

ROY E. APPLEMAN. *East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 1950*. College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1987.

It is evident from the opening lines of the preface to military historian Roy E. Appleman's *East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 1950* that a number of recent press releases from the Department of Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office would have been welcome news to him. Appleman wrote his extraordinary book in part to preserve the memory of the Army men who fell to the east of the Chosin Reservoir during one of the most horrific battles of the Korean War. Appleman notes that these men "have not white-marble markers at their final resting places as do thousands of others memorialized in Arlington National Cemetery."¹ He would certainly have appreciated the exertions made by the Department of Defense to bring their mortal remains home. Due to the efforts of a joint U.S. and Democratic People's Republic of Korea team in September and October 2001 to excavate a mass grave on the eastern shore of the Chosin Reservoir, at least one of those left behind during the dreadful breakout attempt of early December 1950 was buried at Arlington National Cemetery in August 2012. How that young man, Army Corporal Kenneth R. Block, and his comrades came to be at the inhospitable Chosin Reservoir and the utter failure of U.S. Army and Marine communication, command and control to bring him and almost one thousand other young men back home to their families alive is the story that Appleman sought to recreate.²

Appleman, who served with the U.S. Tenth Army in Okinawa, Japan as a combat historian and captain, was later promoted to lieutenant colonel with the X Corps in Korea.³ He was "ordered from reserve status to active duty with the Army and sent to Korea as a combat historian for the purpose of studying the action there and preparing the Army's history of the Korean War."⁴ Based upon his experience with the X Corps in Korea and his training as a historian, Appleman was eminently qualified to write the story of the Army's tragedy at Chosin. Appleman painstakingly reconstructed the story of the men from the U.S. Army's 7th Infantry Division who had been quickly assembled into a near regimental-size task force and sent north to the frigid Chosin Reservoir area in late November 1950 to protect the east flank of a Marine force that had been directed to the area as part of General Douglas MacArthur's strategy to push the Communist forces north of the Yalu River and out of Korea.⁵

Appleman's initial research into the Chosin campaign found near-complete records of the Marines' experience in the area, but virtually nothing, other than short reports prepared by several of the surviving officers; Major Robert E. Jones, Major William R. Lynch, Jr., and Captain Robert E. Drake to document the fate of the Army's task force. Appleman quickly realized that the only way to compile and

preserve the memory of the Army task force's brutal experience at Chosin was to seek out the survivors. Appleman's own previous experience as the Army's combat historian for the Korean War undoubtedly allowed him greater access to the survivors and the ability to form a unique bond with them as he sought to piece together their written records and notes; compare, contrast and weigh the evidence from their recollections, and match divergent accounts to determine the most accurate representation of the actual events that led to "one of the worst disaster for American soldiers in the Korean War."⁶

Appleman labored seven years to bring *East of Chosin* to life; his work not only includes a searing narrative of the disaster at Chosin but also contains maps he created to portray troop positions and movements as well as detailed weather conditions and area topography descriptions that are essential for the reader to appreciate the enormity of the challenges faced by the Army's task force. The task force, initially known as the 31st regimental combat team (RCT), was comprised of Army 7th Division units, including infantry and artillery elements. The task force was originally led by Colonel Allen D. MacLean. Upon MacLean's capture by enemy forces on November 29, 1950 the team was subsequently led by Lieutenant Colonel Don C. Faith.⁷ The fate that befell the RCT, upon the loss of MacLean known as Task Force Faith, is difficult to comprehend; poor planning, deplorable communications, extreme weather, the lack of critical supplies, the loss of key leaders and an unrelenting, merciless enemy combined to cause the death of as many as one third of the task force. However, it is as Appleman describes, the inability of the Army command to understand and appreciate the threat posed by the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF), which essentially sealed the fate of the task force.⁸

Appleman's *East of Chosin* is military history with a purpose; it is not meant to document the social or cultural background of the men who fought the campaign but to analyze the causes and effects of particular command choices. Appleman clearly hopes that by providing extensive analysis into the debacle, the circumstances surrounding the destruction of Task Force Faith can be avoided in the future.

East of Chosin is difficult to read on many levels; the detail provided can be overwhelming to many readers and the horrifying experiences faced by Task Force Faith during their attempted breakout from positions held east of the reservoir to join the Marines at nearby Hagaru-ri sear the reader's thoughts with unforgettable images. Appleman documents courage and valor as well as cowardice and betrayal. Primarily, however, he indicts senior level commanders for their command failures, poor decision making and lack of effective leadership. He nevertheless provides well-deserved credit to many who sacrificed all they had to provide a future for their comrades in arms. This is a book meant to educate a specific audience. It is primarily directed to those who can learn from its lessons, and taking

heed of them, prevent a repeat of the tragedy at Chosin.

ANNE MIDGLEY

Notes

¹Roy E. Appleman, *East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea*, 1950 (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1987), xi.

²"Soldier Missing from Korean War Identified." *Targeted News Service*, Aug 24, 2012. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1037554319?accountid=8289> (accessed February 19, 2013).

³George Davidson, "Roy E. Appleman 1904-1992" *National Park Service: The First 75 Years: Biographical Vignette*, http://www.cr.nps.gov/history/online_books/sontag/appleman.htm (accessed February 20, 2013).

⁴Roy E. Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History United States Army, 1992), viii. <http://www.history.army.mil/books/korea/20-2-1/toc.htm> (accessed February 20, 2013).

⁵Appleman, *East of Chosin*, xi-xii, 7.

⁶*Ibid.*, 305.

⁷*Ibid.*, 10, 145-152.

⁸*Ibid.*, xiii, 303, 305.

Bibliography

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ANDREW J. BACEVICH. *The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism*. New York: Metropolitan Books. 2008. x + 206 pp.

In *The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism*, Andrew Bacevich outlines what he sees as the major problems confronting American exceptionalism, or the idea that America is fundamentally different from other countries by virtue of its origins and unique role in geopolitics. These problems have manifested themselves in three distinct areas: the economy, the government, and the military, the combination of which presents America with a "triple crisis" which threatens the very existence of the United States. Bacevich paints America as a self-righteous bully who does little more than pay lip service to true values such as liberty and freedom in the implementation of its foreign policy. Over time, the United States (especially in the decades during and since the Cold War, and particularly in the proliferation of "small wars" such as those that have been and are currently being fought in Iraq and Afghanistan) has twisted and perverted these concepts to serve what is for all intents and purposes an American Empire. From its very early stages,

the United States always had a mission “not to liberate but to expand... [and has achieved this expansion] by any means necessary... [including] diplomacy, hard bargaining, bluster, chicanery, intimidation, or naked coercion.” (pp. 20) Bacevich’s image of the United States as this type of wily, impudent aggressor is in sharp historical contrast to such visions of Americans as “God’s new Chosen People, [erecting America as a “city upon a hill”] destined to illuminate the world.” (pp. 20) Bacevich often cites Christian theologian and social-political commentator Reinhold Niebuhr, whom he refers to as “our prophet,” (pp. 182) and who is remembered for positing the idea that “the most significant moral characteristic of a nation is its hypocrisy.” (pp. 42) Bacevich sees the United States fitting this Niebuhrian mold perfectly, and it is in this pessimistic vein that Bacevich addresses what he sees as America’s current existential dilemma.

Bacevich suggests that at the very core of the “triple crisis” facing the United States is an even bigger crisis of profligacy, or wasteful spending that has pervaded American society and manifested itself in many insidious forms for generations. Though America professes to be beholden to the ideas of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” (pp. 15) Bacevich asserts that what really lies at the core of American ideology can be summed up in one word: more. For the vast majority of Americans, these ideals are rarely sought after in such noble or grandiose terms; rather, Americans mostly find themselves living by such mottos as “Whoever dies with the most toys wins” and “If it feels good, do it.” (pp. 16) Bacevich believes this obsession with material excess has affected American foreign policy in many ways, chiefly by making the United States grossly dependent on other nations for consumer products such as oil. By virtue of this intolerable dependence, Americans are “no longer masters of their own fate.” (pp. 17) This crisis of profligacy has plagued America at least since the French observer Alexis de Tocqueville toured the nation in the 1830s and noted the “feverish ardor” (pp. 17) with which Americans strive to accumulate things. American profligacy came to infect the foreign policy of the United States, who had from its founding been devoted to expansion, and whose founding fathers “viewed stasis as tantamount to suicide.” (pp. 20) Far from the glorious vision of America as a beneficent liberator of oppressed peoples or “[the uplifter] of little brown brother” (pp. 20), Bacevich portrays America as bent on expansion by any means necessary, who merely uses paeans or allusions to America’s “manifest destiny” to justify actions around the world that otherwise would appear to be reproachable. American expansionism has historically worked out generally very well for the American people until (roughly) the “tipping point” (pp. 29) that occurred from around 1965 (when President Johnson ordered U.S. troops to South Vietnam) through 1973 (when President Nixon ended direct U.S. involvement in Vietnam). America had been experiencing a significant, protracted economic downturn since the end of WWII, which was exacerbated during this “tipping

point,” whereby Americans saw themselves becoming increasingly dependent on foreign oil. Bacevich cites another specific “tipping point” which solidified Americans’ staunch desire to hold fast to the tenets of material excess: This was the response to Jimmy Carter’s “cross-of-malaise” (pp. 35) speech, in which Carter called upon the American people to live within their means and replace materialism and greed with frugality. Americans did not respond well to Carter’s speech; on the contrary, Carter sealed his political fate by delivering this oration. Americans, as always, were not interested in frugality and thrift. They were not looking to change from within; rather, they were looking for further justification for greed and abundance that had always gone hand in hand with American exceptionalism and “manifest destiny.” They found what they were looking for when Ronald Reagan took to the throne in the White House.

Bacevich describes Reagan, along with all subsequent Presidents to a certain extent, as a great placater of the American people, and above all else as an enabler of American profligacy. Whereas Carter encouraged Americans to be frugal, Reagan encouraged unquenchable greed and always assured Americans that they could have more. His successors summarily followed in his footsteps: Take for example George H.W. Bush who affirmed to the American people in 1992 that “The American way of life is not negotiable.” (pp. 53) One unfortunate, major consequence of this “non-negotiable” mentality has been the tendency of the United States, a nation supposedly opposed to starting fights with other nations, to use its military to do exactly this and to perpetuate the problem of profligacy which has grown in the last several decades from a small nuisance to a potentially nation-ending problem. Bacevich details the exploits of the U.S. military since the end of the Vietnam War, asserting that in virtually every conflict the American people have been misled by politicians who at the very least are severely misguided and at the very worst are overtly corrupt. While America has supposedly gone around the world as a great liberator bringing freedom to the oppressed and downtrodden, Bacevich says this has all been a façade. He believes it has been the tendency of the U.S. to engage in “gratuitous air war and... preposterously frivolous legislation,” (pp. 57) particularly in the years since the events of 9/11/01 in what has become the Global War on Terror. After 9/11, it has become the policy of the United States to engage itself in multiple wars on many different fronts concurrently, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan, predominantly in the name of rooting out terrorists and (to a lesser extent) bringing the fruits of liberty and freedom to the people of these nations. More hot air, says Bacevich. What has actually happened is that America has vastly overextended itself militarily and financially in the attempt to fight what has become an almost holy war against terrorism. This has led to what Bacevich describes as a gap between the perception of what the American military is capable of and what it actually can accomplish. According to Bacevich this gap is very wide, and we had better come

to realize this before it is too late. The Bush Doctrine, which is largely based on the concept of preventive war, could ultimately lead to a condition which Bacevich describes as “war without end,” (pp. 119) which has actually been discussed at the very highest levels of national defense amongst the “Wise Men... from Forrestal through Nitze to Wolfowitz.” (pp. 119). These men actually contemplate the possibilities of generational (even multi-generational) warfare that would make Vietnam look like a minor military exercise.

Bacevich paints a bleak picture for the future of the United States; he offers possible solutions to the problem of American profligacy which has caused the “triple crisis” that he sees as potentially responsible for America’s downfall, but he mentions these solutions almost as a passing thought, or maybe more fittingly as an alternative in a parallel universe. For example, he talks about the possibility of bringing back the draft and then immediately shoots the idea down, saying that it would never happen in America for many reasons, the most obvious being its economic unfeasibility and the fact that, due to the current social climate in the U.S., the draft would be totally unenforceable. Bacevich also suggests America should abandon the Bush Doctrine and the concepts of “preventive war” and “war without end,” but he also points to the obvious indicators that this is very unlikely to happen. Bacevich even suggests that nuclear disarmament become a national priority, but points to the failure of Presidential administrations dating back to Truman to make any serious progress along these lines. Bacevich ultimately concludes by pointing once again to “our prophet” Niebuhr: “To the end of history, social orders will probably destroy themselves in the effort to prove that they are indestructible.” (pp. 182) This is a very bitter pill to swallow for the average American, but one cannot help to acknowledge the flaws that Bacevich points out. *The Limits of Power* opens with a quote from the Bible: “Set thine house in order.” (2 Kings 20:1) This was supposedly God pointing out the mortality of Hezekiah and giving him some solemn advice before he died. Similarly with this book, Bacevich shows us that America is also mortal, and had better take care of its affairs before it too dies. In this fashion, he appears as a sober (if somewhat apocryphal and apocalyptic) voice in the current sea of current historical commentary. This book is a scathing exposé of America’s most powerful institutions: It calls into question their methods and motivations in an urgent, forthright manner that will appear refreshing to some, while to others it may be difficult to read.

GREG BALLIET

KELLY DEVRIES. *Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century: Discipline, Tactics, and Technology*. Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell Press, 1996. 216 pages.

In his book *Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century: Discipline, Tactics, and Technology*, Kelly DeVries contends that his analysis and findings differ from most historians of medieval warfare, as he asserts that infantry alone could and did win battles. Through the use of primary and secondary sources, a narrative of fourteen battles, interwoven with contemporary descriptions, is produced which provides a detailed account of the chosen battles that were fought in the first half of the fourteenth century. Each chapter covers one battle and provides, where known, some background on the fight, topography of the battlefield, opposing commanders, and, composition of the opposing armies. Also covered in each chapter is an analysis of the causes of victory and defeat. Additionally the book also contains an appendix titled "Ambushes." (pp. 188) "Ambushes" details three fights where the victorious army initially used surprise when initiating battle. All of the battles covered in the appendix occurred in the same early fourteenth century time period. The book ends with a chapter titled "Conclusion" that summarizes the authors initial thesis and reinforces the conclusions he reached by the end of his study. *Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century: Discipline, Tactics, and Technology* also includes an eleven-page bibliography of primary and secondary sources.

The author uses a wide variety of primary and secondary sources, both literal and poetic that cover an assortment of subjects relevant to the time period studied. It appears from reading the bibliography, and the extensive footnotes found throughout the book that the author used sources that cover the sociology of the period of the high to late middle ages as well as biographies of rulers, leaders, and nobles. Military treaties and contemporary histories are also utilized as well as modern studies on almost every area and aspect of life in medieval Western Europe. The cited sources cover almost every location in Western Europe. Sources on the political, societal, and military organization and other aspects of life in medieval Western Europe are listed as well. The bibliography is a strong and useful reference on the late medieval time frame and can be used as a springboard for further research and study.

Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century provides not only a contemporary look at early fourteenth century combat, but also a concise analysis of why the victors won and the mistakes made by the defeated armies. DeVries illustrates this point with a description of a ledger account of the defeated French commander at the Battle of Courtrai. The ledger account details how the French commander bought a map of the battlefield that included details of the very trenches that would cause the deaths of so many of his soldiers. (pp. 15) Even though the French commander had knowledge of the trenches dug and camouflaged in front of the Flemish positions, he ordered his attack to be conducted directly into the Flemish positions protected by the trenches. DeVries points out that the combination of disregarding the trenches and stiff Flemish resistance lead to

the defeat of the attack and the deaths of the cream of French nobility. DeVries analyzes the tactics, techniques, and weapons used in each battle. The book uses a variety of primary and secondary sources written in both Latin and Middle English to provide as accurate and complete a picture of the battle covered as possible. DeVries also attempts to explain and mitigate any nationalistic prejudice of the sources used. The author uses sources, which conflict with each other, and provides a plausible explanation for the discrepancies. DeVries frames his explanations in a manner that adds to the depth of the battle without confusing the reader.

Many students of medieval military history believe that the armored knight dominated the battlefield and that until the introduction of viable firearms an army of mounted knights would always defeat foot soldiers. Before reading *Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century* it is easy to picture the armored knight riding down and impaling his enemies with impunity; breaking any infantry formation and cutting down all who would dare to resist him. After reading this book the reader begins to realize that regardless of the time period studied, the terrain and weapons have more of an impact on an army's chances of victory than almost any other factor. The book also reinforces the belief that the terrain can act as a combat multiplier and increase the effectiveness of weapons and the efficiency of the battle plan a commander constructs to ensure victory.

This is a very easily read and thoroughly enjoyable book, on a subject that could be very dry and boring. Where appropriate the author provides a level of detail that brings the battle to life, but not so much as to inundate the reader with too much information. *Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century* can be read and enjoyed by the casual reader of military history as much as the well-informed student; it makes a significant contribution to the literature of medieval warfare and to a better understanding of the infantry's role in fighting and winning battles during the first half of the fourteenth century.

FRANCIS M. HOEFLINGER

JOSPEH J. ELLIS. *Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary Generation*. New York: Vintage Books. 2002.

In the first decade of its existence, the American republic was like an infant in an incubator, in need of constant attention and care. The ten years following the signing of the Constitution were the "most crucial and consequential in American history." (pp. 11) This decade "set the precedents, and established in palatable fact what the Constitution had only outlined in purposely ambiguous theory."(pp. 11) The main point of discussion among the caretakers of the new nation was how exactly the promise of 1776 was to be carried out. Or, according to Joseph Ellis in *Founding Brothers*: What was the "true

meaning” of the American Revolution? This conflict would, by the dawning of the nineteenth century, give rise to the separation of the founders into two ideological camps: The Federalists and the Republicans.

Joseph Ellis examines the political dialogue that arose among the “band of brothers” that started the revolution, created the Constitution, and became the first leaders of the brand new United States. In his book, he attempts to answer “How did they do it?” by examining six key episodes in the decade, centered around eight of the founders: Abigail and John Adams, Aaron Burr, Benjamin Franklin, Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison and George Washington.

The republic was created by men of diverse personalities and ideologies. This mix, according to Ellis, generated a “dynamic form of balance and equilibrium.” (pp.17) The multiple personalities and philosophies checked each other and brought a sense of moderation to the discussion.

Ellis’ “founding brothers” are a group engaged in a conversation that spans the decade following the signing of the Constitution. Through letters and other papers, Ellis puts our “ear to the keyhole” as the revolutionary generation discusses the issues of slavery, states’ rights, and the very nature of the American republic.

The ideological battle that embodies the central conflict over the nature of the promise of 1776 most is the friendship and rivalry of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson. The last two chapters of *Founding Brothers* are devoted to the relationship between the two. Over a friendship that lasted from the early days of the revolution until their deaths on the same day, Jefferson and Adams often found themselves on opposite sides of the philosophical debate that defined the 1790’s. Ellis looks at the elections following the retirement of George Washington as the two heirs apparent battled in the first American elections that involved political parties, presenting the two men, “bonded at a personal and emotional level that defied their merely philosophical differences,” (pp.164) as unwilling enemies. Their ideological differences pitted them against each other and, in Jefferson’s case, gave rise to a new political party to challenge the ideas of his old friend.

Founding Brothers delves deeper into the history of the post revolutionary years than many Americans have ventured. Ellis takes the founders off of their pedestals and introduces us to them as real people, experimenting and struggling with the idea of a country created under a republican government, and deciding just what form that government and country should take.

Ellis’ book assumes that the reader already has a good grounding in American history, and is fully familiar with the history of the revolution and the Constitution. Casual readers, not well versed in the background behind the conflicts of the 1790’s may find themselves lost from time to time and reaching for their high school history

textbooks. For those looking for a more in-depth, yet quite readable examination of the early days of the United States, *Founding Brothers* is an engrossing, approachable study.

KEVIN EDGAR

CHRIS KYLE. *American Sniper*. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2012.

Navy SEAL Chris Kyle holds the record of the most sniper kills in U.S. military history, over 150 confirmed kills in a ten year span. Kyle's autobiography provides an excellent insight into the life of a SEAL, by sharing his memoirs and including excerpts written by his wife to see how this life affects both the service member and his family.

Kyle did not write this book to bring glory to himself. He was uncomfortable with the idea of writing the book and took care to shield the identities of his fellow Team members to protect them. He felt, "if you want to know what life as a SEAL is like, you should go get your own Trident: earn our medal, the symbol of who we are. Go through our training, make the sacrifices, physical and mental. That's the only way you'll know."¹

Kyle shared insight into his life growing up and how he loved to hunt and ride horses, "you could say I've always been a cowboy."² One of the most important things he learned from breaking horses was patience. "I wasn't a patient person by nature. I had to develop that talent working with horses; it would end up being extremely valuable when I became a sniper - and even when I was courting my wife."³ He loved being involved in rodeo competitions and thought about becoming a ranch manager, but he also debated joining the military to become an aviator or a Marine. "I wanted to see real action. I liked the idea of fighting. I also heard a bit about special operations, and thought about joining Marine Recon, which is the Corps' elite special warfare unit."⁴ Out of respect for his parents, he followed their wishes of attending college before joining the military. A serious fall ended his rodeo career and his need for cash while attending school led him to a job as a ranch hand, which gave him plenty of time to think about his future. He decided it was time to quit college and go into the military.

In 1996, he was determined to enlist. The Marine recruiter was out to lunch, the Army recruiter said he must be an E-5 to be considered for Special Forces, but the Navy recruiter explained all about the SEALs. The training would be difficult, but he "liked that kind of challenge...when I left there, I wanted to be a SEAL in the worst way."⁵ He was willing to turn down a signing bonus to get a SEAL contract, but his rodeo injury which left him with pins in his arm disqualified him from enlisting. He quit school anyway and worked on the ranch until he got a phone call from the Navy recruiter several

years later, asking if he still wanted to be a SEAL.

Kyle enlisted and in February 1999, he reported to boot camp, which he felt was too easy, causing him to gain weight and to get out of shape. After boot camp, he went to intelligence specialty training and he was inspired to get in shape, after he saw some real SEALs on the base. "I was beginning to develop the right mind-set: Do whatever it takes."⁶ After six months of being in the Navy, he finally received orders to report to BUD/S training, the first step to becoming a SEAL. Even a fractured foot did not stop him from reaching his goal, "if you have the psychological fortitude to come back from an injury and complete the program, you stand a decent chance of being a good SEAL."⁷ After advanced training (SQT, SEAL Qualifying Training), he got orders to join a SEAL team, "we didn't consider ourselves real SEALs yet; it was only when we joined a Team that we would get our Tridents - and even then we'd have to prove ourselves first."⁸ He was assigned to SEAL Team 3, in Coronado, California. He met Taya in nearby San Diego in April 2001. The events of September 11 would have a major impact on his life, with more training to prepare for deployment and war. Chris and Taya married just before his deployment.

Throughout the book, Taya shares her insights of her first impression of him, her fears during deployments, readjustments when he returned home, anger when he deployed again after the birth of each of their children and when he reenlisted against her wishes, emotional conflicts that separations cause, the stories of war, the reality that some of the Team members do not come home alive, and the challenges of life after military service. She soon realized that, "He thought dying on the battlefield was the greatest" and "Being a SEAL is more important to him than being a father or a husband."⁹

Kyle discussed training missions, weapons, his equipment, nicknames for each other, and the realities of being in combat. Kyle did not feel he was the best shot in the world, but he felt the war gave him opportunity to become a good sniper. Kyle and two other snipers soon had the most confirmed kills, "kills that someone else witnessed, and cases where the enemy could be confirmed dead."¹⁰ By the time he left the military in 2009, Kyle was the top sniper in U.S. military history.

Two uncles of this reviewer highly recommended this book, because it also told the story of a family member, Ryan Job, the son of her second cousin. Kyle's first impression of Job was that he was too fat and they constantly harassed him. "He lost weight and got into better shape....He was such a hard worker, so sincere, and so damn funny, that at some point we just went, *I love you. You are the man.* Because no matter how he looked, he truly *was* a SEAL."¹¹ His humor earned him the nickname of Biggles the Desert Hippo. Kyle felt devastated when Job and another SEAL Marc Lee were shot on a mission. A bullet hit Job's "rifle first, then ricocheted into his face."¹² Kyle helped him down the stairs to a personnel carrier. "I was sure he was

going to die. I was sure I'd just lost a brother. A big, goofy, lovable, great brother. *Biggles*. Nothing I'd experienced in Iraq had ever affected me like this."¹³ Lee did not survive and they held a memorial service for him in Camp Ramadi before his body was shipped home. Kyle turned to his faith to find comfort, but he still felt responsible when he learned that Job survived his injuries but lost his eyesight.

Kyle learned that his young daughter was sick and being tested for possible leukemia. "A cloud of helplessness descended over me....The loss of Marc and Ryan's extreme injuries had taken a toll. My blood pressure had shot up and I couldn't sleep. Hearing the news about my daughter pushed me to my breaking point."¹⁴ A Red Cross letter started the process to send him home, but he felt torn about leaving his men. "It was a conflict - family and country, family and brothers in arms - that I never really resolved. I'd had even more kills in Ramadi than in Fallujah. Not only did I finish with more kills than anyone else on that deployment, but my overall total made me the most prolific American sniper of all time - to use the fancy official language. And yet I still felt like a quitter, a guy who didn't do enough."

His daughter got better, but while he was home, he learned another SEAL, Mike Monsoor, had been killed. The funeral gave Kyle a chance to see his friend Job again. "They say friendships forged in war are strong ones. Ours would prove that truism."¹⁵ Their friendship continued to grow after that. He was proud of Job's new accomplishments: getting married, attending college and graduating with honors; and accomplishing a number of physical challenges (mountain climbing, hunting, and a triathlon). He felt Job was "a true patriot. A genuine warrior, with a heart of gold."¹⁶ Unfortunately, Job would lose his life due to an error at the hospital after further reconstruction surgery. "It was a tragic end to a heroic life. I'm not sure any of us who knew him have gotten over it. I don't think I ever will."¹⁷ Job's wife was pregnant when he died, so he never got to meet his daughter.

Kyle finally left the Navy and he and three friends started Craft International, to train military and police units. Their logo "came from the Punisher symbol, with a crusader crosshair in the right eye in honor of Ryan Job. He also inspired our company slogan.... 'Despite what your mama told you...violence does solve problems.'"¹⁸ Kyle had trouble with PTSD and resented leaving the SEALs. Depression and heavy drinking caused him to total his truck, but the accident made him realize that he needed to take care of his family and to take care of others. He got involved with Lone Survivor Foundation, which helps wounded warriors enjoy life again. On February 2, 2013, Kyle and his friend Chad Littlefield took one of those veterans, Eddie Ray Routh, to a remote shooting range. Routh, also suffering from PTSD, turned his weapon on the two men and killed them. Thousands attended Kyle's funeral in the Dallas Cowboys Stadium. Kyle protected American troops in Iraq as a sniper and helped

veterans overcome PTSD. “Though his book became a best seller, he never collected money from it, friends said, donating the proceeds to the families of two friends and fallen SEAL members, Ryan Job and Marc Lee.”¹⁹ Not only did this reviewer get to learn more about a family hero she never had the privilege to meet, she also got to learn more about a real American hero, Chris Kyle.

JENNIFER THOMPSON

Notes

¹ Chris Kyle, *American Sniper* (New York: Harper, 2012), 5.

² *Ibid.*, 9.

³ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 16.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 22.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 28.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 42.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 45.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 224, 243.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 303.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 244.

¹² *Ibid.*, 320.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 321-322.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 344.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 354.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 415.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 415-416.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 419.

¹⁹ Manny Fernandez, “At Texas Service, Mourners Remember Slain Ex-Sniper as Warrior and Family Man,” *The New York Times*, February 11, 2013, accessed March 15, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/12/us/chris-kyle-ex-sniper-recalled-as-warrior-and-father.html?_r=0.

COKIE ROBERTS. *Founding Mothers: The Women Who Raised Our Nation*. New York: Harper Perennial. 2004.

Cokie Roberts, the long-time political commentator for ABC News, bestselling author, and daughter of former Congresswoman Lindy Boggs; asked the question in the introduction of her book, “while the men were busy founding the nation, what were the women up to?” (pp. xvi) It is a question easily asked and difficult to answer because most of the women of the era destroyed their letters and few diaries have surfaced to tell us what they thought. Roberts provides some good answers to this question in *Founding Mothers*.

Men write most of the scholarship of the era about the founding fathers, yet the wives, sweethearts, mothers, sisters, and daughters who supported, advised and encouraged the men who gave birth to a nation go largely unreported. This book brings to light the stories of some of the extraordinary women of the period who fought as bravely the men, defending their homes from the British. Women had to take the reins of their husbands’ businesses, run the family farms, and continue to raise their families while their men went to war and to the Continental Congress. These women were just as much a part

of the founding of the United States as the men who spent months or even years away from their families.

In this time before modern communications, letter writing was the only means of contact for those separated by distance. Roberts uses primary sources, including personal correspondence, journals, and even recipes to give the reader a glimpse in to the life of women from the colonial era through the first presidential election and the raising of the new nation. The book has a delightful and engaging tone that is full of anecdotes and the everyday trials of life in the early days of this country.

The book covers the founding women of the country from Abigail Adams to Martha Washington. In *Founding Mothers*, Roberts tells stories of famous women as well as those less well known. Each of these women played a role in giving birth to our nation. The book opens with the story of Eliza Lucas Pinckney, wife of Charles Pinckney. At the age of sixteen, Eliza took over running her family's interests when her father "left Antigua to rejoin his regiment in fighting the war against Spain" (pp. 4). The author writes of the education and intelligence of this young woman. Eliza and Charles' marriage was a happy one and a reported love match, even though there is a difference of over twenty years in their ages.

The book closes with the years after the Revolution when the founding fathers and mothers were raising the newfound nation of the United States. Roberts relates the story of the women of Trenton who greeted President-elect George Washington with a banner they commissioned which proclaimed Washington "The Defender of the Mothers Will Be the Protector of the Daughters" (pp. 227). There are references to the everyday life of Martha Washington and Abigail Adams in the closing chapter. An advertisement for a cook for the family of the President shows that there was a normal life going on behind the outward appearance of the President.

Roberts also discusses the interest of some of the founding mothers in the education of the young women of the new nation. Abigail Adams was a proponent of educating young women because they would be better able to fulfill their duties to the United States "if they were more formally educated. And the new republic, if it were to function as the Founders envisaged would require the participation of its citizens...someone would have to train those citizens" (pp. 251). Roberts quotes John Adams as saying, "it is by the female world that the greatest and best characters among men are formed" (pp. 251).

The inclusion of some colonial and old family recipes of the founding mothers gives the book a homey touch at the end. The fact that Roberts does not attempt to change the language of these items makes for both a wonderful and at times difficult-to-understand-the-exact meaning look at how the founding mothers used the items they had at hand to provide for their families. It also shows the thriftiness of these women in the example of how to dress a calves head.

The chatty story telling tone of this work may put off a serious academic while others will find it makes the book more entertaining as well as informative. In Roberts's defense, the primary sources used for this book are taken from the personal letters and journals of the women referenced. These are not the works documenting the official records of the day; but women who are telling their friends, loved ones and the man of the household what is happening while they are distant from their families. While this book is not written in a scholarly tone, it is well documented with the primary sources used by Roberts. It gives the casual reader a more interesting look at the lives of the founding mothers than a dry academic work but the use of reliable sources provides good discussion and evaluation of the primary source material used by the author. Covering a wide period of time from early colonial days until after the election of George Washington provides ample examples of the lives of the women who were standing behind their men and this country.

ANITA KAY O'PRY

MATTHEW H. SPRING. *With Zeal and Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in North America, 1775-1783*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008. xxiv + 381 ppg.

Matthew Spring has expanded his doctoral dissertation into a full length book and in the process debunked many fallacies about how the British Army operated in North America during the American Revolution. He drew upon the writings of the officers from both sides of the war as well as diaries and letters of the enlisted men, and those of the Hessians who served under the British flag. In Spring's pages, the visual concept of perfect rows of British soldiers marching over open fields to engage the Continental Army is pushed aside in favor of what actually took place; British troops advancing in skirmish lines across terrain that was broken by fences, brush, and heavily wooded areas. The British Army's reliance on shock tactics including the famed bayonet charge were usually effective, but over time as the Continental Army gained experience and used the terrain to their advantage these tactics failed.

Still, the British Army won most of the Revolution's battles but failed to win the war due to strategic and logistical problems presented by the sheer size of the colonies. In addition, the political factors brought about by France entering the war decreased the manpower available to the British generals who begged for more troops throughout the war. Spring's chapters explore how the British maneuvered, their formations, their units, and how the men were recruited and organized. The book could have used more detailed information on the actual units, the campaigns and battles they fought in, and the weaponry involved beyond the basic arms. Still, it gives a fascinating explanation of the British Army that shatters the

misconceptions held by many.

The facts were that the British soldier fought extremely well and with great pride throughout the war. The soldiers themselves fought in different manners depending on units, but were let down by the lack of resources needed to exploit their battlefield victories while being unable to replace losses late in the war. The image Spring leaves with the reader is one of a proud seasoned British veteran that fought in North America as part of a professional army. Illustrations by Don Troiani add to that image. The book is well written and organized by topic into each chapter which allows the reader to move through the pages by subject conveniently. Tactics, military organization, logistics, and the use of the bayonet as well as both small arms and artillery are explained in their corresponding chapters. His use of supporting statistics serves to add to the information and expands the topic rather than overwhelm the reader with a plethora of numbers.

Spring takes the time to explain how the British regiments recruited their men in the Home Isles, trained them, and sent them into the ranks of the parent units in North America. He also devotes a chapter to the leadership of the regiments and how those officers were instrumental on the battlefield in rallying broken units while also employing intelligent small unit tactics to counter the Continental Army's bushfighting strategy. In addition he explains why the British failed to defeat the Continentals. When the British and Americans clashed in major set piece battles the British carried the day almost every time, but from the very beginning the British commanders were hamstrung by their lack of numbers needed to defeat the Continentals and pacify the countryside. At no time did they have enough men to meet the political goals of the British Parliament. When France and Spain entered the war on the American side and expanded the conflict into a truly global war the British Army in the North American colonies was cut in half. The West Indies were considered far more valuable than the thirteen American colonies and substantial numbers of troops were redeployed from the force in North America in order to protect the island colonies from French and Spanish depredations.

Generally Spring does not go into much detail beyond the strategic military situation of the forces fighting in North America, however to explain the situation so that the reader will understand why the rebellion succeeded he had to outline the handicaps which the British fought under during the conflict. The British attempt to use military force to resolve a political dispute in this manner strongly implies that most members of Parliament as well as the King and his advisors failed to understand the logistical issues as well as the sheer size of the colonies. There is no question that the British Army was by far and above superior to the forces the Americans had, but due to the failure of Parliament to create a force large enough to meet its goals most British victories ended up being Pyrrhic as they

could ill afford to lose any substantial number of men. It was this failure that Spring concludes was the primary reason behind the success of American Independence to overcome the better quality British troops.

All in all the book is a refreshing challenge to the hoary tales of British troops marching into sheets of American firepower ignoring their losses until they finally met into close combat. Instead, the reader is left imagining the British troops using the terrain as cover, employing light infantry to skirmish with and distract the Americans, while quickly closing with the Americans in their defensive positions and often causing the Continental lines to break in fear. In other words, the British Army has been given back its status of the preeminent fighting machine of its day.

JIMMY DICK

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