

Augustus and the Visionary Leadership of *Pax Romana*

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The assassination of Gaius Julius Caesar (100-44 BC) on 15 March 44 BC propelled the Roman Republic into the final throes of internecine warfare as the Roman Senate struggled to fill the vacuum left by Caesar.¹ The period between 44-30 BC remained one of constant turmoil and warfare. The situation became so dire that at one point the Roman Republic resembled an assortment of independent states under the control of military dictators. In the end, neither legislation by the Roman Senate nor effective governance restored order. Rather, the application of overwhelming military force by Gaius Julius Caesar Octavianus “Augustus” (63 BC-14 AD) brought peace to Rome.² Although events thrust Augustus into the center of Roman affairs unexpectedly rather than by design, he quickly developed into a superior political leader and competent military commander to rescue Rome from the fires of civil war. The visionary leadership of Augustus enabled Rome to end a lengthy period of civil war and completed the transformation from a republic into a *principate* (as derived from the root word *princeps* meaning “leading man” from Christopher Mackay’s definition).³ The emergence of Octavian as Augustus began the era of *Pax Romana* (Roman Peace) and brought stability to the citizens of Rome.⁴

In order to understand the influence of Augustus’s action upon Roman history, a brief synopsis of the previous century leading up to the assassination of Caesar enables readers to understand the transformation of the Roman Republic and the decisive role Augustus held at the end of the process. Rome’s evolution from a Republic to a *principate* proved bloody and spanned over one hundred years, but the Republic had to change in order for the Roman state

to survive. These changes began with the end of the Punic Wars.

After the end of the Third Punic War, the Roman Republic emerged as a hegemonic power in the Mediterranean region. The Punic Wars profoundly influenced the development of the Roman military, government, and the everyday life of Roman citizens. Rome fought against the Carthaginians from 265-146 BC in a near constant state of warfare. Rome emerged from the wars as a republic challenged with governing larger swaths of territory. Additionally, Roman society grew increasingly polarized over class divisions, a militia based military not structured for protracted campaigns abroad, and an economy that struggled to meet increased taxation to support government subsidies, wars, and a large influx of slaves into the labor market.⁵

The three Punic Wars conditioned generations of Roman citizens to the privations and logistical challenges of lengthy campaigns, but more importantly helped Rome develop as the dominant regional power and placed stressors upon the Roman militia system. The Punic Wars forced Rome to realize the limitations of a citizen militia based army and the logistical challenges of extended campaigns away from the Italian peninsula. The idea of service and those eligible to serve highlights a key shortcoming of the Roman militia system of the era. By narrowly defining the eligible population for the *dilectus* (draft or levy), Rome limited their ability to project or replace forces. The Punic Wars demonstrated the need for a larger pool of manpower to answer strategic requirements. With the destruction of Carthage, Rome established a new precedent of campaigning abroad and eliminated their nearest peer in military strength and economic capacity.

During the time of the Punic Wars Rome did not employ a *levée en masse* (total mobilization of a nation's population to support a war), but filled the ranks of their military from land owning citizens.

Throughout the early and mid-Republican period of Roman history, the military existed as a militia based army and Rome mobilized their landholders and aristocrats to support the strategic goals of Rome. Historian Adrian Goldsworthy notes the civic duty belief held by Roman citizens during this period and comments, “For such soldiers service in the army was not a career, but a duty owed to the state.”⁶ The societal norms espoused by the Romans of the third and mid-second century BC era denoted a civilization that placed a greater premium on the needs of the state rather than the individual. Early historian Theodor Mommsen commented in his multivolume *History of Rome*, “The Roman constitution was essentially based on the view that the citizen was at the same time a soldier, and that the soldier above all a citizen.”⁷

Additionally, the militia system displayed the tenuous link between an agrarian based society and an effective military. Historian Paul Veyne described the importance of land to the Roman citizen of the era as, “Land was at once a repository of wealth, a means of survival, and a source of trade goods.”⁸ This truism became increasingly apparent as Roman forces campaigned away from the Italian peninsula against the Carthaginians. In the beginning of the Punic Wars, Roman forces remained on the Italian peninsula and the campaigns ended quickly and allowed the legionnaires time to fight and farm.⁹ However, as the Carthaginians pulled Roman forces away from the Italian peninsula to regions across the Mediterranean, Rome’s military could not quickly complete a campaign and release the legionnaires in time to harvest crops. The longer campaign seasons contributed to legionnaires losing revenue, land, and afforded *patricii* (members of the aristocrat class) the opportunity to buy up or seize land from defaulting landowners. Rome also stood to gain with the acquisition of land from conquered territories, land that legionnaires failed to maintain or land from legionnaires that died in the

service of Rome. State ownership of land became so extensive that the Roman state eventually owned twenty percent of the entire Italian peninsula.¹⁰ As the state and wealthy individuals increased their land holdings, the smaller landowners faced increased challenges to maintain a sustainable income to survive.

While the state or *optimates* (the best ones) stood to gain from the acquisition of land and the associated revenue, the Roman Senate did not enact effective legislation to increase the eligible population base for service within the Roman legions. Rather than distributing the land won or acquired during the Punic Wars, the Roman Senate sought to increase the eligible population base for military service by decreasing the property requirements. The Senate changed the property requirement during the time of *consul* (the highest elected public official in the Roman Republic that normally served for a one year term) Lucius Lucullus 151 BC from 11,000 to 4000 *asses* (Roman monetary unit). Although the Senate attempted to maintain the strength of the Roman army, they did not address the growing discontent felt by aristocrats and commoners alike as the distant campaigns meant more time away from Rome. The Senate failed to propose or enact any legislation that shortened the required ten-campaign term that the Roman law mandated aristocrats to complete before they became eligible for political service. The Senate's inability to recognize and remedy the shortage of manpower caused by Rome's near constant state of warfare and outdated *dilectus* requirements, exacerbated the growing rift between the *optimates* and *populares* (the populists or popular party). Two brothers entered into Roman Senatorial politics in an attempt to address the inadequacies of the *dilectus* and to redress the disparity between social classes in Rome.¹¹

The two brothers, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus (163-133 BC) and Gaius Sempronius Gracchus (154-121 BC), increased the fric-

tion between the *optimates* and *populares* with their legislative efforts as *tribunes* (elected officials that represented the interests of *plebes*) to address the shortage of eligible citizens for military service while simultaneously providing the lower classes with land. The Gracchi sought a solution to a strategic necessity whereas the Senate perceived the efforts of the Gracchi as a challenge to their power. History recorded the displeasure of the Roman Senate against the Gracchi when senate inspired mobs killed each of the brothers during their tenure as *tribunes*. The senatorial class clearly illustrated, “the hatred and malevolence of the rich” described by ancient historian Lucius Mestrius Plutarchus “Plutarch” (46-120 AD) when the mobs dumped the bodies of the Gracchi and their supporters into the Tiber River on both occasions.¹² The extreme measures taken by the Roman Senate offers credence to the assertion made by Renaissance historian and philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) about the importance of the agrarian laws of the Gracchi brothers. Machiavelli wrote, “This grew into a disease [the distribution of property to the *plebes*] which led to the dispute about the Agrarian Law and in the end caused the destruction of the republic.”¹³ While the Agrarian Laws were not the sole causal factor behind the transformation of the Roman Republic, the Agrarian Laws evidenced the failures of the Roman Senate and the shortcomings of a militia based army that only drew recruits from a small portion of the Roman population.

The Roman Senate failed to implement permanent changes to the eligibility requirements for military service, resorted to violence as the final arbiter against the legislation of the Gracchi brothers, and did not succeed in healing the growing rift between the *populares* and the *optimates*. Although the Gracchi brothers died violent deaths at the hands of the mobs, their ability to harness the sympathy and support of the *populares* established a dangerous precedent of wresting power away from the Senate. Mommsen offers an ex-

cellent summation with his comment, “in short, he [Gaius Gracchus] accustomed the people to the fact that one man was foremost in all things, and threw the lax and lame administration of the senatorial college into the shade by the vigour [sic] and versatility of his personal rule.”¹⁴ The period that the Gracchus brothers served as *tribunes* displayed the criticality of the *populares* as a political power base and the importance of military recruitment/employment. Gaius Marius (157-86 BC) and Lucius Cornelius Sulla (138-78 BC) built upon the example set by the Gracchus brothers as they used the *populares* and military to further their personal ambitions for greater power.

The need for change to the Roman military’s militia system became apparent during the Gracchi period as Rome required more legionnaires to maintain distant territories and faced new opponents. The requirement for more legionnaires coupled with the growing rift between the *optimates* and the *populares* began the sequence for the professionalization of the Roman legions. Marius and Sulla harnessed the power of the military as a political tool to rise to unparalleled levels of individual power. Their use of the military as a political tool on the path of power marked a new chapter in the history of Rome.

The final transformation of the Roman Republic occurred during the bloody period of the Roman Civil Wars from 88-30 BC. What began with civil unrest and attempts at progressive reform under the Gracchus brothers ended with the total victory of Augustus over Antonius and Cleopatra in 30 BC and the creation of a *principate*.¹⁵ Throughout the civil wars, the Roman army completed their transformation into a professional army and transferred their loyalty from the Roman state to their generals. Apart from their physical embodiment of power, the legions and the veterans also constituted a significant political faction. As the legions grew increasingly privat-

ized and comprised of common class citizens, their needs for compensation and representation increased as their ranks swelled to some sixty legions or approximately 360,000 men during the war between Augustus and Antonius.¹⁶ The Roman Civil Wars epitomized the intrinsic truism of power politics that ancient historian Thucydides referenced with his writings, “that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”¹⁷ Sulla marked the first of the Roman dictators to prove this axiom.

While historians may debate the motivation behind Sulla’s decision to march against Rome, the evidence remains that Sulla used military force to influence the Roman political process and his precedent encouraged a deadly form of one-upmanship for individuals that sought power within the Roman political system. Sulla, above all previous Roman leaders, demonstrated the capabilities of political ambition melded with military force. Sulla was the first *consul* to march on Rome at the head of a *consular* army. Sulla cemented the loyalty of his men with generous rewards from plunder and awarded land to his veterans upon completion of their term of service. Ancient historian Gaius Sallust noted the same sentiment with his words, “Besides all this, Lucius Sulla, in order to secure the loyalty of the army which he led into Asia, had allowed it a luxury and license foreign to the manners of our forefathers.”¹⁸ These entitlements provided powerful incentives for service and more importantly, once enacted they proved almost impossible to take away. Sulla inculcated a greater sense of dependence amongst veterans towards their commander. Although Sulla stepped down from his dictatorship and enacted legislation to prevent the abuse of military power, the allure of absolute power and the expedient vehicle of military command to fulfill political ambition encouraged future Roman leaders, such as Julius Caesar, to build upon the example of Sulla.

Caesar's methodical climb to the eventual position of *dictator* offered Rome another example of the pursuit of power through the application of military force. Caesar's rise, like that of Sulla before him, typified the unique Roman blend of soldier and politician. Historian Paul Veyne captures this concept with his comments, "Engaging in political life,' which meant simply 'holding public office,' was not a specialized activity. It was something that any man worthy of name and member of the governing class, was expected to do...A man could be as rich as he liked, but he did not count among the 'the first men of the city' unless he cut a figure on the public stage."¹⁹ Caesar understood this concept implicitly and his exploits in Roman history denoted a deliberate climb to absolute power rather than an opportunistic grab for prestige.

Caesar learned from the previous examples of Marius and Sulla and enacted his strategy to gain power on both a political and military front. Caesar made political alliances, bribed rivals, bestowed gifts upon the masses and public officials alike. Caesar did not use the military against the citizens of Rome as a blunt object as Marius and Sulla did, but rather like a fine surgical instrument. Caesar's eventual conflict with Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus "Pompey" did not result from any poor political skills of Caesar, but from the Senate's fear of Caesar's growing power and the refusal of Pompey to negotiate with Caesar.

Caesar above all previous *consuls* understood the intrinsic relationship between the politics of the Roman Republic and the power of the Roman legions. Caesar attempted to improve the inefficient republican form of Roman government that proved ill equipped to deal with expanding territories and independent commands of *pro-consuls* (a former *consul* that serves as a governor/military commander) and *consuls*. Caesar implemented a plan to obtain power that resorted to both military force and soft political power, but he failed

to account for the resentment and fear that his actions caused amongst members of the Senate. Although Caesar may have thought his person inviolable within the walls of the Senate forum, some members of the Senate displayed the same violence that killed the Gracchus brothers and represented the ultimate veto power that Senate employed with greater frequency in the late Roman Republic. The death of Caesar plunged Rome into the darkest days of civil war and Caesar's nephew and appointed heir, Augustus, transformed the last vestiges of Roman Republic into a *principate*.²⁰

After the death of Caesar, confusion reigned as the various factions waited to see the reaction of the people. The will of Caesar named young Augustus as his heir and that every Roman citizen should receive seventy-five *denarii* (Roman monetary unit) from Caesar's fortune.²¹ This further incensed the people because Marcus Junius Brutus (85-42 BC) and his fellow conspirators argued against the tyranny of Caesar, yet the donatives left by Caesar to the common people did not depict the actions of a tyrant. The speech by Marcus Antonius (83-30 BC) further angered the masses and in a fit of rage, the crowd burned the building down where Caesar died and sought out the assassins.²² The conspirators fled from Rome and the initial amnesty brokered between Antonius, Brutus, and the Senate fell to pieces under the anger of the Roman people. Although order eventually returned to Rome, resentment continued to grow between Antonius and the young Augustus who wished to claim the fortunes of his inheritance and enter into politics. Augustus's motive for entering into politics may have resulted from a sense of self-preservation, a convenient opportunity or as a simple matter of revenge for the murder of his uncle, but his decision created another faction in the final battle for absolute power during the last days of the Roman Republic. Suetonius suggested that the motivation behind Augustus's eventual campaigns "was that Augustus felt it his

duty, above all, to avenge Caesar and keep his decree in force.”²³ While this sentiment certainly drew the support of Caesar’s veterans, evidence indicated that Augustus reacted to an opportunity and once enmeshed within Roman political and military affairs, he sought to dominate affairs as a matter of expediency and security for himself and the Roman state.

The conflict between Antonius and Augustus, which began with a dispute about Augustus’s inheritance soon boiled out into the open as Antonius prepared to leave his consulship and assume the governorship of Macedonia. Antonius falsely accused Augustus of plotting to assassinate him and in return, Augustus incited unrest by requesting Caesar’s veterans bear arms under his name and encouraged Antonius’s men to defect to his cause. Augustus gathered a sizeable force, and Antonius began legislative efforts to award himself the province of Cisalpine Gaul rather than the earlier agreed upon province of Macedonia. Antonius had already begun the transfer of troops from Macedonia towards Cisalpine Gaul when the Senate belatedly realized that Antonius not only held the Macedonian legions but also stood to gain the troops of Cisalpine Gaul if the Senate did not intercede. Augustus sensed an opportunity and allied himself with the *optimates*, and petitioned for recognition as a Senator. In a mutually beneficial action, Cicero supported Augustus, helped him win a place as Senator, and gave him *imperium* (the authority) to command the forces that Augustus had gathered. Additionally, the Senate declared Antonius an enemy of the state and Augustus along with *consuls* Aulus Hirtius (90-43 BC) and Gaius Vibius Pansa Caetronianus (? -43 BC) marched on Mutina to defeat Antonius. The forces of Augustus, Pansa, and Hirtius won against Antonius in 43 BC but Antonius escaped with a large part of his force; Pansa and Hirtius died during the fighting and Augustus remained the sole surviving commander of the forces dispatched by the Sen-

ate. This placed Augustus in an awkward position as the commander of a *consular* army without the rank of *consul*. Augustus still faced a very capable enemy in the form of Antonius that maintained a capability of inflicting damage on the provinces of Rome. Additionally, one of the murderers of Caesar, Decimus Junius Brutus Albinus (81-43 BC), remained in command of Cisalpine Gaul.²⁴

The Senate wanted Decimus Brutus to command the remaining forces of Augustus, but Augustus refused to aid one of Caesar's assassins. Brutus did not consolidate his forces with those of Augustus and sent out after Antonius, but died during the pursuit. Augustus felt slighted by the Senate because they failed to pay his men for their campaign against Antonius and had attempted to place Augustus's forces under the command of Decimus Brutus. Augustus used these arguments to put the case to his legions, and with their support, he marched on Rome to demand a *consulship* to fill the vacancy left by Hirtius and Pansa. In a strange echo of Caesar's life, Augustus marched across the Rubicon with his forces to redress a perceived slight from the Senate. Antonius did present a clear threat to the Senate and to Augustus's ambitions. Augustus's refusal to obey the law and to follow the instructions of the Senate reinforced the concept of *gloria* (fame or glory) and *virtus* (courage in battle) that Roman society held in such high regard. Augustus placed his own *virtus* and ambition above the dictates of the Roman state.²⁵

Augustus's march on Rome did not result in wholesale violence but demonstrated an example of *détente* as each side gradually relaxed their military posturing and Augustus won the consular election in 43 BC. During this period, Antonius maneuvered closer to Italy, but did not attempt to invade. In order to consolidate his power and to offset the power of the Senate, Augustus began negotiations with Antonius. Augustus rescinded the decree outlawing Antonius and in a display of Roman pragmatism, Augustus, Antonius,

and Marcus Aemilius Lepidus entered into a formal alliance that the Popular Assembly recognized as a Second *Triumvirate* (an appointment of three men as special or ordinary magistrates to execute a public office), with a term of five years. This *triumvirate* differed from the earlier secret *triumvirate* of Caesar, Pompeius, and Crassus because the Popular Assembly ratified their appointment and this did not subject the edicts of the *triumvirate* to any veto from the Popular Assembly or the Senate. In effect, the Popular Assembly appointed a military autocracy with little or no oversight.²⁶

The Second *Triumvirate* wasted little time in the consolidation of their power base and split the Roman territories and areas of responsibilities amongst themselves. The *triumvirate* eliminated potential rivals and gathered money for impending campaigns by proscribing some 300 senators and 2,000 *equites*.²⁷ Rather than imposing tariffs or enacting taxes, the *triumvirate* chose the most expeditious means available to support their aims. The Second *Triumvirate* chose proscription because without any oversight and little or no resistance to their edicts, the Second *Triumvirate* acted as they wished in a brazen form of autocracy. The legions provided the *triumvirs* with the power they needed to achieve their ambitions and Augustus, Lepidus, and Antonius clearly recognized this fact with the allowances they made for their legionnaires. Appian recalled how soldiers, “would ask sometimes for the town-house, estate, country place, or whole inheritance of the proscribed” and the *triumvirs* dared not contradict the soldiers, “Because the only safety for the rulers...lay with their soldiers.”²⁸

After amassing sufficient funding and resources, Antonius and Augustus began their campaign against Marcus Junius Brutus (85-42 BC) and Gaius Cassius Longinus (85-42 BC) in Macedonia. Antonius and Augustus defeated the forces of Brutus and Cassius in 42 BC at two separate battles at Philippi. With the defeat of the main con-

spirators behind Caesar's death, little seemed to bind *triumvirs* together and the growing friction between Augustus and Antonius supported this observation as Antonius directed Augustus to pension out 100,000 veterans onto the Italian peninsula. Antonius hoped to draw support away from Augustus by forcing Augustus to deal with the prospect of failing to keep a promise with his veterans or by seizing land from citizens to give to the discharged legionnaires. Rather than incur the wrath of 100,000 irate veterans Augustus seized eighteen Italian cities, evicted the inhabitants, and gave the territory to the discharged veterans. Augustus's actions proved unpopular with the *plebes* and Antonius's brother Lucius Antonius and Antonius's wife Fulvia sought to exploit the friction point as a cause to dissolve the Second *Triumvirate* but failed in their endeavors.²⁹

While a strained peace appeared in effect between Augustus and Antonius, the son of Gnaeus Pompeius, Sextus Pompeius Magnus Pius (67-35 BC), sought to redress the wrong done to his father during the Caesarean Civil Wars. In 40 BC, Sextus applied enormous pressure on Augustus and Rome by maintaining a naval blockade that intercepted the grain shipments to Rome and to break the blockade, Augustus and Antonius appointed Sextus *proconsul* of Sicily and Sardinia.³⁰ Not content on having an independent command that threatened his power, Augustus decided to campaign against Sextus. Suetonius referred to Augustus's campaign in Sicily as "his most dangerous campaign."³¹ Augustus attempted to defeat Sextus with an initial invasion in 38 BC, but between poor leadership and terrible weather, Augustus lost the majority of his fleet and suffered a humiliating loss.³² Faced with such a decisive defeat, Augustus turned to his most capable general, Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa (64–12 BC) to train and equip a navy. While Agrippa trained the forces, Augustus sought more ships from Antonius and another five-year

extension to their *triumvirate*. Antonius gave Augustus 120 warships; the Senate approved an extension of another five years to the *triumvirate*, and in 36 BC, Augustus launched his final campaign against Sextus.³³ Although the initial efforts of Augustus proved unsuccessful, his subordinate Agrippa scored a huge victory over Sextus, and this victory led to the ultimate triumph of Augustus. The victory of Augustus in Sicily marked his ascendancy as the most powerful military leader in the *triumvirate*. Augustus now commanded some 500 to 600 warships in addition to the forty-five legions that he commanded and he further expanded his power by stripping his fellow *triumvir* Lepidus of his command.³⁴

With the growing military power of Augustus, the friction between Antonius and Augustus grew and the final war of the Roman Republic began as Augustus and Antonius sought to garner public support for their factions by launching disinformation campaigns against one another. In 34 BC, Antonius began the war of insults by conducting a *triumphus* (a public ceremony that recognized the successful exploits of a military commander) in Alexandria. Plutarch commented about how the actions of Antonius riled the Roman populace and wrote, “And herein particularly did he give offence to the Romans, since he bestowed the honourable and solemn rites of his native country upon the Egyptians for Cleopatra’s sake.”³⁵ Augustus used the supposedly pro-Egyptian sentiment of Antonius to discredit him. Antonius further distanced himself from Augustus by divorcing his wife Octavia (Augustus’s sister) and in response; Augustus published the will of Antonius that listed his heirs as the children Antonius sired with Cleopatra.³⁶ Once Augustus believed he had generated sufficient support against Antonius, he formally declared war against Cleopatra and Antonius.

Augustus occupied the moral high ground in both the mind of the *populares* and many of the *optimates* because of his legal standing.

With the end of their second term as *triumvirate* in 33 BC, Augustus retained a consulship in 32 BC and Antonius held no legal position in Egypt. In the winter of 31 BC, Augustus's forces began their campaign against Cleopatra and Antonius, which culminated with a sea battle at Actium. Although Cleopatra and Antonius managed to escape, they committed suicide the following year and the last civil war of the Roman Republic ended. Augustus emerged as the richest man in Roman history and the commander of the largest Roman military force ever assembled.³⁷

Unlike Sulla, Augustus did not lay down the mantle of power and he remained in power long enough to enact lasting reforms that codified the *principate* into Roman law and ingrained his reforms into the psych of the *populus Romanus* (Roman people). Rome stood tired and wracked after decades of war and desired stability and peace. Augustus understood the clearest path to power resided within the ranks of the legions and enacted measures to prevent others from using the same tool that he and other predecessors used to gain power.

Augustus began mitigating the power of the legions by gradually drawing down their numbers. Augustus reduced the strength of the legions from sixty legions to twenty-eight legions. Additionally, Augustus moved the legions to the frontiers of Roman territories to protect earlier Roman gains and to keep military forces away from the capitol. Augustus further strengthened the ties between himself and the legions by enfranchising auxiliary troops and granting them Roman citizenship upon their discharge. Augustus promoted the professional status of the soldier by extending the term of service to twenty years, establishing a military treasury to pay gratuities for retiring soldiers, and paying the salaries of the soldiers directly from the imperial treasury. The legionnaires no longer looked to their commanders for payment and reward, but to their emperor Augustus.³⁸

While Augustus developed an excellent solution to the allure of military power as a political tool, he also faced the challenge of dealing with the Roman Senate and a government not equipped to deal with administering a large geographical area and an increased population base. Early historian W. W. Tarn neatly articulated Augustus's dilemma with the statement, "But that was the negative side merely: no man can win and retain supreme power in a nation by the simple slaughtering of all opponents; he must be able to convince a majority of supporters that he has something definite and acceptable to offer them."³⁹ The recent fifty years of civil war demonstrated the danger of abdicating power without providing some control measures. Augustus could not relinquish his position of supreme power without causing a struggle for power amongst his potential rivals. Augustus arrived at a novel solution that allowed him to maintain his power, but gave the appearance of a humble Roman citizen that sought to emulate civic virtue. Beginning in 27 BC and over a period of approximately four years, Augustus assumed the title of *Princeps Civitatis* (First Citizen) and turned over control of some provinces and their associated legions to the Senate, but he still maintained control of the majority of the provinces and some twenty legions.⁴⁰

To further foster the transition and to change the focus of the Roman Senate, Augustus also removed less than ideal members of the Senate and reduced their numbers from 900 to 600 members. Augustus greatly influenced the selection of the Senators and attempted to blend the old *optimates* with the *novus homo* (new men) to arrive at a balanced Senate that focused on administrative tasks rather than the pursuit of power through military means. Additionally, Augustus established a court system in the Senate to try political crimes and actively involved the Senators in the governorship of the provinces. Augustus established the beginnings of a civil service sys-

tem with his personal staff and developed an executive committee to deal with administrative tasks.⁴¹

While Augustus formally gave up the position of *consul*, he maintained an unprecedented amount of individual power on three fronts. First, the Roman Senate awarded Augustus the lifetime powers of *tribunicia potestas* (tribune or representative of the tribe/people power) that allowed Augustus to veto legislation, intervene/overturn court verdicts and introduce legislation. Second, the power of *imperium proconsulare maius* (greater ex-consul command authority) allowed him to override the governors and the power allowed him to assume command of the entire Roman army and all Roman territories. Finally, Augustus started the Praetorian Guard, which consisted of nine cohorts (each cohort numbered approximately 480 men) and stationed them around Rome and in outlying cities in Italy, a police force of three cohorts in Rome and a fire watch of approximately 7,000 men. These three powers while not overtly contrary to the idea of a Roman Republic in the eyes of the general population, allowed Augustus to centralize authority and establish a *Pax Romana* with his control of the government and the nearby veiled threat of a military under his personal control.⁴²

The Roman Senate lost much of their power before Augustus subtly refocused the role of Senate governance and decreased the allure of power politics during the century leading up to the Caesarean Civil Wars from 49-44 BC. By the time of the Caesarean Civil Wars the Senate effectively lost control of the military as key individuals struggled for power. Political theorist Samuel P. Huntington's discussion of conservative realism describes the key tenets that the Senate failed to enforce. Huntington writes, "It holds that war is the instrument of politics, that the military are the servants of the statesman, and that civilian control is essential to military professionalism."⁴³ The professionalization of the military occurred be-

cause of a necessity to meet Rome's increased strategic demands, but the Senate did not sufficiently control the military as it developed into an instrument of politics. Men like Sulla and Caesar recognized the utility of the military as an instrument in politics, demonstrated the skill, and the resolve to wield such a dangerous tool to achieve their personal goals, but Augustus employed the military to stabilize the state, centralize authority, and promote civil engineering.

When the Roman Senate gave Octavian the name Augustus in 27 BC and he became the *Princeps Civitatis*, the Roman Republic that existed at the completion of the Punic Wars formally ended.⁴⁴ The vision of Augustus established a *principate* that enforced peace, improved the economy, mitigated the military as convenient vehicle for political power, and brought Rome peace after fifty years of internecine warfare. W. W. Tarn wrote, "In sixteen years he [Augustus] avenged his father's death and attained more than his honors, he had surmounted all opposition and made himself master of the Mediterranean world."⁴⁵ The visionary leadership of Augustus enabled Rome to end a lengthy period of civil war, completed the transformation from a republic into a *principate*, and began the era of *Pax Romana*.

Notes

¹ Christopher S. Mackay, *Ancient Rome: A Military and Political History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 158.

² Ronald Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939), 9.

³ Mackay, *Ancient Rome*, 179.

⁴ Throughout this essay the author uses the name Augustus rather than Octavian to avoid confusion.

⁵ Susan O. Shapiro, *O Tempora! O Mores!: Cicero's Catilinarian Orations: a Student Edition with Historical Essays* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2005), 203; Adrian Goldsworthy, *The Fall of Carthage: The Punic Wars, 265-146 BC* (London, UK: Phoenix, 2006), 12.

⁶ Adrian Goldsworthy, *The Complete Roman Army* (London: Thames & Hudson Ltd, 2003), 7.

⁷Theodor Mommsen, *The History of Rome vol. I-V* (Oxford: Benediction Classics, 2011), 322.

⁸Paul Veyne, ed., *A History of Private Life: From Pagan Rome to Byzantium*. trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987), 155.

⁹David Shotter, *The Fall of the Roman Republic*, 2nd ed. (London, UK: Routledge, 2005), 27.

¹⁰Michael Grant, *History of Rome* (New York: History Book Club, 1997), 162.

¹¹Max Cary and Howard Hayes Scullard, *A History of Rome: Down to the Reign of Constantine*, 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1975), 185.

¹²Plutarch, *Rome in Crisis Nine Lives by Plutarch: Tiberius Gracchus-Gaius Gracchus-Sertorius-Lucullus-Younger Cato-Brutus-Antony-Galba-Otho*, trans. Ian Scott-Kilvert and Christopher Pelling (London: Penguin Books, 2010), 54.

¹³Niccolò Machiavelli and Bernard R. Crick, *The Discourses*. Reprinted with a new chronology and updated ed. (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 201.

¹⁴Mommsen, *History of Rome*, 554.

¹⁵Grant, *History of Rome*, 245.

¹⁶Goldsworthy, *The Complete Roman Army*, 50.

¹⁷Robert B. Strassler, Victor Davis Hanson, and Richard Crawley, *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*, rev. ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1996) 5. 89.

¹⁸Gaius Sallust, *The War with Catiline*, 11. 5., ed. Bill Thayer, last modified February 1, 2010, http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Sallust/Bellum_Catiline*.html.

¹⁹Veyne, *A History of Private Life*, 106.

²⁰Cary, *A History of Rome*, 276-277; Mackay, *Ancient Rome*, 158.

²¹Appian, *The Civil Wars* trans. John Carter (London: Penguin Books, 1996), 2.143.

²²Ibid., 2.147.

²³Gaius Suetonius, *The Twelve Caesars* trans. Robert Graves (London: Penguin Classics, 2007), 10.1.

²⁴Cary, *A History of Rome*, 285; Appian, *The Civil Wars* 3.51; Suetonius, *The Twelve Caesars: Augustus* 10.6-8; Cary, *A History of Rome*, 286.

²⁵Appian, *The Civil Wars* 3.73; Ibid., 3.88.

²⁶Ibid., 3.94; Grant, *History of Rome*, 242; Cary, *A History of Rome*, 287.

²⁷Appian, *The Civil Wars* 4.5.

²⁸Ibid., 4.35.

²⁹Grant, *History of Rome*, 242; Cary, *A History of Rome*, 291.

³⁰Cary, *A History of Rome*, 292.

³¹Suetonius, *The Twelve Caesars: Augustus* 16.6.

³²Marcel Le Glay et al., *A History of Rome*, 4th ed. (West Sussex, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 165.

³³Cary, *A History of Rome*, 293.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Plutarch, *Lives: Antony* 50.4.

³⁶Suetonius, *The Twelve Caesars: Augustus* 17.1-2.

³⁷Cary, *A History of Rome*, 296; Grant, *History of Rome*, 245.

³⁸ Grant, *History of Rome*, 247; Lawrence Keppie, *The Making of the Roman Army: From Republic to Empire* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 148-149.

³⁹ W. W. Tarn and M. P. Charlesworth, *From Republic to Empire: The Roman Civil War 44 B.C.-27 B.C.* (New York, NY: Barnes & Noble Books, 1996), 154.

⁴⁰ Cary, *A History of Rome*, 318-319.

⁴¹ Grant, *History of Rome*, 249; Cary, *A History of Rome*, 318; Grant, *History of Rome*, 253.

⁴² Cary, *A History of Rome*, 319; Grant, *History of Rome*, 256.

⁴³ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 79.

⁴⁴ Syme, *A Roman Revolution*, 313-314.

⁴⁵ Tarn, *From Republic to Empire*, 156.

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