse population groups, including Scots, Scotch-Irish, Germans, Swiss, Irish Quakers and French Huguenots, as well as English, Welsh, and a small group of Sephardic Jews, the Cherokees had their own distinct town and regional affiliations and loyalties.⁹ This was not broadly appreciated at the time and trading relationships, in some cases, favored the natives of one region over another, leading to unfortunate consequences for the relationships between the Cherokee and the colonists.¹⁰

Robert Gouedy, a successful trader, migrated to the Ninety Six regions in 1751 and established a new trading post a short distance from Brown's location. Gouedy's store became the nucleus of a growing community and as relations with the Cherokee deteriorated during the Anglo-Cherokee War of 1760-1761, a stockade was built around Gouedy's barn. The fortified barn became the original Fort Ninety Six and within its sturdy walls, the local militia fought off several Cherokee attacks during 1760. The strategic significance of the fort's location at the junction of the Cherokee trading paths was quickly recognized and the small fort became an official provincial military outpost.¹¹

The end of the wars with the Cherokee peoples and the cessation of the French and Indian War brought an uneasy peace to the backcountry. A new wave of immigration surged forth from both colonies to the north, particularly Pennsylvania and Virginia, and from Europe to further populate the region. However, the hostilities had also attracted a new element to the backcountry; lawless men displaced by the wars seeking to prey on both the Native American tribes and the backcountry settlers. Exacerbated by the increasing levels of violence and retribution that burst out during the wars and fueled by a level of savagery unknown in other parts of the American colonies, the backcountry colonists adapted their own defense tactics. The means of reprisal became more brutal. The government of South Carolina, its focus on Charleston and the coastal areas, virtually ignored the plight of the new settlers. The backcountry pioneers lacked access to courts and suffered from the depredations of general lawlessness. Eventually, backcountry settlers formed vigilante groups to protect their interests. The Regulator movement, while initially attempting to bring order to the backcountry, spawned its own increased effect on the level of backcountry ferocity. After much political wrangling and on-going violence, the need to provide law enforcement and court access was recognized by the South Carolina legislature and finally received the approval of King George III on November 25, 1769. Ninety Six again benefited from its strategic location, and a substantial brick courthouse and jail was built in the town.¹²

While the backcountry settlers of Ninety Six and its surrounding region were concerned with the constant threat of violence, the more established coastal regions became caught up in the general colonial ferment against British policies enacted following the Seven Years' War and Britain's attempts at raising revenue through taxation directed at the colonists. South Carolina's influential and wealthy planter class split between political radicals and moderates, however, the rebel radical Whig leaders successfully seized control of the state government, establishing a Provincial Congress and Council of Safety to control the colony.¹³

The radical Whigs moved quickly to consolidate their power and bring the majority of South Carolina's colonial citizens to their side of the dispute with the British government. They established a Provincial Association, which called upon citizens to sign a statement siding with the rebel cause. Determined to bring their viewpoints to the backcountry and rally the populace to the rebellion, William Henry Drayton and Reverend William Tennant led a delegation to the outlying regions during the summer of 1775. They encountered a mixed reception; while recent settlers from Europe tended to support the Crown, most in the backcountry were apathetic to the political nature of the conflict and supported neither side. Drayton and his Charleston delegation encountered outright hostility at some stops in their journey, particularly when they met Robert Cunningham, Thomas Brown, and Colonel Thomas Fletchall, leader of the Fair Forest district militia. These men were confirmed Loyalists and strong leaders of like-minded men. To counter the influence of the Loyalist leaders, Drayton called out the local militia, led by Colonel Richard Richardson and Major Andrew Williamson. These men marched against the militia of Fletchall, with both sides camping near Ninety Six. To head off armed conflict, Fletchall proposed a peace conference, which resulted in the Treaty of Ninety Six on September 16, 1775. Cunningham and Brown, who had refused to participate in the meeting, opposed the treaty. Its terms, however, were subsequently upheld by Drayton and used to ostracize the Loyalist leaders.¹⁴

The resultant conflict between the rebels and the Loyalists led to the first bloodshed of the American Revolution in South Carolina. Following the Treaty of Ninety Six, control of the area was firmly in rebel hands. Robert Cunningham, continuing his strong support for the Crown, was arrested and accused of sedition in early October, 1775 and subsequently jailed in Charleston. In response, his brother, Patrick Cunningham, seeking a means to whip up Loyalist resistance, learned of a supply of arms meant for delivery to the Cherokee tribesmen from the rebels, who sought to placate the Indians, provide for their autumn hunting needs, and prevent them from siding with the Loyalists in the British cause. Patrick Cunningham successfully raised fears of renewed Cherokee conflict throughout the backcountry, raised a Loyalist contingent in response to the threat, and seized the weapons and powder en route to the Cherokees.

The rebel militia leader, Williamson, reacted by once again raising his troops, this time erecting a fortification at Ninety Six. Cunningham and his supporters now armed with the stolen weaponry and ammunition, descended upon Ninety Six, captured the courthouse, and attacked the stockade. The first Battle of Ninety Six was sporadically fought over three days, November 19-21, 1775, resulting in one rebel death and minimal casualties. The Loyalists suffered far greater, with fifty-two men killed and one wounded, however, they did achieve nominal success. Following the rebels' defeat at Ninety Six, Whig Colonel Richard Richardson was ordered to find and arrest the principal Loyalist leaders. Richardson's force swelled in numbers as he approached Ninety Six, eventually growing to almost five thousand men. As Richardson's force grew, Loyalist resistance withered away in the South Carolina backcountry. Some of the principal Loyalists leaders were captured and imprisoned in Charleston; others fled. The rebel Whigs had gained control of the region.¹⁵

The focus of the war remained to the North. However, after years of fighting in the Northern and Middle colonies, the British and American forces had reached a stalemate and as a consequence of the British loss at Saratoga on October 16, 1778, the Americans formed an alliance with France, which was to significantly shape the remainder of the war. Faced with what had become a global conflict, as the Bourbon ally of France, the still powerful Spain, and the Dutch entered the war against Britain, the British were forced to reassess and shift their military strategies to fit the new and increasingly complex demands on their economic and military resources.¹⁶ Struggling for a way to end the war and retain at least some of their American mainland colonies, the British seized upon the Southern Strategy; a strategy built upon the precarious assumption that a significant population of Loyalists existed in the Southern colonies, and only waited upon the military support of Great Britain to rise and take back control of their colonies.¹⁷ Initial successes followed the shift to the Southern theatre, as Savannah, Georgia fell quickly to the British on December 29, 1778, with barely an attempt at defense by the rebels. The British victory at Savannah was trailed by the fall of Charleston, South Carolina, on May 12, 1780, following a shattering siege. The loss of Charleston was devastating to the rebel cause in the South, as the American commander, Major General Benjamin Lincoln, surrendered virtually the entire Southern Continental Army, together with a large number of militia, supplies and weapons to the British. Only a small force of Continental soldiers still operated in the South, as a contingent under Colonel Abraham Buford had been en route to provide additional support for the besieged city of Charleston. In one of the most villainous skirmishes of the Southern campaign, Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton and his British Legion annihilated Buford's small command of Continentals at the Waxhaws, South Carolina, on May 29, 1780.¹⁸

Anxious to seal their victories, the British fanned out forces to pacify the backcountry, establishing strong posts as key strategic towns, including Ninety Six, South Carolina, in June, 1780. Ninety Six was chosen not only for its strategic location but also because the British believed that large numbers of Loyalists lived in the surrounding area, ready to support the Crown. The British commander, Colonel Nisbet Balfour, and his troops were accompanied by the newly appointed Inspector of Militia, Major Patrick Ferguson, as they journeyed to Ninety Six, which was taken with little effort on June 19, 1780. Cornwallis then chose Lieutenant-Colonel John Harris Cruger, a New York Loyalist, to lead at Ninety Six, and Balfour returned to Charleston to take command of the city. Ferguson was initially successful with his campaign to attract and train Loyalist troops in the vicinity of Ninety Six; however, his early triumphs came to a swift and final defeat at the Battle of Kings Mountain, on October 7, 1780.¹⁹

Cornwallis, reacting to Ferguson's defeat at Kings Mountain and other rebel victories gained by the small bands of partisan fighters operating in South Carolina after his victory at Camden, South Carolina on August 16, 1780, wrote to Balfour on November 1, 1780, to apprise him of the strategic importance of Ninety Six that it "must be kept at all events & I think no reasonable expense should be spared-- besides Georgia depends entirely upon it. . . ." ²⁰

It was Cornwallis's concern for the safety of his strategic outpost at Ninety Six that caused him to send Tarleton and his troops westward to guard against the possibility that Lieutenant General Daniel Morgan and his "flying army" might target Ninety Six

when they split from Major General Nathanael Greene's main Southern Continental Army in January 1781, to launch Greene's strategy to reestablish rebel control of the South. Following Tarleton's defeat at Cowpens by Morgan and his motley assortment of Continentals, state troops, and militia on January 17, 1781, Cornwallis continued to express concern for the safety of his key back-country forts. He cautioned Lieutenant Colonel Francis Lord Rawdon, one of Britain's most capable Southern field commanders, on February 4, 1781, "You know the importance of Ninety Six, let that place be your constant care. . . ." ²¹

Events in the South quickly began to unravel for Cornwallis and the British cause. Enraged by Tarleton's defeat at Cowpens, Cornwallis threw all his resources into overtaking Morgan and re-capturing the British prisoners that Morgan was rapidly escorting northward, away from the British strongpoints in South Carolina. The British and American forces set a grueling pace in the "Race to the Dan" as Greene and Morgan directed their forces toward safety, while laying a nightmarish path for Cornwallis and his forces through a territory strongly sympathetic to the rebel cause and picked clean of food and forage. The resultant Battle at Guilford Court House, nominally a British victory, exhausted and decimated the British force. Incapable of further offensive actions, Cornwallis turned north, toward Virginia and destiny, while Greene turned south in April, 1781 to take advantage of his renewed position of strength and begin a campaign to retake British southern strongholds, including the post at Ninety Six. ²²

Meanwhile, the British and Loyalist forces at Ninety Six had not been idle. Cruger significantly improved the fortifications at Ninety Six. Beginning in September 1780, he had worked ceaselessly to secure Ninety Six, building two redoubts and a block house, improving the existing palisade surrounding the village with a deep ditch, which was further enhanced with an abatis; felled trees intertwined and set into the ground with sharpened ends facing the direction of potential attack. Lieutenant Henry Haldane, a military engineer Cornwallis sent to the post, designed one of the redoubts as a Star Fort, an eight-pointed design which would allow defenders to fire musket and cannon in all directions. The Star Fort was also protected by a ditch and abatis. Ninety Six's "Achilles heel" was its water supply, provided by a small stream to the west of the village. The location of the second redoubt, Holmes Fort, was positioned to protect the water supply. All the fortifications were connected by trenches or by covered walkways. ²³

The rebels began their war of posts at some of the less important outposts, including Fort Watson. Held by a small group of Loyalists and regulars, the fort was attacked by the combined force of Colonel Henry "Light Horse Harry" Lee and the partisans of Colonel Francis Marion. A significant innovation was introduced during the siege of Fort Watson, when Colonel Hezekiah Maham, accompanying Lee and Marion, designed and led the construction of what came to be known as a Maham tower. The tower was designed to rise above the fortifications of the outpost to allow the attackers to fire effectively at the defenders. Its successful use at Fort Watson set the stage for its use at the sieges of Augusta and of Ninety Six. ²⁴ The rebels successfully campaigned against the scattered British outposts, with the Battle of Hobrick's Hill leading to the evacuation of Camden, long a strategic location for the British. Only two significant outposts remained in British hands; Augusta, Georgia and Ninety Six. ²⁵

Greene led his army to Ninety Six. Accompanied by the Polish Colonel Thaddeus Kosciuszko, a military engineer, Greene reviewed the state of Ninety Six's fortifications and was dismayed by their strength. Cruger, a Loyalist from a prominent New York family, and his Loyalist defenders were well prepared for Greene. ²⁶ Nevertheless, Greene and Kosciuszko elected to besiege the fortifications. While educated in military engineering and held in high regard by Greene as well as Commander-in-Chief General George Washington, it is questionable whether Kosciuszko was familiar with the siege tactics developed by the French engineer, Sébastien le Prestre de Vauban, who had perfected the art of siege warfare in the seventeenth century. ²⁷ The initial siege trenches dug by the rebel sappers began only seventy yards from the Star Fort, which was aggressively defended by Cruger. The American sappers were fired upon by the fort's small cannons and wiped out by a sortie from the fort led by Loyalist Lieutenant John Roney. Quickly realizing their mistake, the Americans began their next round of parallel siege trenches "at a more respectful distance [400 yards]." ²⁸ The American entrenchments, now proceeding at a much safer distance from the Star Fort, proceeded at a furious pace as Kosciuszko's sappers worked continuously. As the rebels dug closer to the fort, the defenders' accurate fire had a lethal effect. Greene ordered that a Maham tower be erected while Cruger countered the latest threat by raising the walls of the Star Fort with sandbags, allowing his riflemen to continue their deadly work. Cruger also attempted to bring down the Maham tower by firing at it with heated cannonballs, but the tower had been constructed of green wood and did not set ablaze. Greene resorted to firing flaming arrows into the fort; Cruger simply removed the roofs from the interior structures. Lee and his force joined Greene at Ninety Six on June 8, 1781, after successfully seizing the British fort at Augusta. Lee was given the task to take the second redoubt, Holmes Fort, and cut off the supply of water to Cruger. Lee's success controlling the water supply led Cruger to employ naked African American slaves who dared rebel fire to deliver water at night to the fort by way of the trenches that connected the Star Fort

to the remainder of the fortifications. Clearly concerned for Ninety Six, Rawdon set out to relieve the town. As Rawdon approached, Greene grew more desperate. He began the construction of a mine to tunnel close to the Star Fort and blast through its walls. Greene sought to delay Rawdon, but Rawdon's route took him away from the troops of Colonel Andrew Pickens and Lieutenant Colonel William Washington, who had been sent out to slow and divert him. Balfour was able to get word to Cruger that help was on the way; a farmer leisurely approached the fort, and when close, spurred his horse to a gallop under a hail of rebel bullets. He safely entered the fort and provided his welcome news to Cruger. Both sides now aware that Rawdon was closing in, Greene sought to bring an end to the siege by an outright assault. The Americans recruited volunteers and a small group, the "Forlorn Hope," was sent to bring down the walls of the Star Fort with grappling hooks. Under heavy fire, they were attacked by two sally parties from the fort, which resulted in heavy losses on the American side. Greene considered his losses, his lack of prospect for success, and the imminent arrival of Rawdon; he judiciously ended the assault. As he had done so in previous engagements during the Southern Campaign, Greene lost the battle, but "won the war."²⁹

Compared to the major sieges of the Southern campaign, the sieges of Savannah, Georgia, Charleston, South Carolina, and Yorktown, Virginia, the siege of Ninety Six was a relatively small affair, yet it had moments of intense brutality involving small groups of men, like the final, hopeless assault attempted by the rebel "Forlorn Hope." The British capture of Savannah on December 29, 1778 predated the main British Southern offensive, and was undertaken by Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell with a force of about 3,000 British regulars and Loyalist troops. Confusion among the American rebel defenders' command allowed the city of Savannah to be taken by Campbell's forces so quickly that the town itself suffered no damage. The attempt to re-take Savannah by a combined American and French force in September 1779 united approximately 3,500 troops under French Admiral Charles D'Estaing with a force of about 1,500 Continentals and militia led by Major General Benjamin Lincoln. Outnumbered, the British forces fought fiercely. Campbell's defensive force included Cruger, who likely learned the value of an active and aggressive resistance during this siege. The British, in an intense and bloody defense of Savannah, convinced the Franco-American besiegers that a continued, prolonged siege of Savannah would be far too costly to their forces. The allies lost a significant part of their attack force, including the formidable Colonel Casimir Pulaski, the "Father of American Cavalry," who was mortally wounded leading a cavalry charge. All told, the allied losses were over 750 dead and wounded, while the British lost approximately 150 men to death, desertion or battle wounds. The unsuccessful siege of Savannah was the bloodiest engagement since the Battle of Bunker and Breeds Hills and bequeathed to Cruger, the future defender of Ninety Six, the lessons that the besieged can prevail.³⁰

Unlike the sieges of both Ninety Six and Savannah, the sieges of Charleston and Yorktown resulted in success for the besiegers and were significant turning points in the war. The British siege of Charleston took intensive preparation, the commitment of a large joint British Army and Royal Navy force, the naval transport of almost 10,000 British troops, and the flawless execution of the British Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Henry Clinton. Launched by an attack led by Major General Charles Lord Cornwallis, on March 29, 1780, Charleston fell to the British on May 11, 1780, following a combined land siege and sea bombardment of the city which cost the American cause thousands of Continental troops and approximately 1,200 militia, virtually wiping out the American Continental force in the South and paving the way for the perilous, and ultimately tragically flawed, British Southern campaign. Lincoln was not successful in protecting the American interests, especially the valuable Continental forces, due in large part to interference from the civilian leaders in Charleston, a factor that did not come into play at Ninety Six.³¹

The siege of Yorktown turned the tables on the British with a virtual mirror image of the earlier siege of Charleston. This time, the combined Franco-American forces, led by American Commander-in-Chief General George Washington and French Lieutenant General Jean Baptiste de Donatien de Vimeur, the comte de Rochambeau, were aligned against Cornwallis, who had boxed himself and his troops into a trap at Yorktown. French Rear Admiral Francois Joseph Paul, the comte de Grasse, provided French naval support to the American-led siege of Yorktown, and Cornwallis' fate was sealed. Unlike Cruger's extensive preparations and aggressive actions, Cornwallis exhibited a surprising malaise, rather than his characteristically forceful and active reactions to his situation, and on October 19, 1781, he surrendered. The British effort to retain its American colonies was shattered.³²

In the end, it was the strategic significance of Ninety Six that doomed its future. Ninety Six ended in a blaze of fire and smoke as Cruger, late its savior, was ordered by Lord Rawdon to torch the town and shepherd its Loyalist inhabitants to Charleston. With the fall of Ninety Six, the war in the backcountry was indeed lost.³³ No Southern phoenix was destined to rise from the ashes of Ninety Six. The site of the town, the courthouse, and jail is today marked off with stakes and twine. Together with National Park Service field maps, little but the outline of Ninety Six is left to tell its tale. The earthen area by the remains of the Star Fort traces the siege

trenches. The rebels' attempt to mine the Star Fort is simply now a mound of earth, awaiting future excavation. The Cherokee path remains, however, a silent, haunted trail through the Southern forest; a testament to the peoples who lived, traded, fought and died at one of the most strategic sites to the British Southern Campaign of the American War of Independence.

Notes

¹ Marvin L. Cann, "War in the Backcountry: The Siege of Ninety Six, May 22-June 19, 1781," *The South Carolina Historical Magazine* 72, no. 1 (Jan., 1971): 2. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27567019> (accessed December 29, 2011).

² Ibid.

³ Robert D. Bass, *Ninety Six: The Struggle for the South Carolina Back Country* (Lexington, SC: The Sandlapper Store, Inc., 1978), 13-39; John S. Pancake, *This Destructive War: The British Campaign in the Carolinas, 1780-1782* (1985; repr., Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 1992), 209-214.

⁴ Lawrence E. Babits, *A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 8; Stanley D. M. Carpenter, "British Strategic Failure in the Southern Campaign, 1778-1781." *Naval War College Paper*, 2008, 39.

⁵ Pancake, *This Destructive War*, 209-216.

⁶ Bass, *Ninety Six*, 13; Robert M. Dunkerly and Eric K. Williams, *Old Ninety Six: A History and Guide* (Charleston, SC: The History Press, 2006), 11-12; Guy Prentice, "Ninety Six National Historic Site Cultural Overview," National Park Service, (2003). <http://www.nps.gov/seac/SoutheastChronicles/NISI/NISI-Cultural-Overview.htm> (accessed February 4, 2012).

⁷ Bass, *Ninety Six*, 20; Prentice, "Ninety Six National Historic Site."

⁸ John Buchanan, *The Road to Guilford Courthouse: The American Revolution in the Carolinas* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1997), 20; Robert Stansbury Lambert, *South Carolina Loyalists in the American Revolution* 2nd ed. Clemson: Clemson University Digital Press, 2010. <http://www.clemson.edu/caah/cedp/cudp/pubs/lambert/lambert.pdf> (accessed December 18, 2011).

⁹ Tyler Boulware, "The Effect of the Seven Years' War on the Cherokee Nation," *Early American Studies* 5, no. 2 (Fall 2007): 396-399. <http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/docview/195872376?accountid=8289> (accessed February 11, 2012); Buchanan, *The Road to Guilford Courthouse*, 19-22; Lambert, *South Carolina Loyalists*, 2.

¹⁰ Boulware, "The Effect of the Seven Years' War," 404-408.

¹¹ Bass, *Ninety Six*, 28, 45-46; Boulware, "The Effect of the Seven Years' War," 410-415.

¹² Bass, *Ninety Six*, 55-67; Boulware, "The Effect of the Seven Years' War," 410-415; Buchanan, *Guilford Courthouse*, 20; Merrill Jensen, *The Founding of a Nation: A History of the American Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 28-29; Robert Middlekauff, *The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763-1789* (Revised ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 182-183.

¹³ Lambert, *South Carolina Loyalists*, 7.

¹⁴ Buchanan, *Guilford Courthouse*, 91-99; Pancake, *This Destructive War*, 73-75.

¹⁵ Buchanan, *Guilford Courthouse*, 101; Marvin L. Cann, "Prelude to War: The First Battle of Ninety Six: November 19-21, 1775," *The South Carolina Historical Magazine* 76, no. 4 (October, 1975), pp. 197-214; Lambert, *South Carolina Loyalists*, 31; Pancake, *This Destructive War*, 76.

¹⁶ Carpenter, "British Strategic Failure," 73; Middlekauff, *The Glorious Cause*, 391; Pancake, *This Destructive War*, 1-4.

¹⁷ Pancake, *This Destructive War*, 9-13.

¹⁸ Pancake, *This Destructive War*, 32, 63-67, 70-71.

¹⁹ Pancake, *This Destructive War*, 116-120; Buchanan, *Guilford Courthouse*, 80; Cann, "War in the Backcountry," 1.

²⁰ Cann, "War in the Backcountry," 2; Pancake, *This Destructive War*, 104-106.

²¹ Cann, "War in the Backcountry," 2; Pancake, *This Destructive War*, 131-138.

²² Cann, "War in the Backcountry," 4; Pancake, *This Destructive War*, 159-186.

²³ Lawrence E. Babits, "Patterning in Earthen Fortifications," in *Historical archaeology of military sites: method and topic*, ed. Clarence R. Geier, Lawrence E. Babits, Douglas D. Scott, David G. Orr (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2010), 115; Cann, "War in the Backcountry," 4.

²⁴ Paul K. Walker, *Engineers of Independence: A Documentary History of the Army Engineers in the American Revolution, 1775-1783* (Honolulu, Hawaii: University Press of the Pacific, 2002) 281.

²⁵ Pancake, *This Destructive War*, 200-201.

²⁶ Cann, "War in the Backcountry," 6; Pancake, *This Destructive War*, 209-210.

²⁷ Jamel M. Ostwald, *Vauban's Siege Legacy in The War of the Spanish Succession, 1702-1712*, PhD diss., The Ohio State University, 2002. <http://etd.ohiolink.edu/send-pdf.cgi/Ostwald%20Jamel%20M.pdf?osu1039049324> (accessed February 12, 2012).

²⁸ Walker, *Engineers of Independence*, 285.

²⁹ Cann, "War in the Backcountry," 7.

³⁰ Pancake, *This Destructive War*, 32-35.

³¹ Pancake, *This Destructive War*, 62-66.

³² Carpenter, "British Strategic Failure," 60, 66-72; Pancake, *This Destructive War*, 222-230.

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THE DELIAN LEAGUE: A PRELUDE TO EMPIRE AND WAR

KEN OZIAH
UNDERGRADUATE

During the classical period of Greece, the rise of the Delian League was a major factor that led to the Peloponnesian War. What changed over time that transformed the league into an empire? In order to repel a possible third invasion by Persia, Greek city-states met on the island of Delos to form a confederation, or league. In their quest to repel invasion, Athens, which was the foremost city-state in the league, grew in prominence and power, eventually turning the Delian League into the Athenian Empire. Thus, the formation of the Delian League was a prelude to empire and war.

The wheels of war were set in motion as far back as 546 BC, when Persian King Cyrus conquered the Lydian kingdom of Greeks on Anatolia.¹ The Persian kings were very interested in gaining territory in Europe. Interestingly, it was the ousted Athenian tyrant, Hippias, who piqued the Persian interest in the rest of Greece. Hippias had fled to Sardis, which was a Persian satrapy. The satrap, Artaphrenes, after hearing the complaints of an Athenian delegation against Hippias, decided to support Hippias.²

This led to a later attack on Sardis and an Ionian revolt. There were fights and battles all over Anatolia during the years that followed 499 BC.³ The Persians attacked and destroyed Miletus, which further angered the Greeks.⁴ The mainland Greeks had always considered the Ionians as Greeks, as the Ionians were Greek settlers from ancient times. The Greeks considered the subjugation of Ionia as a direct threat to Greece. Fueled by his interest in Greece, as well as the burning of Sardis in 498 BC, Darius set out to conquer Greece.

Darius sent his son, Mardonios, with an army and fleet to cross the Hellespont. He was successful in gaining territory in Thrace and Macedonia, bringing areas of Europe under Persian control.⁵ Apparently, many of the smaller islands gave in to Darius' demands for submission to his kingship. However, his main targets were Athens and then Sparta. A Spartan delegation had previously warned the Persians not to harm any Greeks, however it was mere rhetoric.⁶ Emboldened, the Persians went forward with their plans.

Hippias, still hoping to regain power in Athens, accompanied the Persian fleet and possibly suggested Marathon as the landing place for the Persians.⁷ Marathon was considered an intriguing landing spot as it would draw the Athenian army out away from the city. Hippias believed he still had allies in Athens and hoped that once the anti-Persian force left Athens, his allies would assume control of the city. The Athenians were successful in blocking the two exits from the plain of Marathon. Herodotus noted the Persians probably thought the Athenians were crazy as they rushed the Persian line to attack.⁸

However, the Athenians wanted to launch their attack as the cavalry was out of the camp. The ensuing battle was disastrous for the Persian forces. Some seven thousand Persians perished while reports indicated that only 192 Athenians were lost.⁹ After the battle of Marathon, the Athenians returned home to face the Persian naval forces that had left the area of Marathon in an attempt to gain a victory over Athens.

The plan had been to conquer the city while the army was fighting at Marathon. The Athenians returned to lower Attica in time to confront the Persians, resulting in a Persian withdrawal. Hippias would never again rule in Athens. Hippias dreams of reclaiming what he believed was his to begin with drifted away with the Persian navy.

Darius I died from an illness in 486 BC and was succeeded by his son, Xerxes I.¹⁰ The Greeks should have been well informed of Xerxes' intentions. He spent the years of 484 BC to 481 BC making numerous preparations to attack Greece. Noted Greek historian Terry Buckley tells us of Xerxes' massive construction projects, such as a canal through the isthmus of Mt. Athos, which was the site of a tragedy in 492 BC for a previous Persian fleet. He also built a boat bridge across the Hellespont and arranged food depots, roads and outposts along the route.

Xerxes was keenly interested in paving roads into Greece.¹¹ Xerxes' forethought, planning, and monumental building projects in preparation for his invasion of Greece belie the frequently held notion of the man as a foolish and headstrong leader prone to rash

decisions. Xerxes moved his land and naval forces in conjunction with each other during 480 BC. Moving through Thrace and Macedonia, he made his way through Thessaly virtually unaccosted.¹² Xerxes moved south to Thermopylae.

Here, he was faced with approximately seven thousand men from Sparta and Phocis.¹³ This part of Greek history was immortalized through the Hollywood movie 300. The Spartan King, Leonidas, defied Xerxes long enough to send away a major portion of the forces under him and gave the other Greeks time to gather together in an effort to defend Greece from a Persian conquest. Once finishing off Leonidas and his Spartans, Xerxes marched to Athens, which had been vacated by its citizens. Xerxes, perhaps in retribution for the burning of Sardis, sacked Athens and burned the Acropolis.¹⁴ Xerxes moved his fleet in connection with his land forces.

While watching from his throne, Xerxes could see the battle of Salamis in 480 BC. Themistocles had engaged in an amount of subterfuge and thus the Persians were tricked into attacking the Greek fleet in the straits around Salamis. After the naval defeat Xerxes placed the blame on Phoenician captains and executed them; something it seems he did often. Xerxes went back to his empire in Asia Minor and left a force under the command of Mardonios in Greece. Mardonios died the following year, 479 BC, in the battle of Plataea.¹⁵ This battle concluded Persian aggression in Greece, whether on the islands or the mainland.

Sparta left the Hellenic League a couple of years after the final defeat of the Persians on the Greek mainland, in 477 BC. Before leaving the Hellenic League, they had taken over Cyprus and Byzantion.¹⁶ With the loss of Sparta, there was much discussion which city-state should be in charge of the league. A new league, it was thought, should be formed with new goals and ideals.

The new league met on the island of Delos. Many city-states met there, possibly as many as 150.¹⁷ Athens was, of course, the primary city-state in the league, later named the Delian League by modern historians. Each polis was assessed 460 talents, and paid in either specie or ships put towards the league fleet. This league was also meant to be a permanent one, with the members swearing an oath and sinking lumps of iron into the sea to seal the oath; it was intended to remain intact until the lumps of iron rose back to the top of the sea.¹⁸

The league's aim was to have vengeance upon Persia and extract compensation for past aggressions; a very attractive goal for the poleis, as Persia was a rich empire. The Greeks were still well aware of the burning of Miletus by the Persians as well as the burning of the Persepolis and the sacking of Athens. Persia would pay for the insolence and insults. The Greeks on the mainland of Anatolia also wanted to remain free from Persian rule. Buckley pointed to one literary source that noted the league had a unicameral legislature, but this is in dispute.¹⁹

The treasury of the league was centered at Delos, which was of some religious significance to the Greeks. Aristides of Athens was also assigned to examine the various islands and city-states to assign appropriate contributions from them towards the league.²⁰ The annual contributions of money and ships poured in, which made Athens richer and more powerful as time progressed. The league pushed the Persians out of Europe and back from Ionia. Each victory emboldened the Athenians into presenting themselves as the premiere polis in the league.

The navy was built with triremes, the powerful ships of the day. With these potent ships, the league's navy could enforce the will of the league, and increasingly Athens, on the lesser polis and islands. The trireme was the formidable tool of the navy at the time. Approximately nine times longer than wide, the trireme was about 120' by 15' and accommodated 170 oarsmen.²¹ They were also built for ramming, as could be discerned from the front of all triremes.

Soon, the league, mainly Athens, began forcing other islands to join the alliance. One case in point was the island of Naxos. Naxos had decided to leave the alliance, and as a result, the league navy responded. They had already forced Carystus, located on the southern part of Euboea, to submit to league demands and join. At Naxos, the league navy confiscated the Naxians triremes and demanded future payments to the league be in specie rather than military contributions.²²

Many in the league were becoming distrustful of Athens, as she held sway over the league and its treasury. The culmination of the league's goals came at the battle of Eurymedon in 467 BC. The Persians were dramatically defeated at the Eurymedon River. Not only did the league defeat the Persian navy, but they landed and defeated the army as well.²³ With the decisive defeat of the Persians at Eurymedon, what would follow for the league?

The purpose of the league, for some, had been accomplished and therefore was no longer necessary. As was already pointed out, Athens had begun to bully other city-states and islands into doing what the Athenian leaders wanted. The victory Ci-

mon brought for Athens and the league was a double-edged sword. Victory over Persia ensured there would be no further Persian aggression. It also would bring about the demise of Athenian supremacy, at least in theory. Athens was not willing to lose its control over the league, which they reminded others was supposed to be an indefinite league.

The winds of change were brewing. The previously referred to attack on Carystus, was also an attack on fellow Greeks, not to drive out Persians but to ensure submission to Athens. The Euboeans on the southern part of the island were enjoying all the benefits of the league but not contributing towards its expense. More to the point, Carystus was an important port on the corn trade routes, meaning Athens needed to control Carystus to govern the food route.²⁴ Afterwards, the island state of Thasos decided to abandon the league.

A major consideration was the silver mines close by, in Thrace. It took Athens two years of fighting to conquer Thasos. Afterwards, they also claimed the silver mines and exacted Thasos' payments to the league from the point forward in specie only, rather than in vessels.²⁵ The years that followed saw more revolts and led to political intrigue in Athens. Themistocles was eventually forced out, ending up in Persia, the very nation he had fought so hard to defeat.²⁶

In Athens, through Cimon's fall from grace and through the reforms of Ephialtes, the Athenian Empire, as the league was becoming, was still prosecuting fellow Greeks who failed to live up to the conditions of the league charter. Things took a turn for the worse after the assassination of Ephialtes, as Pericles took the reins of government. The fact that Pericles was able to remain the leading figure in Athenian government from approximately 461 BC until his death from the plague in 429 BC- shows he was either a master of political intrigue, or extremely loved ; or perhaps it was a little of both. The league began fighting the Peloponnesian league as well as other nations, such as Egypt.

Athens was so concerned with maintaining control over the league, now their empire, that Athenian leaders were willing to fight anyone at any time. The ensuing years brought about battles with the Peloponnesian league, headed by Sparta. One of the sparks that ignited the hostilities between the two leagues was in Megara, which had decided to leave the Peloponnesian league and join Athens. This pitted her against Corinth, who was very afraid of Athenian expansionism. The battle proved disastrous for Sparta and her league because it drew Athens into the politics of the Boeotia region and by 456 BC, the Athenians controlled the region, minus Thebes.²⁷

In 454 BC, the Delian league faced a bitter defeat in Egypt, causing even more rifts and strife in the league.²⁸ More revolts had to be put down and Athens tightened its grip on the league members. The scope of the impact outlined by Thucydides' account of the period has been questioned; however, Pomeroy states the fighting against Artaxerxes in Egypt was indeed disastrous for Greece.²⁹ The defeat was not the only calamitous occurrence in 454 BC. The Athenians also moved the league treasury from Delos to Athens, claiming that Delos was now vulnerable to pirates and Persians alike.

At this point, the Delian league ceased to exist for all intents and purposes and became a de facto empire, the Athenian Empire. This empire would be embroiled in battles termed the Peloponnesian wars. Though not a world war as defined by modern day historians, the Peloponnesian wars were a great regional conflict that caused the death of thousands of people. The wars were interrupted by the misnamed Thirty Years' Peace, with Athens signing peace treaties with one state after another.³⁰ This peace would not last thirty years, lasting approximately fifteen years.

Pericles and the Athenians were once again at war with Sparta and the Peloponnesian league, termed the Archidamian war. This would be the end of Pericles as in 429 BC, with Spartan soldiers laying siege to Athens, a plague spread through the city, killing Pericles and many of the citizens and soldiers of Athens.³¹ The war would soon conclude and with it, Athens' power base disappeared.

The Delian league was formed as a way for the Greeks to counter any further Persian aggression into Greece. Persian kings had twice entered Greece, sacked and burned Athens and the Acropolis and caused great suffering and death to the people of Greece. While the league had begun with noble intentions, it was later used as a tool of Athenian aggression, not only towards Persia, but towards fellow Greeks who failed to comply with Athenian demands. The Delian league was indeed a prelude to wars that would devastate the mainland of Greece almost as much as the Persian wars.

Notes

- ¹ Sarah B. Pomeroy, *Ancient Greece: A Political, Social and Cultural History*, 2nd Ed., (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 202
- ² Robert Morkot, *Historical Atlas of Ancient Greece*, (New York: Penguin Books, 1996), 66
- ³ Victor Ehrenberg, *From Solon to Socrates: Greek History and Civilization During the 6th and 5th Centuries BC*, (New York: Routledge, 2011), 99
- ⁴ Pomeroy, 207
- ⁵ Morkot, 66; Pomeroy, 207
- ⁶ PJ Rhodes, *A History of the Classical Greek World: 478-323 BC*, 2nd Ed., (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 121
- ⁷ Morkot, 66-67. Map on p. 75 shows the first campaign of Darius.
- ⁸ AD Godley, *Herodotus, with an English translation*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920), Hdt. 6.112.2
- ⁹ Morkot, 74
- ¹⁰ Pomeroy, 215, 216
- ¹¹ Terry Buckley, *Aspects of Greek History: 750-323 BC: a source-based approach*, (New York: Routledge, 1996), 122
- ¹² Morkot, 77. This map shows the route Xerxes forces took to enter Greece.
- ¹³ Pomeroy, 219
- ¹⁴ Ibid.
- ¹⁵ Ibid, 220
- ¹⁶ Ehrenberg, 155
- ¹⁷ Pomeroy, 229
- ¹⁸ Buckley, 142
- ¹⁹ Ibid, 143, 144
- ²⁰ Ibid, 145
- ²¹ Pomeroy, 217. Pg 216 shows a picture of a modern day built trireme Olympias, built in the 1980's in Piraeus. The 1987 sea trial used 170 oarsmen with the ship achieving nine knots and able to make a 180 degree turn. For more information, see: <http://science.discovery.com/videos/what-the-ancients-knew-olympias-the-trireme-replica.html>
- ²² Ibid, 233
- ²³ Ibid, 231
- ²⁴ Buckley, 147
- ²⁵ Pomeroy, 231
- ²⁶ Plutarch. *Plutarch's lives, with an English Translation by Bernadotte Perrin*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, London. William Heinemann Ltd. 1914), 2
- ²⁷ Pomeroy, 236
- ²⁸ Buckley, 150
- ²⁹ Pomeroy, 236
- ³⁰ Ibid, 237
- ³¹ Ibid, 322

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MERCENARIES AND THE CONGO CRISIS

PATRICK S. BAKER

ALUMNI

Soldier Of Fortune

Down through history men have done it all the time.

You fight on foreign shores not protecting your Fatherland.

Yours is an act of aggression, something not very grand.

A Soldier of fortune fighting for filthy money,

Anonymous

Mercenaries have existed as long as organized armies and for as long as they have existed they have been despised and denigrated. Aristotle wrote against them, as did Machiavelli.¹ Yet there has always been a "market for mercenaries."² In the mid-20th century the best market for mercenaries was the newly independent Republic of the Congo. Indeed within Africa the 1960s were a "golden age" of mercenarism.³

This paper will examine the specific circumstances during the Congo Crisis of 1960-67 that precipitated this new heyday of the mercenary and the responses to this new mercenarism? Mercenarism as a military, political, and economic phenomenon in post-colonial Congo will be examined. By focusing on the Congo Crisis, this paper will illustrate the circumstances that encourage the wide-scale use of mercenary soldiers. Counter-mercenary operations will be examined. Further, mercenarism as a driver for United Nations interventionism and Cold War conflict in the post-imperial Third World will be explored. Lastly, the economics of mercenarism will be analyzed.

The Republic of Congo was declared independent from Belgium on June 30, 1960. No other country in the world was as woefully unprepared for self-government as the former Belgian Congo. Among a native population of 13.7 million there were only 30 college graduates and not one Western-trained native Congolese lawyer, doctor, or judge.⁴ Nine different political parties ran candidates in the first national election, but only two of the parties offered candidates outside of their own tribal power centers. The winning party, Patrice Lumumba's Mouvement Nationale Congolais (MNC), won only 33 seats in the 137-seat legislature. Lumumba became Prime Minister and the opposition leader of the Alliance des Bakongo (ABAKO) party, Joseph Kasa-Vubu was elected President of the Republic.⁵ This arrangement guaranteed inter-governmental conflict.

The one public institution on which the government had to depend was the Force Publique, the national gendarmerie; a unit of soldiers, serving as a heavily armed police force. The Force had to maintain order, if the newly elected government was to survive. It was a 24,000 man army lead by 1,000 Belgian officers, with no Congolese above the rank of sergeant. Only five days after independence the Force mutinied over low pay and lack of advancement for natives. The main targets of the mutineers were Europeans. European men were beaten, some women were raped and there were even reports of cannibalism.⁶ On 7 July, Lumumba renamed the Force Publique the Armée Nationale Congolaise or ANC. He dismissed all the Belgian officers and appointed Congolese in their place. He also promoted the entire army one grade, leaving the ANC as the only army in the world with no privates.⁷ These moves failed to quell the violence.⁸

Meanwhile, between 9 and 11 July, in order to protect its own citizens and other Europeans, Belgium deployed thousands of paratroopers and a naval force. The Belgian government did not ask permission to send these troops. While the elite Para-Commandos did manage to suppress the violence in some areas, in others the Belgian forces overreacted, which sparked even more bloodshed. This new round of mayhem caused the Belgians to occupy most of the major cities, including the capitol of Leopoldville.⁹

In the midst of this chaos, Moïse Tshombe, leader of the Confederation des Associations Tribales du Katanga (CONAKAT) party and administrative head of Katanga Province, declared that mineral-rich region independent of the Congo. Union Minière, the Belgian mining company had strong economic interests in the region and feared the Lumumba government would seize its assets. The mining company's leaders appealed to the Belgian government for help. Belgian troops soon disarmed and expelled all ANC troops from Katanga. Former Force Publique officers set about training a Katangan Gendarmerie. A team of Belgian military officers, labeled a "technical advisor team" landed in Elisabethville, the Katangan capitol, to aid Tshombe.¹⁰

In desperation on 11 July, Lumumba and Kasa-Vubu in a rare show of cooperation, made a joint appeal to the United Nations for help. On 14 July, the Security Council met and voted on a mandate for the UN to deploy forces to the Congo to restore order. Within days over 4,000 troops from 12 countries were in place. By early August 1960 the original mandate had largely been fulfilled with all Belgian troops out of the country, except those in Katanga, and some measure of order was reestablished.¹¹ However, anxious to reunite the entire country and facing yet another secession crisis, this time in diamond-rich South Kasai, Lumumba shrilly demanded the UN launch military actions to bring the rebel provinces to heel. He did not receive an answer and so on 15 August asked the Soviet Union for direct military aid.¹² The USSR quickly reacted to Lumumba's request by sending a fleet of 15 Ilyushin Il-14 transports, 200 trucks and military advisors from both Czechoslovakia and Russia.¹³ Moving quickly, Lumumba had the ANC seize Luluabourg, the capitol of South Kasai. These troops then moved toward the Katangan border. An alarmed Tshombe dispatched a force that stopped the government offensive cold.¹⁴

The request for Soviet help was too much for the West leaning Kasa-Vubu. On 5 September, the president dismissed Lumumba as prime minister. Lumumba responded by dismissing Kasa-Vubu from his post. Fearing a Soviet takeover of the Congo, the United States, through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), aided General Mobutu, Chief of Staff of the ANC, in a coup. In this coup, Mobutu placed Lumumba under arrest and supported President Kasa-Vubu. Lumumba tried to escape but was soon recaptured. Mobutu then had the former Prime Minister shipped to Katanga. On 17 January 1961, at Tshombe's orders, Lumumba was killed by a firing squad lead by a Belgian officer. The CIA also colluded in his death.¹⁵

At this point, just six months after independence, the Congo was split into four parts. Mobutu and Kasa-Vubu were in nominal control of the legitimate central government and its army. But, in reality their power did not extend much beyond Léopoldville province. Leftist MNC leader, Antoine Gizenga, as Lumumba's successor, was defacto ruler of the eastern part of the country. Some ANC troops supported him, as did the Communist bloc. Tshombe continued to hold Katanga, with thinly disguised Belgian support. South Kasai also reasserted its independence with obvious Belgian assistance. Only the UN provided any stability.¹⁶

After Lumumba's murder the UN decided to take stronger action in the Congo. In 1961 the Security Council passed two resolutions; 161(1961) which authorized force to prevent violence between contending parties of the civil strife and 169(1961) which specifically authorized operations to detain and deport mercenaries.¹⁷

During the international and internal maneuverings, Katanga and its corporate sponsor, Union Minière had been hiring mercenaries and buying weapons, including modern aircraft. These mercenaries were a mixed lot of French, German, and South Africans; some were combat veterans fresh from the French Foreign Legion's failed mutiny in Algeria, others had served in the in the German military (Wehrmacht) during World War II or Nazi party's Armed (Waffen) SS. These white soldiers of fortune either provided much needed skills, like pilots, or were placed in training and leadership positions in the native Gendarmerie.¹⁸

From the start, Tshombe had more enemies than allies and he used the foreign-led Gendarmerie to deal with his internal enemies.¹⁹ By August 1961, the Gendarmerie was a well established, well-armed, and well-trained army. It was effectively led by Belgian officers and sergeants, as well as by some foreign mercenaries. It demonstrated, several times, that it was more than a match for the hapless ANC.²⁰ The numbers of mercenaries averaged about 400 throughout the secession. Later in the crisis, besides leading and training the native military, mercenaries were also organized into separate units.²¹

At this point, UN forces essentially went to war against the mercenaries and Katanga. In April 1961, the first direct conflict between UN troops and white mercenaries took place; a confused skirmish in which white mercenaries clashed with Ethiopian troops. Several Ethiopians were killed and about 30 mercenaries captured. The UN having, at that time, no mandate or legal system to handle the captured "dogs of war" simply expelled them from the Congo. But most soon returned.²²

On 1 August 1961, Kasa-Vubu appointed a new Prime Minister and the UN reorganized its forces; creating a separate command to deal with the Katanga Secession. The UN and the new Prime Minister demanded Tshombe expel his mercenaries. When

it became clear that Tshombe was not going to respond to the demands of either the UN or the central government, the UN command decided to conduct its own anti-mercenary operations.²³

Operation Rumpunch, launched on 28 August 1961, came as a surprise to the Katangese and the mercenaries. The UN forces scooped up about 400 of the approximately 500 foreigner military personnel, including some regular Belgian military, without firing a shot.²⁴ While the operation was not completely successful, the new willingness of the UN to go after the mercenaries and otherwise apply political pressure resulted in only a few of the mercenaries returning to the fight. Only about 100 known foreign fighters were still unaccounted for by 9 September 1961.²⁵

With this relative success under his belt, the UN Special Representative in Katanga, Conor Cruise O'Brien, decided to end the secession once and for all. He issued an ultimatum to Tshombe to surrender all foreign military personnel and report to the national capital in twenty-four hours. Tshombe did not respond and the deadline passed. On 13 September 1961 the UN launched Operation Morthor ("Hammer" or "Smash" in Hindi). After some initial successes, Cruise O'Brien prematurely announced that the Katangan Secession was over. On 14 September the Katangese struck back, strafing UN forces and within three days forced an Irish company of 184 men to surrender. On 21 September, a ceasefire was arranged.²⁶

Taking this stalemate as a victory, Tshombe and his gendarmerie upped the pressure on the UN by harassing officials, firing on UN troops and blockading their positions. In response to these actions the UN launched Operation Unokat (a portmanteau of "UN over Katanga").²⁷ The UN forces attacked on 5 December 1961. The opening move was an air raid on the Katangese Air Force. UN jets also bombed and strafed Elisabethville. Then the ground forces then went in. The fighting was fierce, with the mercenaries and the native gendarmes putting up stiff resistance. However, within two days the UN had crushed the Katangese and their mercenary allies.²⁸

The clear victor of the UN in Operation Unokat resulted in about a year of political maneuvering. All the while Tshombe hired mercenaries to strengthen his military hand. By October, the numbers of mercenaries reached the pre-Rumpunch levels of between 300 to 500 men. Further, the Katangese continued to harass and fire on the UN forces. On 24 December 1962, Katangan troop and mercenaries attacked the UN military and inflicted several casualties on the international troops. The UN forces kept their heads down and took these attacks for four days; finally on 28 December they struck back, launching Operation Grand-Slam.²⁹ This time there was little or no resistance as the UN quickly occupied key points and major cities in the breakaway province. By 21 January 1963 the secession was over. One hundred or so mercenaries and several thousand Katangan gendarmes retreated into Portuguese Angola.³⁰ Tshombe went into exile in Spain.³¹

The end of the Katanga Secession did little to restore order to the Congo.³² By early 1963, the Chinese and Cuban supported a revolt of Lumumbist in eastern Congo and the rebellion soon spread.³³ By July 1964, the Lumumbist fighters, called Simbas, had occupied half the country including Stanleyville.³⁴ More important, at least to the international community, were the massacres and atrocities that the Simba fighters carried out against Congolese government officials. Also of grave concern was that several Westerners had been captured and were being held hostage in Stanleyville.³⁵

The ANC was virtually useless in resisting the rebels. A well-armed force of 1500 ANC soldiers ran from a band of 40 Simbas. Sometimes ANC units would simply go over en masse to the insurgents. Only one commander, a Colonel Mulamba, proved effective when he led the successful defense of Bukavu.³⁶

In the midst of this chaos, UN forces left on 30 June 1964. That same day, with no little irony, President Kasa-Vubu recalled Tshombe and appointed him Prime Minister with the specific purpose of ending the Simba Revolt.³⁷ One of Tshombe's first acts was to call on mercenary leaders he knew from the Katanga Secession to form new units to fight the rebellion. These leaders included Michael "Mad Mike" Hoare and Bob Denard.³⁸ Jean "Black Jack" Schramme and some 8,000 former Katangese gendarmes crossed back from Angola into Katanga and nominally joined the ANC as "commandoes."³⁹

The Western powers seeing the Communists behind the latest troubles in Congo responded quickly. The Belgians sent regular military personnel to train and lead the ANC. They also provided weapons and logistical support. The CIA rapidly formed an "instant" air force manned by mercenary Cuban-exile pilots. This air force soon had some T-6 fighters, six T-28 fighters, six H-21 helicopters, and ten C-47 transports.⁴⁰

The situation was desperate and Tshombe ordered the mercenaries into action prematurely. A waterborne attack on Al-

bertville was a predictable failure. With this defeat and the total chaos in the efforts to train, equip and house the first wave of mercenaries, most recruits returned home.⁴¹

In August 1964, the Belgian government dispatched Colonel Frederic Vandewalle (Van der Walle) to the Congo. On his arrival, Vandewalle held a meeting with Tshombe, at which the Colonel told the Prime Minister that no political interference would be tolerated with military operations. Further, Vandewalle asked for and received authority to work directly with the Belgian logistics units, the CIA's air force and the mercenaries.⁴²

With the Belgian Colonel's support, Hoare soon organized a training base. He recruited a force of about 300 men into a unit called 5 Commando. The Belgians provided 5 Commando with weapons, ammo, trucks and uniforms. After a few weeks of training, Hoare's unit went into combat.⁴³

This hodgepodge of regular military, mercenary and spy agency sponsored units proved surprisingly effective against the Simbas. In just two months the revolt was all but crushed.⁴⁴ However, the mercenaries cannot take credit for the final nail in the coffin of the Simbas; Operation Dragon Rouge (Red Dragon) the airborne attack on Stanleyville by Belgian Para-Commandos, lifted by American Air Force C-130s accomplished that end.⁴⁵

However, the effective conclusion of the revolt was not the effective termination of mercenary operation in the Congo, nor was it the effective end of Communist involvement. In April 1965, Che Guevara arrived in the Congo, crossing from Tanzania into the Fizi-Baraka pocket, the last redoubt of the Simbas.⁴⁶ The Cubans were too late to affect the outcome of the fight and by October they and their Simba allies had been routed by Hoare's 5 Commando and the CIA's air force. Even though Hoare later admitted that it was his toughest fight.⁴⁷

On 25 November 1964, General Mobutu deposed Kasa-Vubu and took direct control of the government.⁴⁸ The month before Tshombe had been relieved of his position as Prime Minister and again went into exile.⁴⁹

Some mercenary units went into garrison and some were disarmed and demobilized. In June 1966, rumors that Tshombe was returning to take power caused some Katangese gendarmes to rise in support. This revolt was supported by at least one white-lead mercenary unit. This first mercenary revolt was brutally put down.⁵⁰

A year later another mercenaries' revolt took place, again in favor of Tshombe. This one ended almost as badly for the mercenaries as had the first. They were defeated and forced out of the country by a resurgent ANC; ironically with the CIA's Cuban-exile pilots flying air sorties. This was the last sad action of mercenaries in Congo in the 1960s.⁵¹

During the Congo Crisis there developed four patterns that led to the use of mercenaries. First was the need for military quality over quantity; mercenaries were used when they had unique, specialized and professional skills not otherwise available to a party in a conflict.⁵² In Katanga, mercenaries had piloting and other military skills that Tshombe could not otherwise obtain.⁵³ Further, Tshombe could depend on the loyalty of "his" mercenaries against both his internal and external foes.⁵⁴

The second pattern was the complimentary relationship between mass demobilizations of military professionals from one former warzone making them available to move into a new zone of conflict. This second pattern also fed the pattern of quality over quantity.⁵⁵ During the Katangan Secession it was not an accident that many of the original mercenaries were former French Legionaries fresh from Algeria, or even former British Royal Air Force (RAF) pilots.⁵⁶ During the Simba Revolt, many of the mercenary leaders were World War II veterans. The Irishman, Hoare, was a veteran of the British Army in India; one of his officers had won the Iron Cross fighting with the Waffen SS in Russia and Bob Denard, leader of 6 Commando, served with the French colonial forces in Indo-China and Morocco.⁵⁷

Thirdly, mercenaries thrived in areas of weak state power, in states that were unable to militarily control their territory.⁵⁸ The Katanga Secession was a double proof of this model, with the weak central government and the ineffectual ANC unable to prevent the crisis or put an end to it. Tshombe had to import mercenaries to secure his own territory against secondary insurgents.⁵⁹ The response to the Simba Revolt reinforced this third pattern with the feeble central government having to rely on mercenary units to maintain territorial integrity.⁶⁰

Also, within the construct of this third pattern was the wedge for one part of neocolonialism, as well as UN interventionism and Cold War conflict. Belgium, the former colonial power in the Congo, deliberately left the Congo feeble and fractured.⁶¹

Further, the Belgians seemed determined to maintain neocolonial power through inequitable treaty arrangements, extraterritorial basing rights and unfair business arrangements.⁶² There is little doubt that Belgian business interests took advantage of the weak national power to incite Tshombe to declare Katangan independence.⁶³

The powerless central government faced with multiple crises asked for UN intervention. The UN was called in to militarily strengthen the central government and maintain territorial integrity since the government was too weak to accomplish these goals on its own. This set up the conflict between the UN and the mercenaries, since the UN was acting as a defacto agent of the central power in an internal dispute and the mercenaries were supporting the separatists' interest in Katanga.⁶⁴

Even if the Chinese, Soviets and Cubans did not instigate the Simba Revolt, they took advantage of the weakness of the Congo's central government by supported it.⁶⁵ However, it should be noted, the revolt only really flared up and began to achieve real success after the departure of the UN and the resultant further weakening of the central government's armed forces. Involvement of the Communist Bloc drove a Western response. While it was politically impossible for American ground forces to intervene, nothing stopped the CIA from instead supplying planes and pilots. It is notable that the pilots were anti-Castro Cubans who flew for ideological, not monetary, reasons.⁶⁶ Even more significant were the numbers of the ground force mercenaries that saw this war as an anti-communists crusade.⁶⁷

The final pattern was the interrelation between business and mercenaries.⁶⁸ First, the mercenaries followed a business model, with contracts for services, which included clauses related to pay for dangerous "work", options of contract renewal and insurance.⁶⁹ While mercenaries in the Congo were not solely motivated by pay, they certainly were compensated for their services. However, this pay was not overly generous.⁷⁰ Few, if any, of the mercenaries managed to make and hold on to enough money to become financially "comfortable" after their contracts were up.⁷¹ The mercenaries often supplemented their pay with outright theft and looting. For example, during the Simba Revolt, looting was epidemic, with one mercenary bragging that he commandeered a C-130 transport plane to haul away his plunder. Also, two other mercenaries found and cracked a private safe, stealing \$65,000.⁷²

The interrelation between business and mercenaries represents the second part of neocolonialism, whereby large companies attempt to remain the premier economic power in the former colony. In this case, the corporations either directly paid for mercenaries or supported governments that hired mercenaries such as Union Minière did in Katanga.⁷³

The sudden reappearance of large scale mercenarism was the direct result of decolonization and neocolonialism. In former colonies that were in some way prepared for independence and the imperial power was determined to avoid the worse parts of neocolonialism, such as the British in India, mercenaries did not make an appearance. Only where the imperial nation refused to prepare the colonized nation and also planned to maintain their power through the worst constructs of neocolonialism, do mercenaries appear, usually at the behest of the former colonizers.

Further, by keeping the newly independent nation weak and fractured, the imperial power invited disorder and the unwelcomed intervention of the United Nations to deal with the chaos. Also, as in the case of the Congo Crisis, the UN was required to deal with the imported mercenary forces as well. This same anarchy invited the Communists to take similar advantage and advance their political agenda. The Communists' involvement caused further Western intervention to counter it. In this later case, in the Congo, the mercenaries were then used by the Western nations to stop the Communists.

Mercenarism is a political and military phenomena which arises when circumstances create a frail political and economic situation, ripe with possibilities for exploitation. The decolonization of the Congo in the 1960s created just such a rich environment for abuse and the newly liberated peoples suffer the consequences.

Notes

¹ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1116b and *Politics* 1306a; Nicolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, Chapter XII.

² David A. Latzko, "The Market for Mercenaries" presented at the Eastern Economic Association Meetings, Crystal City, VA, April 4, 1997 at <http://www.personal.psu.edu/~dxl31/research/presentations/mercenary.html>. (Accessed 18 Dec. 2012)

³ Mpako H. Foaleng, "Private Security in Africa: Manifestation, Challenges and Regulation", Monograph No 139, November 2007, Institute for Security Studies at <http://www.issafrica.org/>. (Accessed 18 Dec. 2012)

⁴ Ch. Didier Gondola, *The History of Congo*, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002), 116.

⁵ Donald George Morrison, *Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook*, (New York: Paragon House, 1989), 222.

23. ⁶ Jeanne M. Haskin, *The Tragic State of the Congo: from Decolonization to Dictatorship*, (New York: Algora Publishing, 2005), 23.
- ⁷ Library of Congress Country Studies, Zaire, *The Congolese National Army* at <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/zaire>. (Accessed 18 Dec. 2012)
- ⁸ Haskin, *The Tragic State of the Congo*, 23.
- ⁹ Gondola, *The History of Congo*, 119.
103. ¹⁰ Martin Meredith, *The Fate of Africa: From the Hopes of Freedom to the Heart of Despair*, (New York: PublicAffairs, 2005), 103.
- ¹¹ Jane Boulden, *Peace Enforcement: the United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Press, 2001), 22-25.
- ¹² Meredith, *The Fate of Africa*, 105-106.
- ¹³ Robert Morse, "Behind K's Row at the UN", *Life*, (October 3, 1960), 30-33.
- ¹⁴ Robert Craig Johnson, "Heart of Darkness the Tragedy of the Congo, 1960-67", *Chandelle-A Journal of Aviation history* Vol. 2, No. 3, Oct. 1997 at <http://worldatwar.net/chandelle/v2/v2n3/congo.html>. (Accessed 18 Dec. 2012)
- ¹⁵ Stephen R. Weissman, "Opening the Secret Files on Lumumba's Murder," *Washington Post*, July 21, 2002, B30.
- ¹⁶ Meredith, *The Fate of Africa*, 109-110.
- ¹⁷ United Nation Resolution 161(1961), 21 February 1961 and United Nation Resolution 169(1961) 24 November 1961 at <http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1961/scres61.htm> (Accessed Dec. 18, 2012)
- ¹⁸ Johnson, "Heart of Darkness".
- ¹⁹ Lanning, Michael Lee, *Mercenaries: Soldiers of Fortune, from Ancient Greece to Today's Private Companies*. (New York: Presidio Press, 2005), 154.
- ²⁰ David R Bloomer, *Violence in the Congo: A Perspective of United Nations Peacekeeping*, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1984 at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/BDR.htm>. (Accessed 18 Dec. 2012)
- ²¹ Guy Arnold, *Mercenaries: The Scourge of the Third World*, (New York: Palgrave, 1999), 1.
- ²² Anthony Mockler, *The New Mercenaries: The History of the Hired Soldier from the Congo to the Seychelles*, (New York: Paragon House, 1987), 45-47.
- ²³ Thomas R. Mockaitis, *Peace Operations and Intrastate Conflict: the Sword or the Olive Branch?* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 27.
- ²⁴ Mockler, *The New Mercenaries*, 49.
- ²⁵ Mockaitis, *Peace Operations and Intrastate Conflict*, 28.
- ²⁶ Mockler, *The New Mercenaries*, 50-51.
- ²⁷ Mockaitis, *Peace Operations and Intrastate Conflict*, 33.
- ²⁸ Mockler, *The New Mercenaries*, 52-53.
- ²⁹ Mockaitis, *Peace Operations and Intrastate Conflict*, 33.
- ³⁰ Mockler, *The New Mercenaries*, 55.
- ³¹ Gondola, *The History of Congo*, 193.
- ³² *Ibid.*, 128.
- ³³ Mockler, *The New Mercenaries*, 58.; Frank R. Villafaña *Cold War in the Congo: The Confrontation of Cuban Military Forces, 1960-1967* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2009), 73.
- ³⁴ Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: a People's History* (New York: Zed Books, 2002), 133-135.
- ³⁵ Mockler, *The New Mercenaries*, 58.
- ³⁶ Thomas P. Odom, *Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo, 1964-1965*. FortLeavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute 1988 at <http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/odom/odom.asp>. (Accessed 18 Dec. 2012)
- ³⁷ Anthony Bouscaren, *Tshombe*, (New York: Twin Circle Publishing Co. 1967), 83.
- ³⁸ Lanning, *Mercenaries*, 157-160.
- ³⁹ Mockler, *The New Mercenaries*, 59.
- ⁴⁰ Odom, *Dragon Operations*.
- ⁴¹ Mike Hoare, *Mercenary* (New York: Bantam Books, 1979), 42-52.
- ⁴² Villafaña *Cold War in the Congo*, 77.
- ⁴³ Hoare, *Mercenary*, 62-68.
- ⁴⁴ Arnold, *Mercenaries*, 10.
- ⁴⁵ Odom, *Dragon Operations*.
- ⁴⁶ Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976*, (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press 2002), 109.
- ⁴⁷ Lanning, *Mercenaries*, 161.
- ⁴⁸ Gondola, *The History of Congo*, 193.
- ⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 140.
- ⁵⁰ Mockler, *The New Mercenaries*, 82-84.

- ⁵¹ Ibid., 95-115.
- ⁵² Peter Warren Singer, *Corporate Warriors: the Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 38.
- ⁵³ Lanning, *Mercenaries*, 153.
- ⁵⁴ Johnson, "Heart of Darkness".
- ⁵⁵ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 38.
- ⁵⁶ Arnold, *Mercenaries*, 2.
- ⁵⁷ Lanning, *Mercenaries*, 155-161.
- ⁵⁸ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 38.
- ⁵⁹ Bloomer, *Violence in the Congo*.
- ⁶⁰ Arnold, *Mercenaries*, 10.
- ⁶¹ Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila*, 36.
- ⁶² Mockaitis, *Peace Operations and Intrastate Conflict*, 12.
- ⁶³ Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila*, 100.
- ⁶⁴ Boulden, *Peace Enforcement*, 30.
- ⁶⁵ Villafañá, *Cold War in the Congo*, 73.
- ⁶⁶ Latzko, "The Market for Mercenaries"; Villafañá, *Cold War in the Congo*, 81-82.
- ⁶⁷ Latzko, "The Market for Mercenaries".
- ⁶⁸ Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 39.
- ⁶⁹ Mockler, *The New Mercenaries*, Appendix 1.
- ⁷⁰ Latzko, "The Market for Mercenaries".
- ⁷¹ Mockler, *The New Mercenaries*, 72.
- ⁷² Ibid., 71.
- ⁷³ Johnson, "Heart of Darkness".

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UNDERGRADUATE

Abstract

Ancient Rome is remembered for many things, such as the technological advances of plumbing and systems of road. However, the one thing that Ancient Rome is also mildly famous for is the sexual practices of its people. For the storied past of sexuality in Ancient Rome, it is often forgotten that part of the downfall of Rome was its sexual practices as they were picked apart by the Christians. By studying the sexual practices of Ancient Rome and comparing them to the language used in biblical text prohibiting such acts, it becomes clear that, as with many ideas associated with Ancient Rome, Christianity sought out to end Roman practices of sexuality.

Introduction

Ancient Rome is known for many things: the reflections of the ancient Roman Empire include the advancements in art, architecture, government, law, infrastructure and so many other important elements that would ultimately be the basis and point of comparison to advanced society even through today. On the darker side of the ancient Roman Empire are the sexual practices and social norms of the time. Excess and decadence are an important aspect of ancient Roman culture. There was not much by way of modern standards that was outside the realm of acceptance for sexual acts in Rome with an exception to the ideas of social class. Rome openly practiced sexual acts that are considered taboo in modern times including orgies, homosexuality, incest, prostitution, and bestiality.¹ In the modern era, the idea of some of the sexual practices of ancient Roman culture is beyond acceptance. What were the rules for these sexual practices and why did the acceptance of the sexual practices of ancient Rome change so dramatically?

In the millennium and a half since the fall of Rome, social norms changed due in part to the practice of Christianity. The Christian faith took sexual practices very seriously and created rules and boundaries, supposedly from the mouth of God himself, to enforce the use of the sexual rules of the Christian faith. Many of the practices forbidden by God himself in the Christian faith were incredibly common practices in ancient Rome. By comparing and contrasting what is known about the sexual practices in the Roman Empire to what was forbidden in the Bible, conclusions can be drawn that the elements of Christianity pertaining to sexual practices was a direct affront to the sexual practices in use in ancient Rome. Christianity created the rules in regards to sexual practices that were to be acceptable and unacceptable to directly oppose the Roman rule of the time in which the New Testament of the Bible was actually written.

The three very specific areas in which the Christian faith and the sexual practices of the Roman Empire differ are in the concepts of homosexuality, prostitution, and the issues of abstinence and sex within and outside of the rite of marriage. These key elements of difference between the Bible and the sexual practices of the Roman Empire are an important differentiation between the two sets of beliefs. Each of these elements will be examined at length to first explain the practices in the Roman Empire and then in relation to specific verses of the Bible.

Homosexuality

Homosexuality was widely practiced in ancient Rome. While there were no religious or cultural barriers to homosexuality per se, there were rules and traditions that were in place that needed to be maintained for the practices to be looked upon approvingly by the remainder of society.² Indeed, homosexuality was not looked at as any type of sexual perversion in ancient Rome, but instead was considered to be a normal and natural act between two men and after acts of war, a sign of dominance by the victors.³ The practice of homosexuality was a sign of the increased male sexual desire in ancient Rome and began at a young age. However, the Christian faith reviles this practice.

The rules for homosexuality in ancient Rome were fairly simple. One who practiced homosexual sexual acts had to stay within the boundaries set mainly by tradition from ancient Greece.⁴ The rules pertained to age, class standing, and role in the sexual act. From the language, it is clear what acts were the more masculine act, which in all terms of linguistics was defined as the one who was penetrating the other sexual partner with their penis.⁵ The man who penetrated the other partner needed to be of a higher class than the man being penetrated, either orally or anally.⁶ The age of the male being penetrated also helped decide whether or not the sexual act would be condoned. Generally, young males were the ones being penetrated, with the exception of prostitutes.⁷ To deviate from the traditions and the practices of homosexual relationships in ancient Rome did bring some consequences. A male would be shunned or thought of as “less of a man” if he would allow someone of a lower class or age to penetrate him.⁸ As long as one followed the boundaries set forth for the acceptance of homosexual acts, there were no moral or legal qualms about allowing the practice of homosexual sexual acts to occur within the Roman Empire.

Within the Christian faith the practice of homosexual sexual acts was, and on many levels is today, considered to be an act against God himself according to the Bible. While some of the rules against homosexuality did come from the Old Testament of the Bible, such as Leviticus 18 which is a composition of laws regarding impure acts has a verse that reads “Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it is abomination,”⁹ there were still more regulations against homosexuality in the New Testament. These references would include 1 Corinthians 6 which reads: “neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor effeminate, nor abusers of themselves with men, nor thieves, nor covetous, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor extortioners shall inherit the kingdom of God.”¹⁰ There are further references to the issues Christians found with homosexuality in the New Testament such as Romans, Matthew, and Ephesians.

There are conclusions that can be drawn when comparing the Roman view and the Christian view of homosexual sexual acts. While homosexual acts were expressly prohibited in the Old Testament, the New Testament uses wording that excludes being both effeminate, which was also a rule for certain men in Rome, but also regards homosexual acts as self-abuse. The wording of the Bible provides a little insight as to whether or not the rules for Christians were directly related to the Romans. The separation of effeminate and sexual acts with men shows a conciseness of the general rule of Rome in ancient times regarding homosexuality and indicates that these verses could have been written to oppose the general Roman society as a whole.

Prostitution

Prostitution had a major role early in the Roman Empire. Prostitution was neither illegal nor was the practice generally reviled for the first part of the Roman Empire. In fact the practice became so important and income generating that Rome itself would begin registering and taxing prostitutes for profit.¹¹ Fornication is again an issue within the Christian faith. Prostitution, although not expressly decried was and still is something that is if nothing else, frowned upon in the Christian faith due to reasons of purity and marriage.

Early in the Roman Empire, the practice of prostitution was something that was simply a part of daily life. There were both male and female prostitutes available to those who wished to utilize their service.¹² Prostitution was done in the open with no fear. The best remaining example of the openness and availability of prostitution in the Roman Empire today is the preserved city of Pompeii. Pompeii was destroyed before any laws regarding the control of prostitution, beyond taxation, could occur.¹³ The preservation of ancient brothels and the associated artwork in volcanic ash reveals a great deal about the actual practice of prostitution in early Rome. Prostitution was available all over the city. In some cases, phallic symbols were carved into the street pavement to indicate where prostitution services were available.¹⁴

In 40 AD the Emperor Caligula imposed a tax upon prostitution throughout Rome.¹⁵ The taxation had less to do with actually controlling prostitution, but instead with the tax revenue that could be collected from the practice of prostitution. Further laws would be implemented that would control the prostitutes themselves from entering into Roman society. The prostitutes were forced to register with the state and were forbidden from wearing the clothing of a noble woman.¹⁶ Additional laws were put into place that would actually increase the frequency of the utilization of prostitution by making adultery punishable by law.¹⁷ These laws would actually put women in to the position where they were not allowed to commit adultery; however men could still have sex with prostitutes in lieu of having an affair with a married woman.¹⁸ While these laws did add a bit of shame to the practice, particularly to the prostitutes themselves, the practice of prostitution was still not a moral issue for the whole of Roman society. Prostitution was simply a fact of life in the Roman Empire that has been preserved in artwork and literature.

The Christian faith took issue with prostitution on a moral level. The concept of fornication, which is defined as sexual intercourse between two unmarried partners, is mentioned repeatedly within the Bible. The concept of fornication is expressly forbidden in 1 Corinthians 6 which separates fornicators from adulterers in verse 9 and then moves on to harlots reading "Know ye not that your bodies are members of Christ? Shall I then take away the members of Christ, and make them members of a harlot? God forbid. Or know ye not that he that is joined to a harlot is one body? For, the twain, saith he, shall become one flesh."¹⁹ The use of the term 'harlot' is also referred to as prostitute in other versions of the Bible. The Bible does have many notable prostitutes that are celebrated while denouncing the practice. The conclusions that can be drawn about the relation to the rules against prostitution in the Bible are that it is very likely that the catalyst for the expressly forbidden practice of prostitution was aimed at the Roman Empire. Again, when the language is studied it is clear that there are separations. While prostitution would and should fall under the express terms about fornication, the Bible continues on with the separation of adultery and fornication and lying with harlots. This could most certainly be because the Roman Empire separated these terms themselves. One could commit adultery, as it were, with a prostitute under Roman law. The use of the same and repeating terms that did not necessarily required repetition, i.e. fornicating with a prostitute is redundant. In the Bible is a strong indication that the Christians were simply attacking the common practice of the Roman Empire.

Sex outside the confines of marriage

It should be clear at this point that there was not much the Romans thought of as sexually inappropriate. Sex was something to be encouraged and celebrated within the Roman Empire as it demonstrated virility and encourage the growth of the Empire. There was no shame for most to openly display sexual desire and to act on these desires within the confines of what was allowed for their class. Sexual intercourse was something that was allowed for both inside and outside of marriage for men; with some rules pertaining to class and with whom the man was having intercourse. Women were strictly forbidden from committing adultery, however, this did not apply when the husband was involved, which would generally be during orgies.²⁰ Next to homosexual acts and acts with prostitutes, the Roman orgy was a condonable and legal means to sexual gratification. The orgy was mainly something for the upper classes with Emperors Tiberius, Caligula, Nero, and Elagabalus being very well known for their orgies.²¹ In the Christian world, the concept of having any type of sexual intercourse outside of marriage was considered immoral.

The Roman orgies consisted of men and women who were in some cases related and occasionally, particularly on the part of Tiberius, included children and by some accounts even infants in sexual acts.²² The orgies were generally without rules, such as those that pertained to homosexuality and prostitution. Orgies were not considered to be anything out of the ordinary and allowed for sexual gratification of anyone of the right class who attended.

The concept of orgies was and still is outside the confines of the Christian faith. There are numerous passages in the Bible that pertain to fornication, adultery, or any other type of sexual act outside of the confines of marriage. The books of Matthew and John expressly disapprove of fornication, 1 Corinthians goes into more detail about the sin of fornication and adultery. Mark 7 uses language that is a little stronger regarding adultery and fornication which reads: "That which proceedeth out of the man that defileth the man. For from within, out of the heart of men, evil thoughts proceed, fornications, thefts, murders, adulteries, covetings wickednesses deceit, lasciviousness, an evil eye, railing, pride, foolishness: all these evil things proceed from within, and defile the man."²³ While the passage goes on to speak about the Greeks, the sentiment is important in relation to the Romans. The orgies and sex outside of the marriage was not simply frowned upon, it was thought to be born of pure evil. Again, it is clear that these rules and perceptions of evil were in reference to sexual practices of certainly the Greeks and the Romans.

Conclusion

The Roman practices of homosexuality, prostitution, and orgies are some of the major elements of the abundant sexuality that the Roman Empire was known for. Each of these practices had their own rules, which had little to do with the shame of the act itself and everything to do with class and social standing. The rules were in place to protect the class system and not to place judgment on the morality of the acts themselves. It is important to realize that sex in Rome had everything to do with pleasure and very little to do with morality or marriage.

The change in the perception of sexual acts for pleasure rather than simply multiplication of the species came to fruition as the Christians slowly enveloped the Roman Empire. By specifically using language that condemned the practices of prostitution, homosexuality and polyamorous sexual relations as they were termed in Ancient Rome, the writers of the New Testament appear

to have targeted the Romans to intentionally call into question the morality of the Roman way of life. The New Testament looked specifically at acts that were common practice in ancient Rome and denounced them as sinful. The creation of firmer language in the New Testament as opposed to the Old Testament regarding some of these sexual practices indicates that not only was Christianity the cause of the changes in perceptions of the acceptable sexual acts of the Roman Empire, but was also written intentionally to denounce the sexual practices in Rome.

Notes

- ¹ The History of Sex. Film. New York: The History Channel, 1999.
- ² Craig A. Williams. Roman homosexuality: ideologies of masculinity in classical antiquity. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. 17.
- ³ Ibid. 105.
- ⁴ Ibid. 15.
- ⁵ Ibid. 160.
- ⁶ Ibid. 17.
- ⁷ Sex in the ancient world: prostitution in Pompeii. Film. Directed by Kurt Sayenga. New York: The History Channel, 2009.
- ⁸ Craig A. Williams. Roman homosexuality: ideologies of masculinity in classical antiquity. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. 125.
- ⁹ Leviticus 18 (American Standard Version)
- ¹⁰ 1 Corinthians 6 (American Standard Version)
- ¹¹ Sex in the ancient world: prostitution in Pompeii. Film. Directed by Kurt Sayenga. New York: The History Channel, 2009.
- ¹² Ibid.
- ¹³ Ibid.
- ¹⁴ Ibid.
- ¹⁵ Thomas A. J. McGinn. The economy of prostitution in the Roman world a study of social history & the brothel. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004. 147.
- ¹⁶ Sex in the ancient world: prostitution in Pompeii. Film. Directed by Kurt Sayenga. New York: The History Channel, 2009.
- ¹⁷ Ibid.
- ¹⁸ Ibid.
- ¹⁹ 1 Corinthians 6 (American Standard Version)
- ²⁰ Sex in the ancient world: prostitution in Pompeii. Film. Directed by Kurt Sayenga. New York: The History Channel, 2009.
- ²¹ Nigel Cawthorne. Sordid sex lives: shocking stories of perversion from Nero to Nilsen. London: Quercus, 2010.
- ²² Ibid. 14.
- ²³ Mark 7 (American Standard Version)

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CHRIS BOOTH

GRADUATE

On those all too rare occasions that the world has the opportunity to witness pure genius or someone of an outstanding nature work in their respective craft, the blessing often goes unheralded. However, in the case of William Tecumseh Sherman humanity immediately understood and recognized the remarkable talent with which he proceeded to unveil throughout the Civil War. As a general, only a few were more noteworthy and ingenuitive throughout the entire conflict, which prompted historian Richard McMurry to say that Sherman was “probably the most creative and intuitively brilliant of all the high-ranking Civil War generals.”¹ Few generals were more groundbreaking than Sherman, as he proceeded to utilize the practice of total warfare during his signature ‘March to the Sea’ campaign. Total warfare had previously not been used during the Civil War, and Sherman’s employment of the technique brought both a resounding victory for the Union but also lasting hatred from Southerners for the man who authorized its usage. Nevertheless, despite criticisms against his methods, Sherman most certainly epitomizes the characteristics of a brilliant tactician, and because of his implementation of total warfare, the Civil War was brought to an end much sooner than it would have been had Sherman decided to stay with conventional military techniques in his ‘March to the Sea’ operation.

However, before examining Sherman and his usage of total warfare, three preliminaries must be mentioned. First, a brief look at the important literature that has been compiled on Sherman must be given. Next, an introduction to Sherman and his background will be included, as the two are important in understanding the psyche and mentality of the man who would become an innovator on the method of total warfare and the pioneer of the technique during the American Civil War. Finally, a summary of total warfare and its origin will be included so as to help the reader understand exactly how new to the time and revolutionary it was for Sherman to employ. These three aspects will help the reader to better understand not only Sherman, but more about why he would employ total warfare and the importance of his actions as well.

On the subject of Sherman there is much literature to be found simply because of his importance as a general during the Civil War, and while less goes into depth on Sherman’s usage of total warfare, many of the works are still quite useful and deserve mentioning. Liddell Hart’s *Sherman: Soldier, Realist, American* is a critical piece of literature on the general that has received lush reviews such as the *Saturday Review* stating it was “The best analysis of General Sherman that has appeared.” Hart explores Sherman’s many campaigns and goes into depth on ‘The March to the Sea’, detailing its destruction and importance vividly. *Southern Storm: Sherman’s March to the Sea* by Noah Trudeau is an exceptional piece that describes the damage caused by Sherman’s capstone operation in Georgia through the diaries and journals of Union soldiers and Confederate civilians. Finally, Sherman himself illuminates the reader with his collection, *Memoirs of General W.T. Sherman*, a remarkably well written and engrossing compilation of his life, which is incredibly helpful in creating a picture of the man and his genius. Although there are countless other works that are written on Sherman, these three are noteworthy and deserve to be mentioned as pivotal in understanding his decision to utilize total warfare.

Like so many of his contemporaries, Sherman found himself having to fight for everything that he had at a young age. Forced with dealing with the loss of his father at the young age of nine, Sherman was adopted and moved to live with his foster parents. Sherman said in his memoirs that his father’s death “left the family very poor, but friends rose up with proffers of generous care and assistance.”² Although the schooling that he received because of his foster parents was of a high quality, his life was not destined to become easy with his appointment to West Point. Hart describes the harshness of life at the academy as one that stanching creativity and individualism, something that Sherman had demonstrated much of throughout his life. Liking West Point to a prison and Sherman as to a wild animal from the wilderness of Ohio, Hart says “when he [Sherman] entered the gates of West Point the “animal” must have felt that, in truth, he was entering a cage, and its bars of customs and discipline were to be a sore restraint on body and spirit alike.”³ Although Sherman disliked the academy about as much as one could, he still managed to graduate very highly in his class, saying “My average demerits, per annum, were about one hundred and fifty, which reduced my class standing from number four to six.”⁴

Sherman goes on to mention two other important notes about his character that he discovered while at West Point. The first deals with his drawbacks, of which he mentions by saying he was “not considered a good soldier” due to his not possessing any of the important virtues related to the military at that time, principal among them “neatness in dress and form, with a strict conformity to the rules,” as he described them.⁵ This implies that Sherman realized at an early age that what was expected and deemed normal for military members was not necessarily the best and or right thing. Sherman then mentions that he “always held a respectable reputation with the professors” and noted his skills in certain areas by saying that he “generally ranked among the best, especially in drawing, chemistry, mathematics, and natural philosophy.”⁶ These statements point out that Sherman recognized his attributes and was not afraid to let more trivial matters like uniforms and appearance detract from his ability to perform well as an officer. In fact, Sherman would later fight for the increased professionalization of the military and officer corps, more rigorous evaluation of officer performance and the curbing of political partisanship, a progressive argument that was ahead of its time considering the amateurish nature of the officer corps.⁷ These are important points from Sherman’s youth and schooling that illustrate how Sherman became the fearless general that was able to make controversial decisions that impacted the lives of hundreds of thousands.

So the question that must be answered now is what exactly is total warfare? A short answer as given by dictionary.com is that total warfare is “a war in which every available weapon is used and the nation's full financial resources are devoted.” The origin of the idea traces back to the 19th century, as the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars were the first in which the mass population was mobilized and in which many civilians were targeted and died during battle. The Taiping Rebellion was another instance in which total war was seen, as both belligerents waged war on civilians as well as used them in the conflict in support roles. However, it was in the American Civil War that the practice was first deliberately put into place, as Sherman directed a total war campaign in his epic ‘March to the Sea’. Carl von Clausewitz is credited by many for writing on the subject of total war, as he pointed out that due to the rise of nationalistic armies in Europe that the stakes were bound to rise to new heights (as they proved to during WWI and WWII with trench warfare and the atomic bomb respectively). Clausewitz stated that “If one considers war as an act of mutual destruction, we must of necessity imagine both parties as making some progress.”⁸ Certainly this would not do as a strategy, so therefore the implementation of total warfare, a tactic that would ruin an opponent’s ability to make war and encourage the enemy population to withdraw emotionally from the conflict would be the next logical step.

So did Sherman immediately utilize this strategy at the outset of the Civil War in 1861? The answer to that is surprisingly no, as is the next statement: Sherman actually suffered several setbacks early in his military career. After serving well at the First Battle of Bull Run (where he received minor wounds, the first of many instances in which he was grazed or injured throughout the course of the war), Sherman seemed to be heading in the right direction as he was promoted to brigadier general of volunteers.⁹ However, as Sherman eventually took over operations in Kentucky, he began to suffer from severe pessimism and nervousness, so much so that he broke down and was ordered by Major General Henry W. Halleck to take a leave of absence. Further defeats and losses would come to Sherman throughout the course of the Civil War, as he was a great general but not perfect. Sherman suffered a loss at the Battle of Chickasaw Bayou, which prompted historian John Winters to say of Sherman “if he muffed his Vicksburg assignment, which had begun unfavorably, he would rise no higher.”¹⁰

However, these setbacks were only temporary, and after the period of leave in 1861, Sherman came back to help Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant capture Fort Donelson, a move that would endear him to the future president and unite them for the entirety of the war. This relationship would grow stronger after the Battle of Shiloh, a massive battle that left thousands dead on both sides. Sherman’s command received a major part of the Confederate attack, and despite giving ground, never retreated and due to Sherman’s calm, helped the Union forces from falling into a devastating retreat. Eventually during the next day’s fighting, the Union forces under Grant, Sherman and other generals pushed the Confederate’s back in a battle that made sure the South “no only lost irreplaceable men but also failed to restore the balance of power in the middle and east Tennessee sub theater.”¹¹ The excellent defensive measures that Sherman displayed on the first day and the well executed counterattack on the following day at Shiloh impressed Grant, and while not total war tactics, they can be seen as part of Sherman’s great generalship and an important stepping stone in building the relationship that would eventually allow Sherman to convince Grant and Lincoln that he should embark on his ‘March to the Sea’ campaign.

After the first few years of the war had passed, Sherman was rewarded by being named the overall commander in the western theater, and was so tasked with “bringing Bragg’s army, now under the command of General Joseph E. Johnston, to battle.”¹² Sher-

man did this by participating in the Battle of Chattanooga, and afterwards was given command of all Union troops in the Western theater. Sherman then began to press Grant for permission to take the fight to Bragg and the heartland of the Confederacy by abandoning his supply line and living off of the land in what would become his infamous 'March to the Sea' campaign. This was of course a bold and almost reckless plan but also one that Grant understood was necessary, as coupled with General Sheridan's operations in the Shenandoah Valley it would aid in destroying the Confederacy's will to fight so that when Lee eventually surrendered in Virginia there would be no likelihood of a continued guerrilla war.¹³ In the spring of 1864, Sherman received letters from Grant detailing that his plan would be approved, causing Sherman to say in a letter to his superior "That we are now all to act on a common plan, converging on a common centre, looks like enlightened war."¹⁴

The 'March to the Sea' could not happen until Sherman had captured Atlanta, however, which he accomplished after much maneuvering on September 2, 1864. The battle itself caused minimal damage to the city, but Sherman (in a move that can be seen as a precursor to how he would treat the rest of the state and the future city of Columbus, South Carolina especially) ordered for military and government buildings to be burned after civilians had been given the opportunity to leave. Sherman knew a strategy like this was controversial, when he stated that "If the people raise a howl against my barbarity and cruelty, I will answer that war is war, and not popularity-seeking. If they want peace, they and their relatives must stop the war."¹⁵ To complicate matters, many buildings that were not targeted by Sherman to be destroyed after he captured Atlanta were burned due to the fires that were set to take down the earlier noted military buildings. While Sherman's actions in the destruction of Atlanta might be considered brutal and heartless, it was not necessarily a total war tactic, in that he gave civilians the opportunity to leave and only targeted military buildings to be destroyed (even if many shops and homes were burned accidentally).

Sherman's famous quote of "I will make Georgia howl" left no doubt that he intended to cause as much damage as he could and that his strategy was one of total war during his next campaign of marching through the state and living off of the land. Sherman's ultimate desire was to destroy the ability of the Confederacy to make war, either by crushing their farms which fed the soldiers and funded the war, ruining the infrastructure in the Deep South, or by wiping out all morale and by bringing support for the war down to the point that average soldiers would desert. Rarely in history has an operation succeeded in achieving all of its goals, yet Sherman's 'March to the Sea' did just that. To make matters worse for the Confederacy, the trek through Georgia from Atlanta to Savannah was a relatively easy one that only took Sherman and his army only a month and a half, forcing them to suffer a negligible amount of casualties. Confederate cavalry that was left in Georgia under the command of Major General Joseph Wheeler did what they could to harass Sherman and his troops but were unable to inflict much damage as Sherman's cavalry was "more than sufficient to keep Wheeler's horsemen" at bay.¹⁶ These few defenses were not enough to stop Sherman's torching of certain cities and towns during the trek through the state, as the city of Millen was completely brought down to rubble due to the Confederate prisons that housed Union forces in inhospitable conditions.¹⁷

The path that Sherman and his troops cut through Georgia along what is now I-16 paled in comparison to the destruction that was visited to the state of South Carolina, most particularly the capital city of Columbia. Perceived by many as the state that initiated the Civil War, Sherman and his troops seemed to take extra care to lay waste to the areas that they traveled through, with the most damage being done to Columbia, as it was burned to the ground on February 17, 1865. The troops under Sherman did have to fight their way through Confederate forces in South Carolina more so than in Georgia, as a division of 1,200 Confederate soldiers attempted to thwart Sherman's advance at the crossing of the Salkehatchie Swamp. Sherman's sweeping aside of this enemy forced Confederate General Joseph Johnston to say that "there had been no such army since the days of Julius Caesar."¹⁸ This campaign, that Sherman had to persuade Grant to approve yet again (as Grant pushed for Sherman and his troops to board ships and travel north to rendezvous with his army to fight Lee), finished with Sherman's army crossing into North Carolina where they met Union troops, finally culminating a four month long trek from Atlanta to Goldsborough, North Carolina that helped bring the end of the war that much closer for the Union. A resounding success, what began with the 'March to the Sea' ended with two key Deep South states completely destroyed and utterly useless to the Confederacy. More importantly to the annals of history, the operation placed Sherman in rare air as someone who perfected a strategy that would be implemented for ever more destructive results in the 20th century.

Not as damaging as the instances of total war in the 20th century (such as the fire bombing in Germany and the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan during WWII), Sherman managed to inflict incredible amounts of damage to the Confederacy in his final campaign. By doing the opposite of what Grant was doing in Virginia (Grant's strategy was to focus on

bleeding Lee's army to the point where he would no longer be able to fight), Sherman's operations in Georgia and South Carolina resulted in relatively few Confederate soldiers killed since it was aimed at destroying the infrastructure in the South that allowed them to stay in the fight. In Columbia alone, military buildings along with "the old state house, the Institution of the Sisters of Charity, a hotel, several churches and possibly 1,300 dwellings were burned."¹⁹ Debate still rages over whether Sherman intended for the mass burning to take place or whether it was accidental or set by a few rogues, but regardless of the debate the damage inflicted to the noncombatant structures occurred and the city was summarily out of the war for all intent and purposes. Sherman summed up the scene by uttering the phrase that his soldiers had "utterly ruined Columbia."²⁰

Even if one were to take away the burning of Atlanta and Columbia, the destruction visited to the Confederacy was evident in two other pivotal areas that have already been mentioned but deserve to be delved into deeper as they are prime results of the impact of total war: supplies and morale. The number of weapons, amount of foodstuffs, and all other various and sundry materiel that the Union troops took from warehouses, farms, and towns along the campaign were impossible for the Confederacy to make up for with their limited factories and broken infrastructure (that so many railroads were maimed in the campaign they were nicknamed "Sherman's neckties" speaks magnitudes to the poor state of infrastructure in the Confederacy at the time). In the town of Cheraw, South Carolina alone, Harry Hansen writes that the Federals found "24 guns, 2,000 muskets, 3,600 barrels of gunpowder... and eight wagonloads of fine wines."²¹ This type of taking from the poor (the Confederacy) and giving to the rich (the Union) effectively helped bring the war to an end even sooner, as it deprived the Confederacy of the necessary implements to make war and had the added effect of helping the enemy in the process. Even as the Confederacy was on its last legs the forces under Sherman ensured that even more damage would be inflicted as the printing press in Columbia was destroyed while Sherman's forces used the Confederate money to spend and gamble "in the most lavish manner."²²

All of these factors listed above, combined with the burning of the cities and the homeland of so many soldiers who were away fighting in other states served to ruin the morale of the Confederacy, which had already almost bottomed out by this point of the war. Sherman's march and his usage of total warfare destroyed the Southern will to fight more effectively than had he fought many large scale battles against the Confederate armies due to the fact that it forced the Southern men that were away fighting to worry about their families and homes even more than normal since they knew that Union forces were present in the area. According to Allan Millett and Peter Maslowski, Sherman "perceived that these raids also had a psychological impact, undermining the South's morale by demonstrating its incapacity for effective defense."²³ This statement could not have been more accurate, as it points out that Sherman knew what effects his operation would have on the Confederacy's morale, which is why he fought so hard to convince Grant and Lincoln that it should be attempted as opposed to a conventional style of war featuring large battles.

Only rarely is the perfect strategy utilized by the perfect general that it was designed for, as total war was seemingly meant to be exploited by William Tecumseh Sherman during the American Civil War. Raised through troubling times and maturing in the harsh walls of West Point, Sherman was a rugged man that was willing to do whatever it took to achieve victory for the Union. Throughout the war his brilliance shown in key battles, and although he suffered some setbacks along the way, was in prime position to take the war to the Confederacy in ways unimagined in 1864-1865. His infamous 'March to the Sea' campaign destroyed Southern infrastructure, ruined their morale, and robbed them of any further chance and ability to continue the war. Nevertheless, Sherman knew that by implementing a strategy of total war that he would receive much disdain, but being the man that he was, this did not affect him. Built for the type of conflict, his strong words to the Confederacy of "you cannot qualify war in harsher terms than I will," were not full of just suggestions or bluster, but were words that he stuck to as he visited destruction to the Confederacy by perfecting the strategy of total war.²⁴

Notes

¹ Richard McMurry. *Two Great Rebel Armies: An Essay in Confederate Military History* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 34.

² William T. Sherman. *Memoirs of General William T. Sherman*. Project Gutenberg, pg. 7.
http://www.gutenberg.org/catalog/world/readfile?fk_files=2779714&pageno=7.

³ Liddell Hart. *Sherman: Soldier, Realist, American* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1993), 4.

⁴ Hart, 5.

⁵ Sherman, 9.

⁶ Sherman, 9.

⁷ Allan Millett "Military Professionalism and Officership in America" in David Skaggs and Robert S. Browning, eds. *In Defense*

of the Republic: Readings in

American Military History (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1991), 163.

⁸ Carl von Clausewitz. *On War* (Maryland: Arc Manor, 2007), 200.

⁹ Stanley Hirshson. *The White Tecumseh: A Biography of General William T. Sherman* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1997), 40.

¹⁰ John Winters. *The Civil War in Louisiana* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963), 176.

¹¹ Allan Millett and Peter Maslowski. *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America* (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 187.

¹² John W. Chambers II, ed. *The Oxford Guide: American Military History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 133.

¹³ Edward Eckert "The McClellans and the Grants" in David Skaggs and Robert Browning, eds. *In Defense of the Republic: Readings in American Military History* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1991), 135.

¹⁴ Sherman, 297.

¹⁵ Sherman, 350.

¹⁶ Steven E. Woodworth. *This Great Struggle: America's Civil War* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2011), 318.

¹⁷ Woodworth, 318-319.

¹⁸ Woodworth, 334.

¹⁹ Harry Hansen. *The Civil War: A History* (New York: Signet Classics, 2002), 585.

²⁰ Hansen, 568.

²¹ Hansen, 587.

²² Sherman, 478.

²³ Millett & Maslowski, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America*, 172.

²⁴ Woodworth, 314.

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BOOK REVIEW
BY LEW TAYLOR.

In the introduction to this short biography of Bartholomew Gosnold, Harold Wilson states that he wishes to “rescue Bartholomew Gosnold from historical obscurity,” (10) and that he believes Gosnold “was one of the great, unsung heroes of American history” but that “today, many Americans have never heard of him.” (9). Wilson’s statement regarding Gosnold’s relative obscurity is not clear as there are over one hundred primary and secondary sources in his selected bibliography. Perhaps the reason that few people have heard of Gosnold has less to do with his importance and more with the way history is taught in American schools today.

Wilson declares that “The story of Bartholomew Gosnold begins in about the year 1001 A.D. when Leif Erikson and his men sailed southwesterly from their home in Greenland....” (11). Wilson then devotes the remainder of his first chapter to a brief history of the voyages of the Vikings and the early English adventurers Sir Humphrey Gilbert and Captain Edward Hayes. The rumor spreading around England at that time was that Giovanni da Verrazzano, an Italian sailing for the French, had visited a “beautiful country on the North American coast...” (13). The land would come to be known as Norumbega and it was thought to be a utopia – gold, crystals, fertile soil – everything that England was looking for to help them replenish their treasury that had been severely depleted due to recent wars with France and Spain. Both enemies of England claimed that this area belonged to them. English geographer and writer, Richard Hakluyt contented that England’s claim was more legitimate because North America, where this bountiful land was located, was discovered by John Cabot in 1497 while sailing for England (14).

Wilson dedicates several chapters to Gosnold’s early life including his schooling and his acquaintance with people of station in Elizabethan England. Gosnold’s father was a successful lawyer and his mother was related to Sir Francis Bacon. Gosnold’s upbringing brought him into contact with the best families of England. He received his BA in Law from Cambridge University in 1590 and entered “New Inn, one of the Inns of Chancery, a “farm team” of the Middle Temple, the famous Inn of Court.” (20) While an attorney, his true love was the sea and exploration, having been exposed to the lectures of Richard Hakluyt. (21)

Wilson traces Gosnold’s voyage to America and his exploration of the coast of what is now Cape Cod, Martha’s Vineyard, and the Elizabeth Islands. Gosnold is given credit for the naming of Cape Cod (for the abundance of Cod that his sailors were able to catch), Martha’s Vineyard (named after his daughter who died as an infant), and the Elizabeth Islands (named for his sister). Wilson includes a lengthy description of the rough seas that Gosnold’s ship encountered by a breach thereafter named “Tucker’s Terror.” Wilson states that “if Gosnold had not escaped the fury of Tucker’s Terror.....the founding of Jamestown may not have occurred and what is now the United States would not be an English-speaking nation.” (48) The author gives Gosnold far more credit for the settlement of Jamestown than is warranted.

Wilson’s final chapters are dedicated to Gosnold’s voyage to America that resulted in the settling of Jamestown, Virginia, the first permanent English settlement in the New World. After the death of Queen Elizabeth and the ascension of James I to the throne, peace with Spain put a hold on England’s colonization projects. However, on July 15, 1605 a treaty ratified by King Philip III of Spain stated that “Spain would treat English colonies as legal ventures,” (93) opening the door for Gosnold and other adventurers to organize a new voyage with the intent of establishing a permanent English settlement in North America. Two years later on April 26, 1607 Gosnold’s expedition sailed up the Chesapeake Bay and began the task of establishing a colony in the New World. When they sailed, the adventurers did not know who had been designated to be their leaders until a strongbox was opened after their arrival. Gosnold’s name was first on the list followed by John Smith, Edward Wingate, John Ratcliffe and others. These men were to be the Governing Council of the new settlement. The leaders finally selected a point approximately eighty miles up the James River for the location of their settlement. Gosnold disagreed with this location because of its low marshy ground and its infestation with insects. Gosnold lost this argument, and Jamestown was established. After months of discontent, shortages of food, attacks by natives and damp weather the settlers’ morale was low and a sickness, probably dysentery began to take its toll. Gosnold was stricken with a fever in August of 1607 and after suffering for two weeks died on August 22, barely four months after his arrival in Virginia. (105)

While Wilson did an admirable job in his attempt to “rescue Bartholomew Gosnold” the book was a bit amateurish for a volume marketed to adult readers and appeared geared more towards a middle school audience. Wilson provides extensive primary and secondary sources, but does not cite his references in the book, an unfortunate gap. Wilson devoted much of his book to Gosnold’s adventures around Cape Cod and the Islands rather than to the settlement of Jamestown, despite his claim that the settlement of Jamestown was due, in large part, to the abilities and efforts of Bartholomew Gosnold. It is not clear that Wilson adds any new information to that already available on the subject.

BOOK REVIEW BY
ANNE MIDGLEY

Washington's Crossing is a striking book; a complex work that explores a pivotal moment in the American Revolutionary War as Continental Army Commander-in-Chief General George Washington made his desperate gamble to strike the British and Hessian forces when least expected, Christmas evening, 1776. The American cause was teetering on the brink of extinction yet after Washington's successful attack on a Hessian outpost at Trenton, New Jersey, the sputtering flame of the Revolutionary War burned bright again. Fischer's tome not only traces the events that led up to the battle of Trenton and the subsequent battle of Princeton, which brought a tide of enlistments to the undermanned Continental Army and shifted the momentum to Washington's forces, it also provides a treasure trove of related information to the student and general reader, alike. Fischer has provided extensive resource material; virtually one-third of the volume is dedicated to appendices, source material and most notably, a lengthy section on the historiography of the American Revolutionary War.

Fischer's study includes an examination of the various armies of the American rebels, as well as those of the British and the Hessians, treating each with scholarship and objectivity. The rebel "Army of Liberty" is explored in its almost infinite variety; from the troops fielded by the New England colonies to the rifleman of Virginia's backcountry, the radical democrats of Pennsylvania's Associators to the "silk-stocking" regiments of Maryland; each with its own customs and traditions. The British "Army of Order" is explored in great detail, from the composition of its "regulars" and officers to British recruiting and training processes. Along the way, stereotypes are demolished; although historians have commonly referred to the barbaric British custom of flogging, Fischer notes that not all British units used discipline in the same manner. The Fifth Foot preferred reward to punishment and was one of the first British units to use medals of merit rather than punishment to direct and control behavior. (45) Fischer additionally portrays the Hessian forces in detail and notes that about thirty thousand German soldiers served in the war. The Hessians are described as the "Army of Honor and Profit," bound together by a common belief in "hierarchy, order, and discipline." (59) Fischer's treatment of the Hessians includes a detailed study of Colonel Johann Gottlieb Rall, the commander of the Hessian troops at Trenton. Fischer portrays Rall in a much more positive light than many historians have done in the past. Rall was highly regarded by his men for he treated them with dignity; he "merited the highest respect." (57)

While *Washington's Crossing* is a complex, multifaceted work, at its heart it is a study of George Washington and his growth as a leader while in the midst of almost insurmountable odds and frequent chaos. Fischer provides a telling example of Washington's courage during an memorable incident; a riot had broken out amongst rebel forces from disparate regions who were coming together for the first time; essentially rebel Americans were fighting rebel Americans in a knock-down brawl. Washington galloped into the center of the melee, leapt from his horse, and grabbed the two closest combatants, literally lifting them off their feet while he shook some sense into them. As Fischer relates the incident, the "rioters stopped fighting, turned in amazement to watch Washington in action, then fled... in all directions." (25) Based on Fischer's extraordinary account of the events leading up to the Battle of Trenton, it is easy to understand the memorable reflection on Washington provided by General Henry "Light Horse Harry" Lee at Washington's death; Washington truly was "first in war, first in peace and first in the hearts of his countrymen..." for a very good reason. George Washington was the indispensable man of the American Revolutionary War.

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