
Symbiosis of Military and Diplomatic Success in the Revolutionary War

Andre Nolte

The American Revolution brought about the birth of a new nation, which stood in defiance to the greatest empire in the world. The British Empire ruled the American colonies from the perspective of entitlement and an overall absence of compromise. The Founding Fathers knew that to defeat Britain they needed the help of another foreign power to provide money, arms, provisions, troops, naval power, and, most importantly, international recognition as an independent nation. To achieve the goal of a diplomatic, commercial, and military foreign alliance, Congress courted several nations of Europe whose interests in supporting America were known. In fact, American statesman and diplomat Benjamin Franklin pointed out that “every nation in Europe wishes to see Britain humbled, having all in their turns been offended by her insolence.”¹ The problem for Congress was that foreign recognition and allegiance against Britain was not automatic. France in particular needed proof of American commitment and military capability before it committed itself to support the new republic. Diplomatic treaty negotiations during the Revolutionary War held an intrinsically symbiotic bond with that of military achievement on the battlefield, and vice versa. Another important point was that while diplomatic and military policy were often subservient to the ministries of government, those policies frequently determined the fate of the respective ministry enforcing them, as the British ministry found out in early 1783.

The fledgling Congress faced two problems at the outset of the war. First, over a century and a half of British dominion over the American colonies, and the fact that America was not politically independent, made military success against the British Army paramount towards successful diplomatic negotiations. Second, both sides of the Atlantic knew the British used bribery and deceit in mediation. The French minister Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes pointed out in 1782, “You will notice that the English buy the peace more than they make it.”² The meaning was twofold here. They could not trust the British; and secondly, it would take significant defeat on the battlefield before Britain would consider plausible negotiation or compromise, especially when British diplomatic precedence was typically at the point of a bayonet. Upon returning from London in 1775, Benjamin

Franklin noted, “We have no favo[u]rs to expect from the Ministry [King George III and Frederick, Lord North, 2nd Earl of Guilford’s ministry]; nothing but submission will satisfy them.”³ Peace with Britain required a momentous American military victory.

In supporting America, France and Spain, by contrast, were concerned about America becoming too powerful of a nation. American historian Richard Morris pointed out, “It was not in the national interest of the French government to have the new United States in complete command of so huge a slice of the North American continent.”⁴ Europeans worried that America would later infringe upon their land claims in the American West, fishing rights in the Atlantic, and hinder Spanish control of the Mississippi River.⁵ The importance here was that with every diplomatic negotiation during the Revolution, European agendas sought to limit the overall power and geography of the upstart United States.

In 1782, John Adams reflected on the long-standing American concern of European agendas, “America has been long enough involved in the war of Europe. She has been a football between contending nations from the beginning.”⁶ Adams’ warning to Congress regarding European self-interests aimed at preventing America from becoming subservient to their plans.⁷ But regardless and out of necessity, the earlier Franco-American alliance unavoidably entailed the mutual condition of military obligations. In addition, Congress and the Continental Army had received money, arms, and supplies from France; the heavy British losses at Bunker Hill during the Siege of Boston in June 1775 were proof enough that America was at least worthy of its financial support. By contrast, regarding British negotiations, America sought peace one final time shortly after Bunker Hill.

On July 5, 1775, the Second Continental Congress submitted the Olive Branch Petition to King George III and British Parliament, which requested the cessation of military action and further bloodshed until a compromise could be made.⁸ Benjamin Franklin, aware of its futility, commented sarcastically, “It has been with difficulty that we have carried another humble petition to the Crown, to give Britain one more chance, one opportunity more of recovering the friendship of the colonies, which however I think she has not sense enough to embrace.”⁹ Not only did the obstinate British refuse the petition; the heavy losses at Bunker Hill “only hardened their resolve to crush the American rebellion.”¹⁰ As a result, King George III used the event to send thousands of Hessian mercenaries to fight in America under the British Army.

After the failure of the Olive Branch Petition, American diplomacy started its first significant phase of development when the Second Continental Congress created a Committee of Secret Correspondence in November 1775. The Committee's members, Benjamin Franklin, Benjamin Harrison, Thomas Johnson, John Dickinson, and John Jay, had "the sole purpose of corresponding with our friends in Great Britain, Ireland, and other parts of the world."¹¹ In December 1775, Franklin put his diplomatic abilities into full effect to acquire more French aid and an alliance. He wrote to American agent Charles William Frederick Dumas, a vital link to French ministers at The Hague in the Netherlands. Franklin understood better than most how France needed proof of American unity, commitment, and military capabilities. To pique French interests, he confidently wrote,

We are threatened from England with a very powerful force to come next year against us. We are making all the provision in our power here to prevent that force, and we hope we shall be able to defend ourselves. But . . . we may find it necessary to ask aid of some foreign power . . . we inform you, that the whole continent is very firmly united, . . . that we have had on foot the last campaign an army of near twenty five thousand men, wherewith we have been able, not only to block up the King's army in Boston, but to spare considerable detachments for the invasion of Canada, where we have met with great success, . . . Our artificers are also everywhere busy in fabricating small arms, casting cannon, &c. Yet both arms and ammunition are much wanted.¹²

Even though the invasion of Canada failed, financial loans from France arrived in 1776 thanks to the successful American siege of Boston and Franklin's diplomatic efforts from Philadelphia.

The American siege of Quebec in December 1775 exemplified how military failure can result in failed diplomacy on another front. A part of the Continental Army attacked Quebec in order to deny British forces the opportunity to launch an offensive down the Hudson River into New York, to divide Britain and Canada, and to seek Canadian partisanship with the American Revolution. But the ill-prepared American forces earned for America nothing but Canadian disdain.¹³ Heavy casualties repulsed the American attack on Quebec City, and the British navy was enroute to break the siege. In addition, American commissioners could not provide money and supplies to the American army and any potential Canadian supporters.¹⁴ Continental Congress appointees later concluded, "If money cannot be had to support your army here with hono[u]r, so as to be respected instead of hated

by the people, we repeat it as our firm and unanimous opinion that it is better immediately to withdraw it [the Continental army].”¹⁵ After this costly military failure, American diplomatic efforts also failed and came to an end in Canada.

The British were well aware of American intentions to ally themselves with France, and the Declaration of Independence in July 1776 acted as a catalyst for British interference between the potential allies. Shortly after the declaration, British Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Richard Howe, and his brother, Commander-in-Chief of British landed forces in America, General Sir William Howe, arrived from London with an offer of peace that did not stand up to scrutiny. The Howe brothers had been “authorized to offer amnesty to all Americans who renewed their allegiance to the Crown, to suspend hostilities against those colonies evincing a desire for peace, and to reward those persons who assisted in the restoration of order.”¹⁶ With Benjamin Franklin acting as an intermediary, Congress flatly rejected Britain’s offer. On the American position, Franklin succinctly wrote, “And this must impel you, were we again under your Government, to endeavor the breaking our Spir[i]t by the severest Tyranny, and obstructing by every means in your Power our growing Strength and Prosperity.”¹⁷ This was a direct reflection of Congress’ political conviction within the Declaration of Independence.

The enmity between Great Britain and France went back centuries over many wars and conflicts, most recently in the French and Indian War. In 1776, the French minister Comte de Vergennes claimed, “England is the natural enemy of France; and she is a greedy enemy, ambitious, unjust, and treacherous.”¹⁸ After the Declaration of Independence, much of Europe realized helping America made vengeance on Britain possible. Catherine II, Empress of Russia, also hoped for irreconcilable differences between America and Great Britain.¹⁹ In exacerbating Anglo-European enmity, the Declaration’s “purpose was to make clear to Europeans, especially the French, the colonies’ commitment to independence.”²⁰ American merchant Silas Deane’s timely arrival in France helped facilitate the negotiation process for more foreign aid.

The Congressional appointment of a diplomatic commission to Paris, headed up by Benjamin Franklin, followed the Declaration in October 1776, to begin the process of negotiating an alliance with France and to be the primary source of “information as to the political state of this country.”²¹ Diplomatic historian Thomas Bailey pointed out, “The United States has never sent abroad a man better qualified by training, character, and temperament for the task at

hand.”²² The political goals were established. The players were in place. Favorable negotiations needed American military success.

In order to prevent an overt political commitment in Europe, the Americans sought initially to gain a commercial agreement with France and other European nations. Prior to Franklin’s arrival, Deane brought together France and Spain who provided covert weapons and supplies to the American rebellion through the cover of a private firm sponsored by Pierre-Augustin Caron de Beaumarchais.²³ Both the Kings of France and Spain, Louis XVI and Charles III, donated one million livres to fund the operation. The weapons and




Figure 1 Benjamin Franklin. Oil on canvas by Joseph Siffred Duplessis, c 1785. National Portrait Gallery, Smithsonian Institution.

provisions supplied from 1776-1777 through that commercial operation “were the margin of victory in the northern campaign of 1777, which ended in an American victory at Saratoga.”²⁴ The result of the Battle of Saratoga was the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce and the Treaty of Alliance between France and the United States.

Prior to the Battle of Saratoga, Franklin corresponded with the Comte de Vergennes regarding a mutual treaty of alliance where American independence would guarantee future trade and commerce.²⁵ In addition, Franklin pledged military support in return if Britain attacked France. He also added a ploy of a warning to the French that if they did not aid America, then Congress might be forced to end the war and make peace with Britain.²⁶ Franklin urged France and Spain to ally with America before the opportunity was lost through unforeseen events. Vergennes facilitated several commercial arrangements and a French loan of two million livres.²⁷ But a treaty was still too risky without American military success.

The American Congress and commissioners in Paris were rewarded when the momentum of the war in America changed on October 17, 1777. General John Burgoyne, commanding a British invasion from Canada, surrendered his entire force to the Continental Army at the Battle of Saratoga. This British military defeat provided a significant diplomatic swing in favor of the American commissioners, which “must be regarded as one of the decisive battles of world history.”²⁸ The French celebrated as though it was their own troops who had beaten the British.²⁹ French and American public sentiment after Saratoga rapidly facilitated the shift in diplomatic negotiations towards an officially recognized alliance. Franklin used his diplomatic skills and savvy to play the British and French against one another and, with a renowned military victory as leverage, Franklin was able to negotiate favorable terms. French fear of Anglo-American reconciliation; the possibility of getting revenge on their arch enemy; and the possibility of benefiting from a prosperous American trade, hastened Vergennes to the French Court of Louis XVI whose appeal to fear facilitated the treaties with France.³⁰

On February 8, 1778, Benjamin Franklin and Silas Deane wrote to Congress informing them that the American commission and the French minister, Comte de Vergennes, had signed two treaties with France in Paris. The Treaty of Amity and Commerce achieved Congress’ aims of a trade of equality with France and its colonies; a “mutual grant of most-favored-nation status” in commerce and navigation; no American “export duties on merchandise bound for the French West Indies”; “a mutual grant of liberty to have consuls, vice consuls, agents, and commissaries in each other’s ports”; and lastly, “a French grant of one or more free ports in Europe to American merchants, in addition to the free ports already opened in the French West Indies.”³¹ This treaty significantly helped the Continental Army in arms and provisions and achieved a new trading partner for the American people. The second treaty brought the diplomatic and military support that America primarily sought.

Franklin and Deane described the purpose of the Treaty of Alliance with France, was to “establish the Liberty, Sovereignty, and Independency absolute and unlimited of the United States as well in Matters of Government as Commerce.”³² With this treaty, France became the first nation to officially recognize the independence of the United States of America. It also “provided the young nation with the financing, military assistance, and the prestige of Louis XVI’s

government.”³³ Both parties needed the other’s approval before negotiating or concluding a peace with Great Britain; and either party could bring other countries into the alliance.³⁴ Lastly, the French promised to continue fighting until America had achieved independence from Great Britain. American military success at Saratoga provided this diplomatic coup and achievement.

The alliance was remarkable because both parties brought long-standing negative biases to the negotiating table. The French Court saw the United States “as an object to be manipulated to their own ends,” in which bribery served the French well.³⁵ The timing of the fortuitous alliance allowed the news to reach the United States just prior to the arrival of a British peace commission who were “prepared to concede everything but the word *independence*.”³⁶ Diplomatic and foreign affairs historian George Herring concluded that the alliance eliminated any further British attempts at compromise and garnered for America \$9 million in foreign military assistance from France, Spain, and Holland.³⁷ The Treaty of Alliance revived the American Revolution at home and spread it into the international community because of one American military victory at Saratoga.

No sooner had the ink dried on the two treaties between America and France, when Benjamin Franklin began his war of propaganda on the British ministry. It was a war meant to undermine and blame Lord North’s ministry for the outbreak and continuation of the war and the alliance with France. To Lord James Hutton, member of King George III’s Court, Franklin wrote on February 12, 1778, “I abominate with you all murder . . . I therefore never think of your present ministers and their abettors, but with the image strongly painted in my view, of their hands, red, wet, and dropping [sic] with the blood of my countrymen, friends, and relations. No peace can be signed by those hands.”³⁸

This was a strong suggestion that in order for peace to happen, King George and Parliament wanted to replace the present ministry with someone more conciliatory. Franklin further planted the political seed of change by writing to American sympathizer and British parliamentarian David Hartley, “Whenever you shall be disposed to make peace upon equal and reasonable terms, you will find little difficulty, if you get first an honest ministry. The present have all along acted so deceitfully and treacherously as well as inhumanly towards Americans.”³⁹

Great Britain in return attempted to split the Franco-American alliance with a promise of peace, but Franklin refused to allow his perception of British deceit to lure him. To David Hartley he stated,

You mention, ‘that the alliance between France and America is the great Stumbling Block in the way of Making Peace;’ and you go on to observe, that ‘whatever Engagements America may have entered into, they may, . . . *be relinquished*, . . . but we could never hope to be trusted again by France, or indeed by any other Nation under heaven . . . We know the worst you can do to us, . . . is to confiscate our Estates & take our Lives, to rob & murder us; and this you have seen we are ready to hazard, rather than come again under your detested Government.’⁴⁰

America was as committed to France as she was to independence. Franklin also knew an Anglo-American peace was more difficult to achieve than a French alliance. Only an American military victory would achieve change in British political policy towards America. But it took four years before the Battle of Yorktown provided that catalyst.

In the interim, the Franco-American alliance created problems for the British in Europe by the formation of a League of Armed Neutrality against Britain. The British Royal Navy had been stopping and seizing merchant shipping of all nations in an attempt to curb the aid of arms and supplies going to and from America. In the process, Britain renewed the hostility of the Baltic States, which in turn began negotiations with Russia. The Armed Neutrality of 1780 was a naval alliance headed by Catherine II of Russia and the Baltic States who sought to weaken Britain’s naval strength and protect their neutral shipping rights through international law.⁴¹ The Armed Neutrality was not a major fighting force, but it was reflective of the British Empire’s wartime dilemma which was the continuing growth of enemy belligerents and unfriendly neutral nations. By 1783, Britain was at war with the United States, France, Spain, and Holland, and the League of Armed Neutrality consisted of seven small-navy nations which spread the British Navy very thin.⁴² In addition, the Russian minister assured American agent Dumas, according to the Empress a “peace between the belligerent powers [Britain and the League of Armed Neutrality], will not be accepted without the preliminary condition *sine qua non* of Great Britain’s acknowledging the independency of the United States.”⁴³ The Armed Neutrality was a further ramification stemming from the Treaty of Alliance and the American success at Saratoga.

Besides the Treaty of Alliance with France, however, few other treaties aided the American war effort leading up to the Battle of Yorktown in 1781. American commissioner Francis Dana went to Russia in an attempt to join the League of Armed Neutrality, but since America was a belligerent of Britain it did not qualify. But in early 1782, John Adams was able to secure a commercial treaty

between America and Holland. This treaty enabled Adams to secure several Dutch loans, which kept the United States financially stable over the early 1780s, and courtesy of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, the French government guaranteed those loans.⁴⁴

Until Yorktown in 1781, British peace negotiations did not occur due to several American military reverses after Saratoga, such as the losses of Savannah and Charleston. Adding to American setbacks was the absence of French troops in America except for a few volunteer officers. However, after the American victory at the Battle of Cowpens and the costly British victory at Guilford Courthouse, British forces under Lieutenant General Lord Charles Cornwallis, shifted into Virginia. Also, French military ground forces under Lieutenant General Comte Jean-Baptiste de Rochambeau, to include an anticipated arrival of a French naval fleet under Admiral Francois-Joseph de Grasse, had finally arrived. In addition to this tremendous good luck, “the king of France had authorized a huge sum, six million livres, as [according to French minister Luzerne in Philadelphia] ‘a new proof of his affection . . . independent of the four millions which the ministry have enabled Dr. Franklin to borrow for the service of the coming year.’”⁴⁵ Diplomatic policy had assisted military success at Yorktown where financial aid, arms, supplies, and French troops and ships gave an edge to the Continental army.

General George Washington had the option of either attacking the British forces under General Sir William Henry Clinton at New York or General Cornwallis at Yorktown. With a new sense of purpose, Washington chose the latter, because Cornwallis had made his forces vulnerable by not anticipating a French naval fleet arriving to impose a naval blockade on his position. The combined American and French armies heavily outnumbered and trapped Cornwallis’ army. The short siege and battle ended in Cornwallis’ surrender on October 17, 1781, which happened to be the four year anniversary of General Burgoyne’s surrender at Saratoga.⁴⁶ American victory at Yorktown would not have occurred without the diplomatic preparations that paved the way.

The United States and France widely celebrated American victory at Yorktown; however, King George III remained in denial and wished to continue the war.⁴⁷ Both sides needed a great deal of diplomatic negotiation to secure peace and formally end the war. But with King George III and Lord North’s ministry defiantly in place, American independence was impossible without a British political change, and defeat at Yorktown gave Parliament the means to replace North’s ministry after years of unpopular war. North became the scapegoat in a British political revolution

in the winter of 1781-1782.

A common perception of British Parliament during the American Revolution is that it was reflective of King George III in his diehard war-hawkish defiance towards the American colonies. The war in America from 1780-1782 had dominated Parliamentary politics in Great Britain, and Lord North's ministry had been able to maintain political support from the House of Commons because of military successes in the Southern campaign.⁴⁸ The British defeat at Cowpens, the heavy losses at Guilford Courthouse, and the demoralizing loss at Yorktown jeopardized that support. British Whig parliamentarian Charles James Fox observed:

Though Lord Cornwallis had done everything he proposed, by penetrating into North Carolina; though he had been fortunate enough to come up with General Green [Nathaniel Greene], engaged, and defeated him, he had found no one good consequence of his success [after Guilford Courthouse], not being joined by any body of Americans [supposed thousands of Loyalists] as he expected, nor even retaining the ground upon which he had conquered [Guilford Courthouse]. . . . It was undeniable that the project [Southern campaign] was a vain one, similar to all the other enterprises [overall British military policy] we had formed during the course of the war.⁴⁹

Fox and a large part of the House of Commons, sympathetic with America and doubtful of British military policy, realized that subjugating the entire American colonies was impossible and some even hoped for British failure. Fellow Whig parliamentarian Edmund Burke "took comfort from the growing difficulties of Cornwallis in Virginia: 'As to North America, things there begin to operate their own cure. At least it looks as if that war was in a state of swift decay.'"⁵⁰ Fox had committed his work to "deter the Ministry from wasting the resources of England on ill-advised and fruitless efforts for the subjugation of America."⁵¹ The military defeat of Cornwallis' army at Yorktown proved to Parliament that British policies in America had failed.

Yorktown created two central political issues in Parliament: to end the war and replace North's ministry. Parliament was dead set against the king's war aims and the House of Commons firmly believed "they [North's ministry] could not . . . be trusted to carry out the wishes of the House respecting the war in America . . . and their lack of success proved them thoroughly incapable of

conducting either war or foreign policy.”⁵² Lord North resigned in March 1782 after a vote of no confidence from Parliament. The new ministry under Charles Watson-Wentworth, 2nd Marquess of Rockingham, better known as Lord Rockingham, and later William Petty-FitzMaurice, the Earl of Shelburne, better known as Lord Shelburne, facilitated the way for peace negotiations to end the war.

In August 1782, the British commissioners in Paris discussed terms of peace with Dr. Franklin with the authorization “to make the Independency of the Colonies the Basis & Preliminary of the Treaty.”⁵³ In addition, despite the fact that Britain, France, and Spain each had a separate agenda that went against American political and diplomatic goals, the American commission negotiated a successful Treaty of Peace with Great Britain. France and Spain both preferred British control of Canada “to keep an independent United States in check.”⁵⁴ Spain was never committed to American independence, despite all of its commercial aid, and sought to keep sole navigation rights of the Mississippi River.⁵⁵ And, the British tried to divide the French and American alliance if it had to concede independence. The main purpose behind this aim was the hope that “America . . . would gravitate back toward Britain’s influence and become its best customer.”⁵⁶

In the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain, the British still held New York and Charleston as bargaining chips; however, American military successes gave the American commissioners an easy hand in achieving most of its war aims in the final draft. The most important was Great Britain’s and King George III’s acknowledgement of “the said United States . . . to be free, sovereign and independent States.”⁵⁷ U.S. borders, property and debt, and fishing rights were negotiated and ratified on September 3, 1783. To the disappointment of Spain, the treaty gave the navigation rights of the Mississippi River to the United States and Great Britain. Moral absolutism in diplomatic negotiations leaves little room for compromise, but as Adlai Stevenson points out, “Compromise is not immoral or treasonable. It is the objective of negotiation and negotiation is the means of resolving conflict peacefully. But when we negotiate we have to have something to negotiate with as well as for.”⁵⁸ That is where the advantage of military success increases diplomatic and political strength.

George Washington and the Continental Army were able to provide several military victories to American diplomats in Europe, giving them an edge in the negotiating process. Diplomats Benjamin Franklin, John Jay, and John Adams among others successfully negotiated several treaties of amity and commerce; a

Treaty of Alliance with France; and a Treaty of Peace with Great Britain. The military, diplomatic, and political arenas needed each other to achieve suitable compromise in negotiations; military success on the battlefield; and political success at home. The new Republic had achieved short-term international respect by winning the war. However, diplomatic historian Richard Leopold pointed out, "Victory on the battlefield meant political but not diplomatic independence."⁵⁹ After the war, the U.S. continued to deal with the same European, and especially British, biases in the diplomatic arena, until the American military stood up again to defend its country and global status in the War of 1812. By the twentieth-century, the U.S. had established a much more substantial international reputation as a global power due to its continuously growing and symbiotic military, political, and international policies.

Notes

1. Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People*, 10th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), 26.
2. *Ibid.*, 38.
3. H. W. Brands, *The First American: The Life and Times of Benjamin Franklin*, 1st ed. (New York: Anchor Books, 2002), 494.
4. Richard B. Morris, "Ending the American Revolution: Lessons for Our Time," *Journal of Peace Research* 6, no. 4, Special Issue on Peace Research in History (1969), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/422750> (accessed June 15, 2010), 350.
5. *Ibid.*
6. Bailey, 19.
7. Morris, 350.
8. Mary A. Guinta, ed., *Documents of the Emerging Nation: U.S. Foreign Relations, 1775-1789* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1998), 296.
9. Brands, 501.
10. Joseph J. Ellis, *American Creation* (New York: Vintage Books, 2007), 28.
11. Guinta, xx.
12. Benjamin Franklin to Charles W. F. Dumas, Agent of the United States in Holland, Philadelphia, December 10th, 1775, *The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution: Being the Letters of Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane, John Adams, John Jay, Arthur Lee, William Lee, Ralph Izard, Francis Dana, William Carmichael, Henry Laurens, John Laurens, M. De Lafayette, M. Dumas, and Others*, Vol. IX, ed. Jared Sparks (Boston: Nathan Hale and Gray & Bowen, 1830), 256-259. Reprints from the collections of the University of Michigan Library, 2010.

13. Brands, 508.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., 514.
17. Benjamin Franklin, *Franklin: Autobiography, Poor Richard, and Later Writings*, annotated by J. A. Leo (New York: The Library of America, 1987), 252.
18. Bailey, 26.
19. Ibid., 27.
20. George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: US Foreign Relations since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 15.
21. Committee of Secret Correspondence to Charles W. F. Dumas, Agent of the United States in Holland, Philadelphia, October 24th, 1776, *The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution*, 297.
22. Bailey, 30.
23. Guinta, 9.
24. Ibid.
25. Brands, 522.
26. Ibid., 530.
27. Ibid., 530-531.
28. Bailey, 31-32.
29. Ibid., 31.
30. Ibid., 32.
31. Guinta, 59.
32. Benjamin Franklin and Silas Deane to the President of Congress, Paris, February 8, 1778, *Documents of the Emerging Nation: U.S. Foreign Relations, 1775-1789*, ed. Mary A. Guinta (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1998), 59.
33. W. M. Malloy, ed., "Treaty of Alliance with France, 6 February 1778," *Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols, and Agreements between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1776-1909*, Vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1910), <http://psi.praeger.com.ezproxy1.apus.edu> (accessed June 15, 2010).
34. Guinta, 59.
35. Herring, 21.
36. Ibid., 22.

37. Ibid.

38. Benjamin Franklin to Lord James Hutton, Paris, February 12, 1778, *Letters From France: The Private Diplomatic Correspondence of Benjamin Franklin, 1776-1785*, ed. and annotated by Brett F. Woods (New York: Algora Publishing, 2006), 15.

39. Benjamin Franklin to David Hartley, Paris, February 12, 1778, *Letters From France*, 17.

40. Benjamin Franklin to David Hartley, Paris, February 3, 1779, *Franklin*, 265-266.

41. Bailey, 39.

42. Ibid., 40.

43. C. W. F. Dumas to the President of Congress, The Hague, March 5, 1781, *The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution*, 449.

44. Guinta, 212.

45. Benson Bobrick, *Angel in the Whirlwind: The Triumph of the American Revolution* (New York: Penguin Books, 1998), 447.

46. Ibid., 462.

47. Ibid., 466.

48. I. R. Christie, *The End of North's Ministry: 1780-1782* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1958), ix.

49. Ibid., 264.

50. Ibid., 268.

51. Sir George Otto Trevelyan, *George the Third and Charles Fox: The American Revolution*, Vol. 1 of 2 (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1911), 44. Forgotten Books, Classic Reprint Series.

52. Christie, 352-353.

53. Lord Shelburne to Richard Oswald, July 27, 1782, *Documents of the Emerging Nation*, 91.

54. Herring, 28.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid., 29.

57. ART. I, "Treaty of Peace with Great Britain, 3 September 1783," *Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America*, Vol. 1, edited by Hunter Miller (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1931). <http://psi.praeger.com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/> (accessed June 15, 2010).

58. Morris, 352.

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